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ABSTRACT 
This research addresses the issue of diversity of organisational forms in franchising, 
which despite its prevalence, is poorly understood. The research focuses on the choice 
between three categories, consisting of five common types, of franchising: single-unit 
franchising, direct multi-unit (sequential franchising and area development) and indirect 
multi-unit (area representation and subfranchising) franchising forms. 
The thesis presents and tests a contingency model that explores the influence of 
environmental (munificence, complexity and dynamism) and task (task complexity) 
uncertainties on choice of franchising form. Six factors were operationalised to represent 
environmental and task uncertainties. These factors included demand size and growth 
(environmental munificence), demand dispersion and heterogeneity (environmental 
complexity), intensity of rivalry (environmental dynamism) and task complexity (task 
uncertainty) . 
A multi-case study research strategy was conducted to test the contingency model. The 
strategy involved interviews with founders, other franchisor executives and franchisees, 
and also considered documentation and direct observations. The sample comprised a 
heterogeneous selection of seven New Zealand founded franchise systems. Companies 
were theoretically selected to ensure all five types of franchising were represented. 
The findings illustrated general support for the thesis that environmental and task 
uncertainties do influence choices made between alternative franchising forms. Most 
companies adopted types of franchising that were consistent with expectations derived 
from the model. Importantly, however, the overall fit was not neat and conclusive. The 
explanatory power of individual factors varied and in some situations form choices 
occurred contrary to expectations. 
This research produced further important findings. The qualitative methodology 
employed helped uncover five further drivers of franchising form choice. These 
additional factors related to individual choice and the firm, and included incentives, 
growth aspirations, need for control, resource constraints and franchisee aspirations. 
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The findings also confirmed that no one factor or theory was sufficient to explain form 
choice, and the factors important in one company's decision might have little relevance 
to another's. Consequently, multiple perspectives were necessary to understand the 
decisions made by franchisors. 
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INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Introduction 
There are two aspects to franchising that justifY greater attention to this phenomenon from 
organisation and management scholars. First, franchising is becoming ubiquitous. Over 
one-third of all retail sales in the United States pass through franchises making franchising 
a dominant mode of retail entrepreneurship in the United States (Bradach, 1997; Shane, 
1998). The growth rate of franchising is comparable to that of the U.S. economy as a 
whole since 1986, with more than 200 new franchises appearing each year (Lafontaine & 
Shaw, 1998; Shane & Spell, 1998). Second, franchising is a complex phenomenon 
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Outwardly, the franchise chain may seem like a simple 
organisational form seeking to provide a standardised product or service. McDonalds 
exemplifies this replication of a simple business concept, providing stringent selection, 
training, operating and monitoring practices, so that customers receive a similar 
experience at over 8,000 restaurants in the United States and 26,000 worldwide. While 
units of this franchise system and many others appear strikingly similar, beneath may 
reside complex strata of heterogeneous organisational arrangements. Franchising can be 
simultaneously viewed as an organisational arrangement, a governance mechanism or a 
resource exchange process. Even as an organisational arrangement, it is puzzling for two 
reasons. First, franchise systems often comprise both company-owned and franchised units 
(Brickley & Dark, 1987; Caves & Murphy, 1976; Lafontaine & Kaufinann, 1994; Rubin, 
1978; Shane, 1996). Second, franchised units can be linked to the franchisor through two 
arrangements called single-unit and multi-unit franchising (Bradach, 1995; 1998; 
Kaufmann, 1992; Kaufinann & Dant, 1996, 1998; Kaufinann & Kim, 1995; Lowell, 
1991). To add to this complexity, multi-unit forms consist of a variety of organisational 
designs that can be categorised as direct and indirect forms. Despite its ubiquity and 
enigmatic nature, franchising is scarcely mentioned in books that survey the literature in 
organisation theory (Bradach, 1997). 
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This thesis seeks to integrate franchising with extant organisation theory and is motivated 
by a view of franchising primarily as an organisational arrangement. It addresses the issue 
of diversity of organisational forms in franchising, which despite its prevalence, is poorly 
understood (Bradach, 1995, 1998; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995). I 
build on a structural contingency perspective to argue that environmental and task 
contingencies shape organisational forms by influencing organisational design criteria. I 
specify these criteria and show how each design criterion is associated with ex ante and ex 
post transaction costs. In doing so, I seek to shed light on the organisational design 
decisions in franchising by elucidating the role of transaction costs in influencing the 
choice of organisational form. Analysing the phenomenon of franchising as an 
organisational arrangement, I seek to contribute to organisation theory by unbundling the 
concept of fit in terms of transaction costs and by showing how these costs are embedded 
in specific environmental and task contexts. 
This chapter is arranged as follows. First, I present basic aspects of business format 
franchising and define the five dominant organisational forms in franchising. Second, I 
survey the literature on franchising, highlighting theoretical issues and the scope of 
existing multi-unit franchising research. I then explore organisational design issues and 
criteria in franchising, before proposing a framework to theorise about organisational 
design choices in franchising. The framework involves the development of propositions 
that explore the influence of environmental and task uncertainties on franchising form 
choices. I then present the research objectives and questions that govern this research, 
before outlining the structure and content of forthcoming chapters. 
Business Format Franchising 
The focus of this thesis is business format franchising (BFF), which accounts for nearly 
three-quarters of all franchise arrangements in the United States (Combs & 
Castrogiovanni, 1994). Typically, BFF involves the franchisor providing franchisees with 
a comprehensive business package including a product or service, trademark, methods of 
operations, and ongoing guidance (Hoffman & Preble, 1991). Well-recognised sub-sectors 
utilising BFF include fast-food restaurants, domestic cleaners, business services, computer 
equipment, real estate, convenience food stores, auto repair and a variety of other products 
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and services (Justis & Judd, 1986). This can be distinguished from product and trade name 
franchising which uses franchisees to distribute a product under a franchisor's trademark, 
and is common in automobile sales, retail gasoline, and soft drink distribution (Preble, 
1995). 
A franchise relationship involves a franchisor granting franchisees the right to operate a 
business format, comprising a product or service for sale to the market through satellite 
enterprises (Stern & Stanworth, 1994), often in particular locations (Norton, 1988b). The 
franchisor normally charges franchisees an initial fee for this right as well as ongoing 
royalties, typically a percentage of sales (Falbe & Dandridge, 1992; Norton, 1988a, 1988b; 
Rubin, 1978; Shane, 1996). Some also require franchisees to contribute an advertising fee 
to be used solely for advertising expenses (Desai, 1997). The essence of the franchise 
relationship is formalised in a franchise agreement, a legal document that provides legally 
binding obligations and duties on both franchisor and franchisee (Felstead, 1993). 
Franchisor's control may extend over a variety of aspects. These may include products 
sold, price, quality, hours of operation, conditions of the plant, inventory, insurance, 
personnel and accounting and auditing (Felstead, 1993; Rubin, 1978; Shane, 1996). 
Furthermore, the franchisee may be compelled to purchase inputs from the franchisor or 
from a list of approved suppliers (Norton, 1988a, 1988b; Rubin, 1978). The franchisor 
normally provides managerial assistance to the franchisee in areas such as site selection, 
store layout, promotions, an advice hotline, bookkeeping, and so on, though the actual 
extent of ongoing support among franchisors varies (Rubin, 1978). 
The Franchise Association of New Zealand, on its Internet site, defines franchising 
similarly: 
[Franchising] (i)s a method of marketing and distribution whereby a company 
(called the franchisor) expands nationally or internationally by granting a person 
or company (called the franchisee) the right to operate a copy oj its business in 
another geographic area. The right will usually include the ability to use the name, 
the business system and the know-how of the franchisor. 
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The franchisor gains his or her income from initial and ongoing fees paid by the 
franchisee. In return, he or she must provide a variety of services to encourage the 
continuing profitability and growth of the franchisee's business. The franchisee 
pays to set up the business in their area and is the owner of their own business. 
They receive their income from successfully marketing a desirable product or 
service under a promotable brand name. 
Multi-unit Franchising 
Franchise systems can consist of a variety of franchising arrangements that can be broadly 
grouped into two types of organisational arrangements, In single-unit franchising (see 
Figure 1), franchisees operate a single franchise outlet (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). This is 
consistent with a historical image of franchising (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Curran & 
Stanworth, 1983; Norton, 1988b, Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Rubin, 1978). Frequently, a 
franchisee may own more than one outlet leading to multi-unit franchiSing forms (Baucus, 
Baucus & Human, 1993; Bradach, 1995, 1998; Grunhagen & Mittlelstaedt, 2000; 
Kaufmann, 1992; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; Lafontaine & 
Kaufmann, 1994). For example, in the study reported by Bradach (1997), 17 people owned 





Direct Multi-Unit Franchising 
Sequential Franchising Area Development 
Indirect Multi-Unit Franchising 
Area Representation Subfranchising 
I 
______________________ 1 
Adapted/rom Kaufmann & Kim (1995) 
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Broadly, multi-unit franchising forms can be further categorised into two groups the 
direct and the indirect form. In the direct form, a high performing franchisee may be 
permitted to expand and purchase additional franchises on an incremental basis. This is 
called sequential franchising (Kaufinann, 1992; Kaufinann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & 
Kim, 1995). An important implication of sequential franchising is the necessity to hire 
employees as managers as it becomes increasingly difficult for the franchisee to maintain a 
direct operating role with each additional unit (Kaufinann, 1992). Area development 
involves the franchisor granting the franchisee the rights and obligation to establish and 
operate more than one franchised unit within a specific territory. Frequently, a 
development schedule will be agreed upon specifYing a minimum rate of expansion and 
the area developer must have the financial and managerial capacity to develop the units 
(Lowell, 1991). Similar to sequential franchising, area development franchisees recruit 
employees to manage units. Both sequential franchising and area development constitute 
the direct form. However, the franchisor may still retain the right to establish new units 
through company outlets or single-unit franchising. 
In the indirect form, the franchisee is granted the right to provide franchises to other 
parties (Lowell, 1991). This form is called sub franchising. A subfranchisor is responsible 
for regional or local issues affecting subfranchisees such as site selection, training, 
operating assistance and monitoring - tasks normally performed by a franchisor in the 
direct form (Lowell, 1991). In addition, units are more likely to be owner-operated 
compared to the direct forms, although in some instances subfranchisors may also be 
granted the right to own and operate franchises themselves (Justis & Judd, 1986; 
Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; Lowell, 1991). Typically, a development schedule may be 
specified. Area representation is a variation of subfranchising in which the agreement also 
normally involves an exclusive territory and a development schedule (Lowell, 1991). 
Under an area representation agreement the franchisor grants an area representative the 
right to solicit prospective franchisees. The area representative furnishes franchisees with 
supporting services but does not recruit subfranchisees. The type and extent of services 
provided by the area representative also varies and is frequently less than is provided 
under subfranchising agreements (Lowell, 1991). The indirect form comprises of both 
subfranchising and area representation agreements. Again, the franchisor will often 
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reserve the right to establish company-owned operations or franchises within the territory 
offered to subfranchisees and area representatives (Lowell, 1991). 
Direct and indirect forms differ on two important aspects. First, in the indirect form, 
owners are more likely to manage units under subfranchising and area representation 
agreements. In contrast, the direct forms may have more employee-managers. Second, in 
the indirect form there is an additional layer of hierarchy and control between the 
franchisor and unit-level management. While in the indirect forms, contracts exist between 
the franchisor and the subfranchisor/area representatives, on the one hand, and between 
the franchisees and the subfranchisor/area representatives, on the other, the franchisor still 
retains a non-contractual interest in the behaviour of the franchisees as it can influence 
consumer perceptions of the entire chain and, therefore, the franchisor's brand equity. 
Figure 1 illustrates the direct and indirect forms. Franchise systems may comprise more 
than one franchising form. For example, well-known fast-food systems Pizza Hutt and 
McDonalds combine area developers, sequential multi-unit holders, and company-owned 
units, within their franchise systems (Kaufmann, 1993; Kroc, 1985; Love, 1985). 
The definitions of single-unit franchising, sequential franchising, area development, area 
representation and subfranchising are summarised in the Table 1,1 below. 
I F.'anchising Form 
. Single-Unit Franchising 
Sequential Franchising 
Table 1.1 
Summary of Franchising Form Definitions 
Definition 
Franchisees are restricted (by the franchisor) to operating a I 
single franchise outlet. . 
The franchisor permits certain franchisees to expand and 
operate additional franchises on an incremental basis. 
Normally, only high performing franchisees are allowed to 
establish additional franchise units, Additional franchise 
units typically have employees as managers, as it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the franchisee to maintain a direct 





The franchisor grants a franchisee (area developer) the rights 
and obligation to establish and operate more than one 
franchised unit within a specific territory. Frequently, a 
development schedule will be agreed upon specifying a 
minimum rate of expansion and the area developer must 
demonstrate the financial and managerial capacity to develop 
the units. Similar to sequential franchising, area development 
franchisees often recruit employees to manage units. 
Under an area representation agreement, the franchisor 
grants an area representative the right to solicit prospective 
franchisees within a specified territory. The area 
representative then furnishes franchisees with supporting 
services but does not recruit subfranchisees. The type and 
extent of services provided by the area representative also 
varies and is frequently less than is provided under. 
subfranchising agreements. 
The franchisor grants a subfranchisor the right to provide 
franchises to other parties (subfranchisees) within an 
exclusive territory. A subfranchisor is then responsible for 
regional or local issues affecting subfranchisees, such as site 
selection, training, operating assistance and monitoring. 
Individual franchise units are typically owner-operated, 
although in some instances subfranchisors may also be 
granted the right to own and operate franchises themselves. 
Typically, a development schedule will be agreed upon 
specifying a minimum rate of expansion. 
Theoretical Issues in Franchising 
The franchising literature has mostly focused attention on two theoretical issues: (a) why 
do firms choose to franchise? and (b) why do firms operate both company-owned and 
franchised outlets? There are two alternative explanations for why firms choose to 
franchise rather than expand through company ownership. The capital scarcity or resource 
allocation theory argues that firms choose franchising because they lack the necessary 
resources for expansion (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Hunt, 1972). The evolution of this 
viewpoint argues that franchising efficiently delivers resources that growing businesses 
require, but seldom have (Dant, 1995). These resources include (1) financial capital, 
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through access to franchisee funds, (2) human capital, through franchisees who are viewed 
as a self-selected pool of managerial talent, and (3) local market knowledge, through 
franchisees who contribute reliable knowledge of local market conditions to assist site 
selection decisions (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Dant, 1995; Hunt, 1972, 1973; Minkler, 
1990; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Ozanne & Hunt, 1971). 
The second perspective, agency theory (Baiman, 1982, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988, 1989b; 
Levinthal, 1988; Scapens, 1985) views organisational forms as arising out of the relationship 
between principals (franchisors) and agents (franchisees/managers). The theory invokes the 
principle of utility maximisation to argue that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory identifies two 
impediments to effective contractual performance: moral hazard or the lack of effort on the 
part of the agent and adverse selection or the misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). While agency theory has been criticised for its underlying assumptions 
about human behaviour and organisational processes (Donaldson, 1990), it does offer a 
useful framework for examining franchising relationships. It is argued that franchising 
facilitates the reduction of the problems associated with adverse selection and moral 
hazard by making the franchisee the residual claimant on the proceeds of a franchised 
outlet (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Rubin, 1978). Adverse selection 
is reduced, because qualified individuals are more likely to see buying a franchise as 
worthwhile than unqualified individuals (Shane, 1996). Shane (1996) argues that 
predilection exists because expected compensation from residual c1aimancy will fall below 
that of the average wage rate if the prospective franchisee is not qualified. The problem of 
moral hazard is reduced because franchisees, as owners of the units they operate, are more 
likely to perform highly. Franchisees are more motivated because they bear or receive the 
costs and benefits of their own actions (Brickley & Dark, 1987). By contrast, managers of 
company-owned units lack similar incentives to perform, because their remuneration is 
partly fixed salary and determined independently of unit performance (Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 1991). 
The capital scarcity theory has been criticised on two counts. First, it is argued that 
franchisees are a costly source of capital compared to passive investors. This is because 
franchisees have a limited number of outlets and face greater risks. They are likely, 
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therefore, to demand greater returns (Norton, 1995; Rubin, 1990). Second, it is argued 
that agency theory provides a more robust explanation precluding the necessity to invoke 
capital scarcity arguments (Shane, 1998). However, there is indirect support for the capital 
scarcity theory. In one study, access to capital was cited as a reason for franchising by 60 
percent of managers surveyed (Dant, 1995). There is evidence that franchising increases 
and falls in response to interest rate increases (Martin and lustis, 1993). This is seen as a 
support for the capital scarcity theory since interest rates influence the number of capital-
scarce firms in an economy. Agency theory has also received empirical support. Brickley 
and Dark (1987) found that franchising was favoured over company ownership under 
conditions of high monitoring costs, low initial investment cost per unit and high 
frequency of repeat customers per unit. Thompson (1992) found that company ownership 
is favoured in urban areas and in areas where there are large number of units. Studies by 
Thomas, O'Hara, and Musgrave (1990) and Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) also 
support agency theory arguments. 
While each theory has received modest empirical support, it is likely that together they 
may explain why firms choose to franchise. Based on a study of 152 franchisors in the 
fast-food restaurant industry, Kaufinann and Dant (1996) found that the use of multi-unit 
franchising is positively related to growth rates. They argue that such an effect indicates 
that capital scarcity may be the reason for franchisors to use multi-unit franchising. This is 
because multi-unit franchising arrangements cannot control for shirking at the unit level. 
They also found that the level of commitment franchisors feel toward continuing to 
franchise is negatively related to the average number of units per franchisee and negatively 
related to their ability to obtain capital elsewhere. They conclude that this is " .... 
consistent with the idea that agency and capital reasons are working in concert to explain 
franchising" (Kaufinann & Dant, 1996: 355). Combs and Ketchen (1999) tested 
predictions related to firms' franchising decisions based on agency theory and capital 
scarcity hypothesis on a sample of 91 restaurant chains. The study found that, while the 
agency variables were significant predictors of franchising, the capital scarcity variables 
explained additional variance. They concluded: "Such a finding not only sheds light on a 
long-disputed aspect of franchising research but also points to the need for the application 
of multiple theories in studies of franchising literature" (Combs & Ketchen, 1999: 205). 
While both these studies are based on the fast-food industry, making generalisation to all 
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franchise relationships somewhat problematic, the findings do indicate the need for the use 
of mUltiple perspectives for studying organisational arrangements such as franchising. 
Another study (Shane & Foo, 1999) supports the use of multiple perspectives in 
franchising research. They examined the survival of 1292 new franchisors established in 
the U. S. from 1979-1996. Their study supports the use of institutional explanations in 
addition to economic explanations for the survival of new franchisors. 
The second issue that is both puzzling and contentious in franchising is the simultaneous 
operation of both company-owned and franchised outlets in franchise chains. This has not 
received a great deal of attention. Bradach (1997) refers to this simultaneous use of 
company-owned and franchised outlets as the plural form. Why do franchise chains prefer 
the plural form given that they manifest contrasting economic and managerial 
characteristics? Again there are competing explanations for this puzzling phenomenon. 
The economic explanation is based on the use of the promotion-based incentive systems to 
motivate managers. It is argued that in some organisations the economies of scale 
associated with production are such that the corporate hierarchy is not large enough to 
provide promotion-based incentive systems for all lower level managers (Brown, 1998). 
Therefore these organisations decide to franchise since franchising provides an alternative 
incentive system. However, complete franchising is less optimal since the promotion-
based system is more efficient. Thus, the economic model argues that dual distribution or 
the plural form and franchising is a long run equilibrium solution for organisation. 
Bradach (1997) offers an alternative organisational explanation. Based on an ethnographic 
field study of five large U.S. restaurant chains, he argues that the plural form enhances the 
performance of the chain overall by rectifying some of the weaknesses and elevating some 
of the strengths of the company-owned and franchise units. Specifically, he discusses four 
processes - modelling, ratcheting, socialisation and mutual learning - that promote 
uniformity and system-wide adaptation. In his study, franchisees modelled the structure 
and practices of company-owned units to manage their multiple units. Ratcheting involved 
"having each arrangement serve as a benchmark for the other on a variety of performance 
measures" (Bradach, 1998: 8). The socialisation process involved using company people 
as franchisees. Mutual learning refers to the process where the franchisees and company-
owned units complemented each other in generating, testing, selecting and implementing 
new ideas. In the absence of any empirical support for the economic model, Bradach's 
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study offers a richer explanation for the prevalence of the plural form. The most important 
contribution of his study is the need to view organisational design choices in franchising in 
terms of a balance between conflicting demands of standardisation and adaptation. 
Multi-Unit Franchising Research 
Considering the pervasiveness and magnitude of multi-unit franchising there is a notable 
dearth in research examining the complex array of multi-unit forms (Grunhagen & 
Mittelstaedt, 2000~ Kaufmann and Dant, 1998). This section summarises the findings of 
four key studies exploring a variety of issues relating to selected multi-unit franchising 
forms. 
Robicheaux, Dant and Kaufmann (1994) surveyed 160 U.S. fast-food franchisors to 
examine the incidence and operating characteristics of multi-unit franchising. The research 
reported that, on average, 33 per cent of all franchisees could be characterised as multi-
unit franchisees (comprising sequential and area development franchisees), and almost 20 
per cent of multi-unit franchisees held area development agreements. Explaining the 
incidence of these forms, the study reported that area development agreements were more 
common in the chicken and full menu industry segment of the fast-food sector. 
Robicheaux et al (1994) also found that the greater respondents perceptions of franchisee 
and franchisor management difficulties with multi-unit operations, the lower the 
percentage of operators with area development agreements. 
Bradach (1995) compared the effectiveness of two types of franchising forms (1) single-
unit franchising and (2) multi-unit franchising, comprising sequential franchisees and area 
developers only to meet four key management challenges, namely unit growth, 
uniformity, local responsiveness and system-wide adaptations. Bradach addressed these 
issues with an in-depth field study involving semi-structured interviews with personnel 
from five very large and successful U.S. fast-food franchise systems. Bradach proposed 
and found that multi-unit franchisees facilitated more rapid unit growth by obviating the 
need and investment required to attract and select new franchisees for each additional unit. 
He also found that sequential franchising and area development facilitated system-wide 
adaptations, in these huge chains, because the tasks of implementing changes involved 
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persuading a comparatively small number of franchisees who each, in tum, own tens or 
potentially hundreds of units. Single-unit franchising, by contrast, would be more 
cumbersome logistically, and involve the franchisor convincing individual franchisees of 
benefits for each and every unit. On balance, Bradach felt both forms performed equally 
well in addressing the issue of uniformity. Finally, Bradach (1995) found that franchisor 
managers and franchisees felt that single-unit franchisees performed best at addressing the 
challenge of local responsiveness due to incentives associated with ownership and 
management of each unit. 
Kaufmann and Kim (1995) surveyed 169 International Franchise Association members to 
explore growth rates associated with area development and subfranchising forms of master 
franchising. They proposed and found that franchisors that employed these forms of 
master franchising were associated with higher rates of franchise system growth. 
In the final study, Kaufmann and Dant (1996) explored growth and management issues 
associated with multi-unit franchising. This study involved a survey of 156 franchisors in 
the US fast-food industry. Kaufmann and Dant found that the proportion of sequential and 
area development franchisees within a franchise system were positively associated with 
franchise system growth rates. They also found the level of franchisor commitment to 
franchising was negatively related to the number of outlets per franchisee, and the ability 
to obtain capital elsewhere. Consequently, they posited that agency and capital acquisition 
arguments both contribute to the existence of franchising. 
In summary, few studies exploring issues relating to multi-unit franchising. In the 
exceptions, findings are predominately limited to franchise systems within the US fast-
food sector. Furthermore, our knowledge of franchising is further limited as none of these 
studies examine the full complexity of forms that are known to exist. 
Organisational Design Issues in Franchising 
In theorising about the diversity of organisational forms in franchising, I address two 
specific questions: (a) what factors influence the choice between single-unit and multi-unit 
franchising? (b) what factors influence the choice between direct and indirect forms within 
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multi-unit franchising? I build on the structural contingency notion that organisational 
design choices are driven by the need to reduce environmental and task uncertainty (Burns 
& Stalker, 1961; Donaldson, 1987, 1995a, 1995b; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Thompson, 1967). 
Structural contingency theorists posit that individual organisations adapt to their 
environment (Donaldson, 1995a). The environment is regarded as a composite of 
requirements that demand individual organisations to be efficient, innovative, or whatever, 
in order to survive and prosper (Rage and Aiken, 1970; Donaldson, 1995a). It is then 
argued that an individual organisation's management will adopt an organisational 
structure, design, or form that reflects the organisation's environment. 
At the centre of each main structural contingency theory is a contingency factor, or a set of 
contingency factors. The theory then delineates which organisation structure is needed in 
order to operate effectively at each level of the contingency factorls (Donaldson, 1995a). 
For example, in a seminal multi-case study Chandler (1962) argued and found that 
organisations that increased their level of product diversification needed to move from a 
functional to multi-divisional structure, to increase the level of required decentralised 
decision-making. He argued that the multi-divisional form best catered for high levels of 
product diversification, by catering for the complexity through allowing co-ordination of 
each separate product market. By contrast, Chandler's (1962) research also demonstrated, 
through rich qualitative evidence, how low organisational performance would be 
associated with utilising the multi-divisional structure when levels of product 
diversification are low. 
Other studies show how varying environmental factors have led organisations to adopt 
differing levels of size, technology, diversification, bureaucracy, and other factors, each of 
which may be considered a contingency variable in structural contingency theory (e.g., 
Blau, 1970; Chandler, 1962; Donaldson, 1995a; Weber, 1968; Woodward, 1965). 
In this thesis, I argue that organisational designs represent the decision-makers' choices in 
managing different aspects of environmental and task uncertainties (Stinchcombe, 1990). 
In other words, environmental and task dimensions or contingencies influence the choice 
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of organisational form. In order to map the nature of this influence, the environmental and 
task contingencies need to be identified and linked to specific organisational design 
criteria. Therefore, I first operationalise the dimensions of environmental and task 
uncertainty based on the extant literature in structural contingency theory. Second, I 
propose four design criteria based on the extant literature on franchising forms (Bradach, 
1998; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998) and link each criterion to specific dimensions of the 
environment and task uncertainty. 
Structural contingency theory has paid a great deal of attention to the concept of 
environmental uncertainty. There is a well-established literature that conceptualises 
environmental uncertainty in terms of three dimensions. These are munificence or capacity 
of the environment, dynamism or turbulence in the environment and complexity in terms of 
heterogeneity and dispersion (Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan, 
1972; Mintzberg, 1979; Scott, 1981). I operationalise munificence as the size and growth 
of the market. I define demand size as total market sales for a particular product/service 
within a domestic economy. Demand growth refers to the change in total market sales for 
a particular product/service sector within a domestic economy. Accordingly, I propose 
demand size and demand growth as the two variables associated with munificence. I 
propose intensity of rivalry as a measure of environmental dynamism. Intense rivalry leads 
to the introduction of new products and services, calls for flexibility and adaptation and 
heightens uncertainty for rival organisations. Managerial efficiency becomes paramount in 
administering chain units. Intensity of rivalry calls for system-wide efficiency, more 
diligent unit-managers, clear communication, and power to make adaptations and monitor 
effectively on a system-wide basis. I propose demand heterogeneity and demand 
dispersion as measures of environmental complexity. Apart from size, growth and 
heterogeneity, demand may also be geographically dispersed. 
Finally, in structural contingency theory, task uncertainty has been operationalised in 
terms of diversity of outputs, number of different input resources utilised and the level of 
goal difficulty (Galbraith, 1973). I argue that task uncertainty is related to the product/ 
service features of a franchise and operationalise it in terms of product-line breadth, 
number of suppliers and inputs and product complexity. 
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Organisational Design Criteria in Franchising 
I contend that a franchising form must provide for four design criteria: (a) growth by 
adding units, (b) standardisation by ensuring uniformity, consistency and system-wide 
implementation of new ideas, (c) local responsiveness by responding to variations in local 
demand, and (d) management of task complexity. 
The importance of growth as a design criterion is well established in the franchising 
literature. It has been shown that the use of franchising not only overcomes managerial 
limits to growth but also enhances firm growth and survival (Lafontaine, 1992; Kaufmann 
& Dant, 1996; Shane, 1996). In franchise chains, typically growth is associated with 
addition of new units since existing units are unable to grow beyond a certain limit 
imposed by their location (Bradach, 1998). Demand size and demand growth are the two 
key environmental variables associated with growth. The size of the total market 
influences the feasibility of growth. Establishing chain unit and sales growth at a rate 
commensurate with increases in demand is important as any lag means missed 
opportunities, which may result in the creation of new and/or larger competitors. 
The second design criterion is standardisation. Standardisation not only reduces costs by 
achieving economies of scale but also reduces the cost of monitoring quality across units 
(Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). While franchising may convert franchisees into residual 
claimants and take care of the problem of suboptimal effort, it is unable to deal with the 
problem of misdirected effort (Shane, 1996). Hence, monitoring is still needed to minimise 
misdirected effort. Standardisation reduces the cost of monitoring by quantifYing 
subjective properties such as quality or convenience (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). 
Standardisation also reduces costs by minimising duplication of systems and practices. 
Therefore, it is directly associated with a strategy of cost minimisation. However, 
standardisation also affords benefits other than cost minimisation. It permits consistency 
of image and service (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). Uniformity in terms of image and 
service is critical in establishing a favourable market position. Standardisation also 
facilitates the introduction of new products and services by providing the franchisor with 
better information about changes to the system and by facilitating system-wide 
implementation (Kaufmann & Erogiu, 1998). Intensity of rivalry is the environmental 
driver for standardisation. This is because competition reduces profit margins and pushes 
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franchisors towards greater cost savings. As markets get saturated and rivalry intensifies, 
cost minimisation becomes an attractive option. Standardisation helps franchisors to 
reduce costs. 
The third design criterion is local adaptation. Local adaptation is critical when a franchise 
chain operates in diverse or changing markets. Meeting local requirements becomes 
paramount for the unit operator. However, the need for local adaptation may conflict with 
the franchise chain's requirement for uniformity and standardisation (Bradach, 1998; 
Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). Therefore, local adaptation needs to be balanced with 
standardisation. This conflict between adaptation at the local level and standardisation at 
the system level increases the importance of four areas of franchise system management. 
First, chain unit managers must be diligent in order to identify and respond to customer 
wants and be motivated to communicate important market information to the franchisor. 
Second, there must be clear communication paths for accurate and timely flows of 
information. Third, the franchisor must maintain bargaining power over franchisees to 
assist adaptation at the chain-unit level. Finally, bargaining power is also required for 
effective monitoring, to ensure conformity with standardised practices. Local adaptation is 
related to both diversity in markets and the dispersed nature of demand (Kaufmann & 
Eroglu, 1998). Heterogeneous demand requires unit operators to be locally responsive. 
Dispersed demand means chain units must be established in locations geographically 
removed from their franchisor. I expect demand heterogeneity to be associated with local 
adaptation and demand dispersion to be associated with both local adaptation and growth. 
The fourth design criterion is managing task complexity. In a franchise, four features of 
the product/service offerings contribute to task complexity. Product-line breadth (PLB) 
refers to the number of different product types or services that chain units offer to 
customers; accordingly, some businesses may have a narrow while others have a broad 
PLB. For example, a specialist retailer may carry a smaller range of stock compared to a 
general retailer. Number of suppliers refers to the number of separate entities from whom a 
franchise sources products that are offered to customers. The number of inputs refers to 
the number of product inputs involved in the product/service offering. Finally, product 
complexity refers to the relative simplicity/complexity of preparing the product/service 
mix for customers. PLB, the number of suppliers and the number of inputs also affect 
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product complexity. I propose that product/service features of a franchise drive the need to 
manage task complexity. 
These four structural requirements with their associated environmental/task dimensions 
are summarised in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 
Environmental & Task Dimension and Organisational Design Criteria 
in Franchising 
Environmentalrrask Dimensions Based 
. on Structural Contingency Theory 
Munificence operationalised as demand 
size & demand growth 
Dynamism operationalised as intensity of 
rivalry 
Complexity operationalised as demand 
heterogeneity & demand dispersion 
Task Complexity operationalised as 
product-line breadth, number of suppliers, 
I number of inputs and product complexity 
Organisational Design Criteria 




Management of Task Complexity 
To summanse, environmental and task contingencies influence the choice of design 
criteria in franchising. Given specific environmental and task contingencies, franchisors 
must choose an organisational form that is superior in meeting the design criterion 
associated with the specific environmental or task dimension. The notion of "fit" or 
alignment in structural contingency theory captures this idea of linking environmental/task 
drivers with organisational design attributes of fit (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985). However, 
in this thesis I have adopted a different approach. I depart from contingency theory by 
including two other sources of uncertainty that are ignored by the theory. 
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Choice of Organisational Form in Franchising 
The central idea in contingency theory is that environmental and task uncertainties 
influence the design of organisational forms. However, these two sources of uncenainty 
do not exhaust all the sources of uncertainty that impinge on an organisation. There are 
other significant sources of uncertainty that impact on organisational design choices. As 
Stinchcombe (1990) notes, one of the most complex uncertainties facing organisations is 
about the ability and willingness of people to do the work. This is particularly significant 
in the franchising context. Franchisors face two types of uncertainty relating to the ability 
and willingness of people. First, franchisors face uncertainty while recruiting potential 
franchisees. They may be unsure about the franchisee's ability to manage the unit in the 
over -all interest of the chain. They need to be able to attract the right people, select the 
most competent, and train them adequately to ensure over-all effectiveness. Second, 
franchisors face uncertainty with regard to franchisees' performance. They may be unsure 
whether the franchisees have extended optimal effort in the over-all interest of the chain. 
They need to motivate, monitor and manage the franchisees to ensure the over-all 
effectiveness of the chain. 
These uncertainties impose significant costs on the franchisor. Using transaction costs 
economics terminology, I refer to them as ex ante and ex post costs. Ex ante costs refer to 
the costs associated with attracting, selecting, training, and establishing franchisees. Ex 
post costs refer to the costs associated with motivating, managing, monitoring franchisees 
and also ensuring conformity of franchisees with standardised practices. Alternatively, the 
two types of uncertainties can also be conceptualised within an agency theory framework. 
The first type of uncertainty that relates to franchisee recruitment and ability is a problem 
of adverse selection or hidden information while the second type of uncertainty relating to 
franchisee willingness is a problem of moral hazard or hidden effon (Arrow, 1985; 
Bergen, Dutta & Walker, 1992). 
Agency theory and transaction costs economics have both commonalties and differences. 
They both emphasise a managerial discretion set-up and efficient contracting but differ 
with respect to unit of analysis, focal cost concern and contractual focus (Williamson, 
1988). I contend that ex ante and ex post costs can be analysed using an agency theory 
framework. I support this argument by showing how ex post costs can be viewed in 
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agency theory terms. Ex post costs are made up of two components motivational costs, 
that is, the costs of motivating unit managers and standardisation costs, which are costs 
associated with ensuring uniformity and adaptation of standardised practices. The 
motivational problems are reduced to a great extent by making franchisees residual 
claimants. In accordance with agency theory, I expect franchisees or owner-operators to be 
more motivated than employee-managers in ensuring optimal performance of their units. 
Therefore, I expect franchisors to incur lower costs in motivating owner-operators 
compared to employee-managers. Indirect forms have more owner-operators than 
employee-managers in comparison with the direct forms. Therefore, I expect indirect 
forms to be associated with lower motivational costs. On the other hand, centralisation of 
decisions about uniform practices tends to reduce standardisation costs. When decision-
making is delegated, as in indirect forms, I expect standardisation costs to be higher due to 
duplication of systems and procedures. Therefore, I expect indirect forms to have 
relatively higher standardisation costs compared to the direct forms. 
Each design criterion emphasises one type of cost over the other. In the following section, 
I show that ex ante costs are associated with growth. Standardisation and local 
responsiveness require greater attention to ex post costs. Task complexity is associated 
with both ex ante and ex post costs. Figure 2 summarises my arguments. 
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Figure 2 
Relationship between Environmental/Task Factors, 
Design Criteria and Transaction Costs 
I En.,.m", ... ,,1>Iff.,k D,;",,, De~"ll Cri'i!ria Type of Cost 
Demand Size 
Demand Gro\Vth Gro\Vth ----lI'-II' E.'! ante 
Demand DispeISion 
.,.. Local .. l!. . daptation 
Demand Heterogeneity .------..,..., 
----lI'-1I' Ex post 
Intensity ofRivahy ---_II' Standardisation ----lI'-1I' Ex post 
Task Complexity ---_II' t.llarlilgement of II' Ex ante 
Task C·omplexity ----~ 
Ex post 
Franchising forms differ in their ability to mitigate these costs. Therefore, comparison of 
costs offers a way to choose an optimal structure. More importantly, analysing these two 
uncertainties in terms of transaction costs is a useful way to unpack the notion of fit that is 
central to structural contingency theory. I analyse fit in terms of transaction costs and 
choose the form that minimises these costs. In the following sections, I consider each of 
the environmental and task contingencies and analyse their impact on single and multi-unit 
franchising in the first instance in terms of transaction costs. Subsequently, I compare 
direct and indirect forms within multi-unit franchising in terms these ex ante and ex post 
costs. 
Influence of Environmental uncertainty 
Munificence 
Demand size and demand growth constitute munificence. Both demand size and demand 
growth require the design to emphasise growth. Ex ante costs are crucial in assessing 
designs for growth. Higher demand size requires more units to be established and 
21 
managed imposing significant capital requirements and managerial burden on the 
franchisor. While the single-unit form provides the franchisor with direct control and, 
therefore, lowers ex post costs, multi-unit franchising enables the franchisor to economise 
on ex ante costs. This is not without disadvantages: owner involvement in units is reduced 
(Kaufmann, 1992) and franchisees acquire bargaining power with additional units 
(Kaufmann & Lafontaine, 1994; Lowell, 1991). However, franchisors may be willing to 
trade-off control for lower ex ante costs. Therefore, I propose: 
Proposition One: When demand size is high, multi-unit franchising forms 
will be more prevalent compared to the Single-unit form. 
Given that multi-unit forms will be more prevalent, how does a franchisor choose between 
a direct and an indirect form? Both forms will lower ex ante costs compared to the single-
unit franchising form; therefore I need to compare the motivational and standardisation 
cost components of the ex post costs. A direct form will have more employee-managers 
compared to an indirect form. Therefore, indirect forms with owner-operators will 
minimise motivational, but will compromise standardisation costs by duplicating the 
franchisors' role through master franchisees. On the other hand, direct forms minimise 
standardisation costs by providing franchisor support directly but jeopardise motivational 
costs through having more employee-managers. The franchisor is left to choose between 
faster growth through lower motivational costs in the indirect forms and advantages of 
greater standardisation in the direct forms. Therefore, the choice between direct and 
indirect forms is influenced by the franchisor's preference for standardisation versus rapid 
growth. Therefore, I propose: 
Proposition Two: When demand size is high, the choice between direct and 
indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's strategic choice. 
Single-unit franchising has lower growth potential because franchisors recruit, train and 
socialise new franchisees for each additional franchised unit. In other words, the ex ante 
costs of this form are high. Through enabling existing franchisees to expand, I anticipate 
multi-unit forms to yield greater growth prospects, while also economising on franchisor 
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resources. In terms of sales growth at the outlet level, however, I expect single-unit 
franchising to perform best. Direct multi-unit forms involve decreasing owner 
involvement, and hence productivity, in individual units. I expect that while sales growth 
per individual unit is compromised, these multi-unit forms provide greater potential for 
growth in the number of units, leading to larger overall growth. Indirect forms are also 
likely to enable faster growth in units as franchisors focus scarce resources on recruiting 
and training master franchisees that, in turn, establish and support multiple units within 
specified territories. Thus, with the recruitment of several master franchisees, these forms 
enable the simultaneous development of units in multiple markets/territories. In terms of 
sales growth at the unit level these forms should perform similar to the single-unit form 
since they preserve owner-involvement at the unit-level. In summary, I propose the 
following: 
Proposition Three: When demand growth is high, multi-unit franchiSing 
forms will be more prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
The strategic choice between standardisation and faster growth will mediate the choice 
between direct and indirect multi-unit forms. Sequential franchising and area development 
attempt to achieve growth while preserving cost efficiencies through centralising 
franchisor support. However, they compromise unit-level growth by reducing owner-
involvement in unit-level operations. Conversely, area representation and subfranchising 
preserve owner involvement to maximise output at the unit leveL However, by duplicating 
the franchisor's role in different markets using master franchisees, they compromise 
standardisation costs. Hence, I propose the following: 
Proposition Four: When demand growth is high, the choice between direct 
and indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's strategic choice. 
Complexity 
I operationalise complexity as demand heterogeneity and demand dispersion. Demand 
heterogeneity imposes conflicting demands on the franchisor. On the one hand, units need 
to be responsive to local demand. This may require units to adopt different practices and 
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will, therefore, be in conflict with the system's requirement for standardised practices. The 
franchisor needs to balance the conflicting demands of standardisation and local 
responsiveness. Both standardisation and local adaptation are related to ex post costs. 
Therefore, under conditions of heterogeneous demand, ex post costs become crucial. In 
keeping with agency theory, I expect that owner-managers will be more diligent and 
therefore more motivated than employee-managers to identifY and respond to different 
customer requirements and pass information on to the franchisor. Accordingly, I propose 
single-unit franchising will perform well in this regard. This receives some empirical 
support from Bradach's (1998) five-chain study, where he notes multi-unit franchisees 
providing fewer ideas compared to hands-on owner operators. The power each form 
provides the franchisor to effectively make adaptations and monitor chain units becomes 
increasingly important with heterogeneous demand. Single-unit franchising provides the 
most appropriate form because franchisor's power to make changes is reduced in multi-
unit forms (Kaufinann & Lafontaine, 1994; Lowell, 1991). In indirect forms such as area 
representation and subfranchising, unit management diligence should be similar to single-
unit franchising, as each form is likely to have owner-managers. However, area 
representation and subfranchising are likely to reduce the effectiveness of adaptations and 
monitoring since they compromise standardisation costs. Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition Five: When demand heterogeneity is high, the single-unit 
franchising form will be more prevalent compared to multi-unit forms. 
Demand dispersion requires the establishment and management of geographically isolated 
outlets. Therefore, both ex ante and ex post costs may be important. Ex ante costs are 
highest with single-unit franchising where new franchisees are recruited for each unit. 
Direct multi-unit forms economise on these costs. Sequential franchising enables the 
franchisor to economise on these costs through expanding existing high performing, 
established and experienced franchisees. Granting an exclusive territory for multiple units 
from the outset, as in area development, lowers ex ante costs further. 
When demand is dispersed, ex post costs are also crucial. A number of studies (Brickley & 
Dark, 1987; Brickley, Dark & Weisbach, 1991; Norton, 1988a) proposed and found that 
the proportion of franchisee-owned units to company-owned units is greater with distance 
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from franchisor headquarters. They concluded that employee-managers need more 
monitoring for sub-optimal effort than franchisees because they do not have residual 
claims tied to the performance of their unit. Following this, I expect sequential franchising 
and area development will incur greater ex post costs, since they have employee-managers 
who require supervision for sub-optimal and misdirected effort. In terms of ex post costs, I 
expect the prevalence of single-unit franchising to be higher with high demand dispersion. 
Compared to single-unit franchising, indirect forms such as area representation and 
sub franchising reduce ex ante franchising costs as master franchisees under each 
arrangement undertake activities normally performed by the franchisor. Subfranchising 
reduces these costs most since franchisors delegate more responsibilities with this form. 
They also reduce ex post costs. An area representative may, and a subfranchisor almost 
certainly will, be granted tasks associated with monitoring franchisees within their 
territory. These forms, and especially subfranchising, are also likely to reduce costs 
normally associated with the franchisor performing such tasks. Therefore, I expect that 
area representation and subfranchising will be more likely to be adopted with dispersed 
demand. 
In summary, with high dispersion of demand, both ex ante and ex post costs point to 
increased prevalence of indirect forms such as area representation and subfranchising. In 
terms of ex ante costs, I expect the increased prevalence of direct forms such as sequential 
franchising and area development. However, the opposite appears to be true in terms of ex 
post costs. I expect that the savings from ex ante costs will be greater than additional costs 
of monitoring that will increase the ex post costs. Thus, I propose the following: 
Proposition Six: When demand dispersion is high, multi-unit forms will be 
more prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
Proposition Seven: When demand dispersion is high, indirect multi-unit 
forms will be more prevalent compared to direct multi-unit forms. 
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Dynamism 
I operationalise dynamism as intensity of rivalry. Intensity of rivalry requires the structure 
to be competitive in terms of being efficient, maintaining uniformity, introducing new 
products and services and facilitating system-wide adaptation. Therefore, standardisation 
is the crucial structural requirement associated with rivalry. Standardisation is directly 
related to ex post costs. Therefore, intense rivalry increases the importance of ex post 
costs. I expect single-unit franchising to provide more diligent management than direct 
forms such as sequential franchising and area development since owners are more likely to 
be managers. I also expect sequential franchising to be better than area development since 
area development is likely to result in a greater prevalence of employee-managers. Single-
unit franchising is also less likely to result in the delay, distortion, exclusion or loss of 
important market information than sequential franchising and area development. This is 
because franchisees are more likely to report directly to the franchisor. Multi-unit forms 
such as sequential franchising and area development are likely to be less effective in 
communicating as employee managers first communicate with the franchisee who passes 
the information to the franchisor. Thus, potential for delay, distortion, exclusion or loss of 
important information is increased (Stern & EI Ansery, 1977). Furthermore, franchisor 
power for influencing and monitoring system-wide adaptations is likely to be lower with 
sequential franchising and area development (Kaufinann & Lafontaine, 1994; Lowell, 
1991), and I expect area development to reduce this power the most. Thus, these two are 
likely to impede both the speed and quality of chain unit adaptations. Therefore, the 
single-unit franchising form has lower ex post franchising costs compared to the direct 
forms such as sequential franchising and area development. Inefficiencies are likely to be 
greatest in area development with a higher proportion of employee managers. 
Like single-unit franchising, indirect forms such as area representation and subfranchising 
are likely to provide diligent owners as managers. Franchisor power for influencing and 
monitoring system-wide adaptations, however, is likely to be lower with area 
representation and subfranchising, and I expect sub franchising to reduce this power the 
most. Thus, these two are also likely to impede both the speed and quality of chain unit 
adaptations. Compared to single-unit franchising, standardisation costs are higher in area 
representation and subfranchising through additional hierarchy. Inefficiencies in this area 
are likely to be greatest with subfranchising because subfranchisors are delegated higher 
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levels of responsibility compared to area representatives. In conclusion, I propose the 
following: 
Proposition Eight: When intensity of rivalry is high, single-unit franchising 
will be more prevalent compared to the multi-unit forms. 
Influence of Task Uncertainty 
The remaining four factors that can influence the choice of a franchise form are product-
line breath, number of suppliers, number of inputs and product complexity. Different 
levels of each factor impact on the complexity of unit-management. The more complex the 
task, the harder it is to find competent operators for the units. High task complexity 
requires greater emphasis on recruiting unit-managers, unit management decision-making, 
ensuring the quality of training and support, providing clear communication, and 
monitoring quality. Therefore, task complexity requires attention to both ex ante and ex 
post costs. With increasing task complexity, quality of decision-making, the quality of 
training and support and the quality of monitoring the franchise holders and unit managers 
become paramount. Ex ante costs will be higher due to the difficulties associated with 
attracting and selecting high-quality unit-managers. However, hiring high quality unit-
managers will reduce ex post costs because they are likely to make high quality decisions, 
need less training, monitoring and support. 
Ex ante costs will be lowest with single-unit franchising. The quality of individuals 
recruited will also be highest with single-unit franchising because the franchisor 
individually recruits and forms contracts with owner-managers. In contrast, in direct multi-
unit forms, sequential franchisees and area developers are more likely to recruit employees 
as managers, increasing the risks of poor selection. This risk is greater with area 
development due to the exclusive rights to multiple outlets units from the outset. Also, 
single-unit franchising is less likely to result in the delay, distortion, exclusion or loss of 
important market information compared to both sequential franchising and area 
development. 
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Compared to single-unit franchising, I also expect indirect forms such as area 
representation and sub franchising to have higher ex post costs, due to the relative levels of 
responsibilities delegated to intermediaries. I expect recruitment quality to be poorest with 
subfranchising, since the franchisor has less involvement in this process. Compared to 
single-unit franchising, I expect area representation and subfranchising to compromise the 
quality of training and support. This is, again, due to the increasing responsibilities 
delegated to area representatives and subfranchisors. The quality of monitoring is also 
likely to decrease with area representation and sub franchising as monitoring is delegated 
to master franchisees. My analysis suggests the following proposition: 
Proposition Nine: When task complexity is high, the single-unit franchising 
form will be more prevalent compared to the multi-unit forms. 
Research Objectives and Questions 
The objective of this research is to determine what factors influence the choice of 
franchising forms. Accordingly, two research questions address this objective and guide 
the research: 
1. Do environmental and task uncertainties influence the choice of franchising forms? 
2. What other factors influence the choice of franchising forms? 
The conceptual model presented in this chapter drives the first research question. 
Accordingly, my goal for this research is to test the logic and direction of my propositions. 
Specifically, I seek to determine whether, as predicted, demand size, growth, dispersion 
and heterogeneity, intensity of rivalry and task complexity influence the choice of 
franchising forms. The second research question is more circumspect and seeks to identify 
and explain other important factors that influence decisions pertaining to the selection of 
franchising forms. 
While addressing the research objective and questions outlined above, it is important to 
note the following important limitation of scope associated with this study. This thesis 
focuses on what factors influence local franchisors choice of franchising forms within a 
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domestic context. Consequently, the research does not examine factors which influence 
local franchisors choice of franchising forms for use within other countries, nor does it 
exam factors that influence foreign franchisors choice of franchising forms for use within 
the local domestic market. 
Thesis Structure 
This chapter began describing the ubiquitous nature of franchising and multi-unit 
franchising. It then explored theoretical issues in franchising and the current scope of 
research addressing multi-unit franchising. Organisational design issues and criteria 
specific to franchising were subsequently considered. An examination of the choice of 
organisational forms in franchising then followed. That examination involved the 
development of a conceptual model, including propositions exploring the influence of 
environmental and task uncertainties on choice of franchising form. Chapter 1 then 
concluded by stating the research objectives and questions governing this research. 
The remaining thesis structure is organised as follows. Chapter 2 outlines and describes 
the methodology utilised in this research. The methodology chapter contains information 
on case study research, the preliminary study, case and informant selection, data collection 
and analysis, validity and reliability, and limitations. Chapters 3, 4 & 5 then follow, 
introducing case descriptions of franchise systems utilising single-unit franchising, direct 
multi-unit franchising and indirect multi-unit franchising forms, respectively. 
Chapter 6 presents the analysis and findings generated from this research. It draws on case 
descriptions from the three preceding chapters to test the influence of environmental and 
task uncertainties on choice of franchising form .. The chapter then illuminates and 
discusses a range of additional factors. These additional factors include individual and 
firm specific variables shown to influence form choice. Chapter 6 concludes with an 
overview that more clearly illustrates the variety of factors that influence specific 
decisions between alternative franchising forms. 
The final chapter, Chapter 7, restates the key findings from this research. It then discusses 
these findings in the context of current research, before exploring the implications for both 
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This chapter outlines the case study methodology used in this research. I begin by restating 
the research objectives and questions governing the study, before defining and discussing 
the selection of a case study research strategy. Following this, I explain the research 
design. This covers details of a preliminary study undertaken, the unit of analysis for 
individual cases, case selection, choice of informants, data collection and data analysis. I 
then conclude the chapter by discussing validity and reliability issues, and limitations, 
associated with my approach. 
Multi-Case Study Approach 
In keeping with my research objective and research questions I adopt a case study 
approach. As stated at the end of the previous chapter, the primary objective for this 
research is to determine what factors influence the selection of franchising forms. 
Accordingly, my research questions seek to determine (l) whether environmental and task 
uncertainties influence the choice of franchising forms, and (2), what other factors 
influence the choice of franchising forms. 
A case study methodology is appropriate to this research because I seek to describe, 
generate and test theory (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994; 
Yin, 1994). A case study approach is also advantageous for a number of other reasons. 
First, it allows for important contextual conditions that may be highly pertinent to the 
selection and utilisation of alternative franchising forms (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994). It allows the investigation to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 1994) by focusing on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
A second important reason for adopting a case study approach is its unique ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence, that includes interviews, questionnaires, secondary data 
31 
and observations (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1981, 1994). 
Finally, the closeness to detail and familiarity with ongoing organisations that this type of 
approach provides, can often prove more attractive to practising managers, than the 
abstract variables characterised by much quantitative research (Bryman, 1989). 
Case study research can involve the investigation of one or many cases. I adopt a multi-
case or collective case study (Stake, 1994). By examining several cases, I seek to achieve 
both a better understanding and better theorising about the phenomenon of interest than 
would be achievable from a single case (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1994). Moreover, the 
reasons for adding cases (hence multi-case) are twofold: the generalisability of the 
research is enhanced and the opportunity for comparisons allows the special features of 
cases to be identified more readily (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Huberman & Miles, 
1994; Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
Over the years, case study methodology has been subject to three common criticisms and 
perceived weaknesses. The most significant criticism relates to what Yin (1994, p. 9) 
describes as a "lack of rigor," with roots where "the case study investigator has been 
sloppy and has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of 
findings and conclusions." Following Yin (1994) I seek to overcome this criticism 
through the development, and adherence to, a thoughtfully formulated and structured 
research design. A second criticism relates to the generalis ability of findings (Bryman, 
1989; Yin 1994), and a common misconception starting with the failure to appreciate what 
Yin (1994, p.30) describes as "analytic generalisation," as distinct from the more 
traditional "statistical generalisation." Whereas statistical generalisation seeks inferences 
to a larger population on the basis of empirical data collected about a sample, the purpose 
of analytic generalisation is to expand and generalise to theories (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 
1994). More specifically, the method of generalisation using multiple cases is analytic 
generalisation, where previous theory is used as a template with which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same 
theory, then replication may be claimed. The third area of concern relates to the length of 
time case studies take to prepare, and the ensuing formulation of enormous, unreadable 
documents (e.g. Miles, 1979). Again following Yin (1981, 1994), I attempted to avoid this 
pitfall through the development of a clear conceptual framework. A thorough 
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understanding of these concerns and criticisms are clearly important, not only to defend 
the methodology chosen, but also to ensure that each is countered, as much as practicable. 
Preliminary Study 
Preliminary interviews were undertaken prior to the multi-case study in order to obtain a 
broader understanding of the issues surrounding the utilisation and choice of franchising 
forms within the New Zealand franchise market. As Yin (1994) notes, a good grasp of the 
issues being studied helps keep you on target, particularly during the data collection stage. 
Seven loosely structured interviews were conducted with a heterogeneous sample 
compnsmg a specialist franchise consultant, franchise lawyer, franchise magazine 
publisher, franchise banker and three franchisors. Interviewees were selected for their 
knowledge and experience of franchising in New Zealand. All were past or present board 
members of the New Zealand Franchise Association (NZFA). The sample also included 
the present and immediate past chairman of that association. In the absence of other 
signals or indicators, it seemed logical that individuals holding NZF A board positions 
would be knowledgeable about franchising in New Zealand. 
Interviewees were questioned about their knowledge of different types of franchising and 
asked to identify New Zealand-founded examples of each type. Interviewees were then 
asked to: 1) identify what factors contribute to franchising form choice, and 2) explain 
how these factors influence franchising form choice. Interviews ranged from 40 to 120 
minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Transcripts were then 
content analysed and coded on a sentence-by-sentence basis. I then reviewed the 
transcripts for recurrent themes and patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1994). 
The preliminary interviews provided important insights. The interviews improved my 
knowledge of the prevalence of franchising forms in New Zealand. Valuable insights also 
included an increased awareness of the factors influencing franchising form choice, and 
how this occurs. The factors identified corresponded with many of those in the conceptual 
model, but also included additional factors that were not, such as a desire for growth and 
control, and incentives. These insights assisted numerous areas of the thesis. For example, 
new insights strengthened the conceptual model by confirming the importance of many 
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factors, and highlighting gaps in the logic underlying certain propositions. Insights assisted 
case selection by identifying the forms of several New Zealand-founded franchise 
systems. A more in-depth understanding also assisted data collection by improving my 
interviewing technique and ability to keep interviews on track. Finally, data analysis was 
assisted through an advanced awareness and understanding of potential factors and 
relationships. 
This thesis was assisted further from insights gained from another research project I led 
(Floyd & Fenwick, 1999). Using a multi-case study methodology, the research project 
explored the problems and challenges experienced by franchisors attempting to expand 
their franchise systems. The research involved 10 franchisors from five different business 
sectors. Evidence collected for that research included the type of franchising form utilised. 
This research benefited from me revisiting that evidence. in the context of this thesis's 
objectives. The evidence provided me with further background knowledge and three cases 
to approach for the current project. 
Finally, participating In New Zealand Franchise Association (NZF A) events further 
improved my understanding of :.Jew Zealand franchising. From 1996 through 2000 I 
attended several regional NZF A breakfast and lunch meetings, three-day nationwide 
conferences and franchise expositions. 
Research Design 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis selected to satisfY the research objectives and propositions is the 
franchising form within a single franchise system. Thus, a particular franchising form 
utilised in a single franchise system constitutes one case. 
Case Selection 
Careful case selection is acknowledged to be of critical importance in case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1994). This is because 
our ability to understand the phenomena is dependent on choosing well. Cases were 
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selected for theoretical reasons rather than statistical reasons (Bryman, 1988; Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Cases were chosen to fill the 
three different categories of franchising forms outlined in the conceptual model: single-
unit, direct multi-unit and indirect multi-unit franchising. Thus, the sample was selected to 
extend theory to a broad range of organisations and forms (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Multiple 
cases within categories also allowed findings to be replicated within categories 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
In total seven cases were selected. This total corresponded nicely with Eisenhardt's 
(l989a, p. 545) recommendations that "with fewer than 4 cases it is often difficult to 
generate theory ... with more than 10 cases it quickly becomes more difficult to cope with 
the complexity and the volume of the data." 
Four important criteria were identified a priori to guide case selection. The first criterion 
required cases provide an accurate representation of the three primary categories of form. 
Additionally, good matches were also sought for the different forms that make up both 
direct (i.e., sequential franchising and area development) and indirect (area representation 
and sub franchising) multi-unit franchising forms. The second criterion limited cases to 
New Zealand founded franchise systems. International systems with local operations were 
excluded in an attempt to limit extraneous variation (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
The third criterion limited the sample to mature firms. Mature firms were selected for two 
important reasons. First, I wanted to ensure the firm and form combinations studied were 
viable. Like Bradach (1992: 38) "1 did not want my findings confounded by data from 
chains that were fads or who had not demonstrated viable organisational arrangements." 
Second, 1 wanted informants who were experienced and knowledgeable of the challenges 
associated with managing their business and franchise network under a range of trading 
conditions. Looking to the sample (Table 2 below), the majority (5/7) had ten or more 
years franchising experience. Further, six from seven were leaders, in terms of number of 
units, in their respective sectors, and, three had won important Franchise Association of 
New Zealand awards. The fourth and final criterion required cases to provide sufficient 
access to information. This meant informants needed to be available who were both 
willing and knowledgeable of (and preferably, influential in) their organisation's form 
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decision-making process. 
All franchising forms were confirmed in telephone conversations. These were often 
lengthy. Most informants were unaware of one or more forms. Further, most informants 
applied different labels to the same forms. Consequently, I often needed to provide a full 
explanation of the various forms, and much questioning was required, to determine the 
formls utilised within a particular firm. The task of satisfYing this criterion was also 
challenging as pure or perfect examples of form appeared rare in mature franchise 
systems. Often, for example, two or more forms were present, or firms were changing 
from one form to another. Further challenge existed due to the apparent scarcity of two 
forms, area representation and area development, in New Zealand-founded franchise 
systems. The sampling process attempted to overcome these difficulties and find the best 
possible fit between theory and practice. The selection of individual cases (see Table 2 





Company Area of Business FOnD Age Years Franchise 
(years) Franchising Units 
MortCo Mortgage broking services Single-unit franchising 9 2 27 
SportCo Sports equipment retail Single-unit franchising 36 16 50 
VideoCo Video hire Sequential franchising 10 10 88 
RealCo Residential real estate sales Sequential franchising 112 10 145 
Area development 
Snacl<Co Locatable snack trays. Converting from 9 8 36 
Honesty box system single-unit franchising 
to area representation 
Sel'"vCo Home services Subfranchising 11 10 550+ 
FastCo Courier services Subfranchising 17 16 350+ 
MortCo and SportCo were selected to represent single-unit franchising. MortCo closely 
characterises a pure single-unit form. With 27 franchises there was one exception: in one 
agreement two partners were allowed to operate as Mortgage Consultants. With 43 of 50 
stores operated by owner-operators, SportCo also closely characterises a single-unit form. 
However, two exceptions were noted. Two separate franchisees own two stores each. 
Further, another franchisee owned one store outright and had shares in two others. That 
franchisee, and a separate franchisee partner for each store jointly owned those two further 
stores. Despite these differences, SportCo satisfied my conceptualisation of single-unit 
franchising for at least three reasons. First, the single-unit franchising form dominated. 
Pure owner-operators operated 43 stores and the remaining stores maintained high levels 
of owner-involvement. Second, SportCo were committed to continuing with the single-
unit form. SportCo considered owner-involvement to be highly important. Third, and 
finally, no future franchisees would be allowed to wholly purchase and operate additional 
SportCo franchises. 
VideoCo and RealCo represent direct multi-unit franchising. Both firms provided good 
examples of this category. At VideoCo, 20 percent of units were controlled by multi-unit 
franchisees while at RealCo the figure exceeded 50 percent. However, while these firms 
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provided a good representation of direct multi-unit franchising generally, difficulties arose 
in finding a pure representation of the area development form. Moreover, it appeared New 
Zealand-founded franchise systems rarely used area development at all in the domestic 
market. After much research and consideration, RealCo was selected to represent this 
form. At least two limitations should be noted, however. First, RealCo also utilised 
sequential franchising. Second, the operation of area development at RealCo was on a 
small scale. While the definition of area development conjures images of area 
development franchisees with large numbers of units, RealCo area developers had 
between two and five offices. Despite these limitations, I felt both firms provided a good 
representation of direct multi-unit franchising forms generally. Further, with both utilising 
sequential franchising, and one also adopting area development, useful comparisons could 
be made within this category. 
ServCo, FastCo and SnackCo represented indirect multi-unit forms. Of these, ServCo 
and F astCo provided examples of subfranchising while SnackCo represented area 
representation. While good examples of subfranchising were identified, no working 
example of area representation could be found. Finally, after much research, I identified 
SnackCo advertising for franchisees characteristic of area representatives. Ironically, this 
franchise· system was founded and managed by a franchisor interviewed in the preliminary 
study. Importantly, while SnackCo was committed to adopting area representation (from 
single-unit franchising), I could not find a working example. Consequently, Snackeo was 
not experienced with area representation. Despite that lack of operational experience, I felt 
that the inclusion of SnackCo to represent area representation was warranted for at least 
three reasons. First, no working example could be found. Second, because SnackCo was 
committed to utilising the area representation form, I would be able to solicit the factors 
leading to that decision. Finally, the newness of SnackCo's transition provided certain 
advantages. Specifically, the factors leading to the decision were more likely to be fresh in 
informants' minds. In addition, the absence of experience utilising that form limited 
potential bias through post hoc rationalisation. 
Choice of Informants 
As described in the following section, interviews provided the primary source of case 
information. Given the primacy of interview data in this case, selecting key informants 
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was critical to satisfYing my research objectives (Yin, 1994). To obtain a rich and 
balanced understanding of each case, a cross-section of informants were selected from 
within each firm. Respondents were sought from the franchisor and franchisee level. 
Consistent with my research objectives, the founders or owners of the franchisor 
constituted the primary informants in the investigation. It seemed logical that these 
respondents would be most knowledgeable about the factors influencing decisions 
pertaining to form (Bogdon & Bilden, 1992). In one case, however, a founder/owner was 
not available. Fortunately, the franchisor executive alternative was both experienced and 
influential in the form decision-making process, and able to provide necessary information 
and insight. One or more senior executive/s were also selected to supplement these 
interviews at the franchisor level. Only in one case was this requirement relaxed. At 
Snackeo, a knowledgeable second informant was not available. Fortunately, limitations 
that might otherwise have appeared were minimised by the depth of information provided 
by the founder. 
Franchisees were included in the research for a number of reasons. First, because of the 
interdependent nature of a franchise relationship, including the franchisees' perspective is 
critical to obtaining a rich and balanced understanding of the case. As indicated later in the 
RealCo case, the franchisees' perspective and influence can feature prominently in 
franchisor decision-making pertaining to form choice. Second, franchisees were able to 
provide important detail on unit-operation. While many franchisor informants had 
managed a unit at one point in time, practising franchisees were able to provide important 
detail on operating within their area. 
In summary, involving multiple informants at the franchisor level and franchisees enabled 
a richer and more balanced understanding of each case to be achieved, and provided one 
method for ensuring the reliability and validity of findings (lick, 1979) 
Access to Cases and Informants 
All the firms selected agreed to participate in the research. Initial contact involved the 
founder or most significant franchisor executive in all cases. Telephone conversations 
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were used primarily to assess their interest in participating in the research. All agreed to 
participate. Primary informants were then asked to recommend a secondary informant 
from their franchisor executive team. All except one were also available for interviewing. 
For franchisee informants, I requested the contact details of the franchisee (or 
subfranchisor and subfranchisee, in subfranchising systems) located closest to my home in 
Christchurch. The reason for this request was to reduce the potential for bias that might be 
associated with franchisors selecting their preferred choices. All were happy to provide 
these details and all franchisees contacted agreed to participate in the research. 
Three strategies were employed to placate possible confidentiality-related concerns. First, 
descriptive identities, such as SportCo and VideoCo, were developed to replace the trading 
names of participating companies. Second, job titles rather than individual names were 
used in the final presentation of the data. Third, and finally, complete transcribed 
transcripts remained private between the interviewer and interviewee. All participants 
were comfortable with these arrangements. 
Data Collection 
Case evidence was drawn from three sources: interviews, documentation and direct 
observations. Of these, interviews provided the primary source of case evidence. 
A semi-structured format was selected for interviews. These interviews were conducted in 
a one-on-one manner (Creswell, 1994). This methodology was selected as the most 
appropriate way to collect data for two reasons. First, it was the only appropriate method 
for collecting data, given the factors leading franchisors to select between alternative 
franchising forms had not been documented (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & Huberman, 
1984; Yin, 1994). Second, the use of semi-structured interviews allowed for the inclusion 
of variables not considered when entering the field (Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 
1984; Yin, 1994). Interview schedules were carefully constructed to obtain as much rich 
information as possible whilst retaining a focus on the research questions. Consideration 
of the objectives along with the diversity within cases meant different schedules were 
developed for franchisor and franchisee informants. Additionally, in the case of franchisor 
informants, further variations in schedules were sometimes required due to differences in 
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interviewees' area of expertise and level of experience. Variations were designed to reflect 
the different capabilities and limitations of each group to provide pertinent case 
information. Customisation meant a broader and more balanced understanding of each 
case could be obtained. 
A general interview schedule was pre-tested twice prior to interviewing case subjects. The 
initial interview pre-test took place within the University. This involved me interviewing 
one thesis supervisor while the other observed. Following useful comments, one 
supervisor interviewed the other to further illustrate improvements to interviewing style 
and technique. For the second pre-test I interviewed the founder of a pizza delivery 
company. Because this company was not included in the case study I was able to talk 
openly with him about the research's objectives and ways in which interviews could be 
improved. 
Initial franchisor questions focused on the historical and future development of franchising 
form. Following this, questions sought information on environmental and task 
uncertainties, and how these might be associated with business operations and franchising 
form. An example of that interview schedule appears in Appendix One. Franchisee 
questions focused more specifically on franchising form from their perspective, and on the 
association between environmental and task uncertainties as they affect their business 
operations. An example of the franchisee interview guide appears in Appendix Two. 
I also made use of visual aids during franchisor interviews. These aids included 
representations of single-unit franchising, sequential franchising, area development, area 
representation and subfranchising. They mirrored Figure 1, and were enlarged onto an A3 
sheet of paper. 
During the interviews, I took care not to reveal the nature of propositions outlined in the 
conceptual modeL However, effort was made to solicit information about issues that were 
not covered more spontaneously, and to reflect answers back to respondents to ensure the 
meanings conveyed were understood by both interviewer and interviewee (Bogdan & 
Taylor, 1989). 
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Franchisor interviews ranged from one to two and a half hours. Franchisee interviews 
were typically shorter, averaging one hour. A number of informants were interviewed 
more than once and in many instances I called to clarify certain points or solicit 
information not covered more fully in the interview/so Specific to cases, 29 interviews 
were conducted involving 21 people during 1998 and 1999. Informants included twelve 
franchise executives and nine master or unit-level franchisees. These 29 interviews and 
further interactions were in addition to the seven preliminary interviews undertaken prior 
to the main data collection period. Consequently, 36 interviews were conducted in alL In 
addition to these interviews, numerous less formal interactions took place, such as 
conversations at franchise meetings and conferences, and telephone calls. These less 
formal interactions also often provided important case evidence that were considered in 
the analysis. 
All interviews were taped with consent, and the researcher judged the interviewees to be at 
ease with this arrangement. Transcripts were prepared immediately following each 
interview (See Appendix Three for an 10 page interview snapshot). The majority of 
material was recorded verbatim. Only material of obvious irrelevance was omitted. On 
average, a one-hour interview equated to around 15 pages of single-spaced text and took 
between five and eight hours to transcribe. 
Multiple forms of documentation were also collected and referred to as case evidence 
(Creswell, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Patton, 1987; Yin, 1994). Documentation considered 
was varied and included franchise manuals and agreements, company Intranet and Internet 
sites, videos, newspaper and magazine stories, advertorials and advertisements for both 
franchises and business services. Following Yin (1994), these materials were carefully 
assessed for bias and used mostly to corroborate and augment evidence from other 
sources, particularly interviews. 
Observation played an important role in the data collection process (Creswell, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Patton, 1987; Yin, 1994). Evidence 
provided by this source is often useful in providing additional information about a case 
(Yin, 1994). During interviews I followed the advice of Bogdan and Taylor (1975, p. 118-
9) who note the use of a tape recorder "does not obviate the need to write down your 
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impressions and observations after each interview session.... such notes both help you 
guide future interviews and provide a frame of reference when you later try and interpret 
your data". In addition to a list of remarks of impressions gained during interviews, 
observations were also recorded during most contacts with cases. Also, because most 
interviews (two exceptions) were conducted at the respondent's place of business, I was 
able to obtain a broader picture of each case. In one company, observing a Franchise 
Advisory Council meeting broadened my understanding further. In all cases I made sure I 
recorded observations on the numbers, appearance, and interaction of staff, and, the 
condition and layout of offices and fittings. Observation notes were added to transcripts 
(See example in Appendix Four). 
The triangulation made possible, by making use of these multiple data collection methods 
- and multiple sources within each, provided stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses, and helped ensure the reliability and validity of findings (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
lick, 1979; Patton, 1987; Yin, 1994). 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis progressed simultaneously with data collection and management, although 
the major portion of analysis took place at the end of data collection. Data analysis was 
guided, in particular, by the works of Eisenhardt (1989a), Miles and Huberman (1984), 
Huberman and Miles (1994), Stake (1994) and Yin (1981; 1994). 
According to Yin (1994), the preferred strategy for analysing the evidence is to follow the 
theoretical propositions that led to the research. Hence, and guided by Eisenhardt (1989a), 
I began with a 'within-case' analysis resulting in detailed descriptions for each firm. Cases 
for each company appear in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and are structured around 
the research objectives and propositions. 
Individual case descriptions were generated from a detailed analysis of interview 
transcripts and other forms of evidence. I content analysed each interview transcript using 
a process of sentence-by-sentence pattern coding (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1994). 
Recurrent themes and patterns were noted in the margins of interview transcripts (Miles & 
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Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1994). All interview transcripts, and other items of evidence, were 
content analysed countless times during the course of the research. For example, to satisfy 
the first research objective, I went through each transcript separately, at least twice, 
searching for data relating to each environmental and task-related factor. This meant each 
individual transcript was analysed at least 12 times to satisfy that objective alone. 
Transcripts and other evidence were analysed further to satisfy the second research 
objective. That was, to identify and describe other factors that influence the choice of 
franchising forms. 
The within-case analysis process was highly iterative. Earlier cases needed to be re-
examined for additional factors identified in later cases or during the cross-case analysis. 
As a consequence, case descriptions were living documents. The descriptions required re-
writing as my understanding of each case, and the factors influencing form choice, grew 
during the investigation (Dey, 1993; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Overall, the process of within-case analysis was designed to make me familiar with each 
case as a stand-alone entity and allow the unique patterns of each case to emerge, before 
pushing to generalise patterns across cases. Becoming intimate with each case is very 
important to ensure that the commitment to generalise or create theory does not divert the 
researcher's attention from features important to understanding the case itself (Stake, 
1994). The familiarity also helped accelerate cross-case comparisons (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Following the within-case analysis, cross-case patterns and themes with regard to each 
research objective and proposition area were identified (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 1994). To 
address whether environmental and task uncertainties influence the choice of franchising 
forms I ordered the data separately for each factor. I then grouped cases by category of 
form, namely single-unit franchising, direct multi-unit franchising, and indirect multi-unit 
franchising. The propositions were tested following the replication logic specified by Yin 
(1994). This involved two forms of replication: literal replication and theoretical 
replication (Yin, 1994). Literal replication occurred when two or more cases within a 
category (such as SportCo and MortCo in single-unit franchising) provided similar results. 
Theoretical replication occurred when different categories contrasted for predictable 
reasons (Yin, 1994). Hypotheses were most strongly supported when both theoretical and 
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literal replication occurred. 
Analysing the data in these divergent ways assisted the second objective - that is, to 
identify what other important factors influence choice of franchising form. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989a), looking at the data in divergent ways is recommended as a good 
strategy to counteract the danger of reaching premature and/or false conclusions. I 
therefore ordered analysed the data in yet further ways. This meant, at some stage or other 
during the analysis, data were ordered into different arrays by proposition factors and 
other factors such as, importance of incentives, importance of control, desire for growth, 
organisation size, access to resources, founder self-image, category of form and specific 
form. Additional data analysis strategies were also employed, For example, within and 
across categories of form (e.g., single-unit, direct multi-unit and indirect multi-unit 
franchising) I listed and analysed similarities and differences, in an attempt to break 
simplistic frames (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and exhaust explanations from the data. The 
outcome of the cross-case analysis appears in Chapter 6, 
Validity and Reliability 
In his book on case study research Yin (1994) specifies four criteria for judging the quality 
of research designs. These are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. Satisfying each criterion required specific attention at one or more stages 
during the research process (i.e., from design to composition). 
Two methods suggested by Yin (1994) were employed to improve the construct validity. 
First, multiple sources of evidence were used to satisfy the information requirements, 
These included interviews, documents and observations. Second, a chain of evidence was 
established providing clear links between research questions, data, case reports and 
conclusions. Construct validity was also addressed earlier in the research process by 
carefully defining factors in the conceptual model. Eisenhardt (1989a) notes such a priori 
specification is valuable because it enables more accurate measurement of constructs. This 
specification then guided the development of the interview schedule, specific interview 
questions, and probing within interviews. 
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Internal validity addresses the degree to which the observations and measurements offer a 
true description of the phenomenon under study (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Yin's (1994) 
analytic strategies of pattern matching and explanation building were both employed 
during analysis to address this issue. Further, multiple data sources and triangulation were 
also utilised to enhance the validity of this study. Several and diverse data sources 
provided examples from different sources. They also sometimes highlighted different 
perspectives (e.g., franchisor vs. franchisee) that could be specifically addressed and 
clarified in follow-up interviews and/or phone calls. This resulted in a richer 
understanding and further enhanced internal validity. 
The external validity of this research is addressed by using multiple cases to improve 
generalisability. The propositions were tested following the replication logic specified by 
Yin (1994). The method of generalisation using multiple cases is 'analytic generalisation', 
where previous theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of 
the case study. Hence, if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, 
replication may be claimed (Yin, 1994). The multi-case design here is especially unique in 
that it allows for two forms of replication: literal replication and theoretical replication 
(Yin, 1994). Literal replication occurred when two or more cases within primary 
categories (such as SportCo and MortCo in single-unit franchising) provide similar results. 
Theoretical replication was enabled with different categories of cases. This replication 
occurred when contrasting results (in different categories of forms) occurred for 
predictable reasons (Yin, 1994). Consequently, through involving heterogeneous forms, 
the research design broadened the applicability of findings. 
Finally, providing enough information so that another investigator researching the same 
case could reach the same conclusions satisfies reliability issues. Detail in the conceptual 
framework and research design helped to address these issues. 
Limitations 
The results of the study need to be put into the context of its limitations. First, this study is 
primarily retrospective, relying on some informants to recall events and circumstances 
more than 15 years previously. This was not viewed asa major limitation, however, 
because deciding to franchise a business can be regarded as a memorable event, and only 
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two of the informants were required to think back this far. In addition, utilising multiple 
informants and data sources meant evidence could be corroborated. 
Second, it is possible some informants might have substituted idiosyncratic decision-
making with clear-headed reasoning shaped from experience. I was confident, however, 
given the candour of most informants regarding past mistakes, that this was limited. 
Furthermore, entering the field with a broad understanding of the issues (Yin, 1994) meant 
I was alert to any inconsistencies and unlikely stories. The potential for negative impact 
from this area was also limited by employing multiple data sources. 
A third, but unavoidable limitation in this research was the use of a single investigator. 
Eisenhardt (l989a) suggests that multiple investigators can improve both the creative 
potential and confidence in findings, with case study research. This limitation was 
addressed through regular meetings with my supervisory panel and colleagues to discuss 
findings and ideas. 
A fourth limitation pertains to the generalisability of results. The applicability of my 
findings to outside contexts is potentially limited by the focus on domestic operations of 
New Zealand-founded franchise systems. With a population of less than four million, the 
market for goods and services in New Zealand is small relative to others economies such 
as, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This size means chains 
operating an identical concept would have the potential for fewer units in this economy 
compared to other larger economies. Given that demand size had an important influence 
on franchising choices in this study, this potentially limits the generalis ability of my 
findings to economies of a similar size. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CASE DESCRIPTIONS: SINGLE-UNIT FRANCHISING 
Introduction 
This chapter, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 present the case descriptions of seven companies 
representing the three primary categories of franchising forms, namely single-unit 
franchising, direct multi-unit franchising and indirect multi-unit franchising (see Table 3). 
The presentation of case descriptions is ordered by organisational form. This chapter 
discusses cases representing single-unit franchising (MortCo and SportCo). The next 
chapter presents companies adopting direct-multi-unit franchising (VideoCo and ReaICo). 




. Franchising Category Companies 
Single-unit franchising MortCo 
SportCo 
Direct multi -unit franchising VideoCo 
RealCo 







The cases are descriptions and follow format consisting of four pnmary sections: 
Background, Development, The Environment and a Summary. The Background section 
provides a brief business description and explains the franchising form. The Development 
section details company and franchise development. In addition, it identifies and explains 
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important factors contributing to form choice. The Environment section presents and 
explores factors representing environmental uncertainties. This also includes my analysis 
of task uncertainties. Each case description concludes with a summary of the factors 




MortCo is a mortgage broking business that provides prospective and existing property 
owners (clients) with free assistance and advice on obtaining property finance. Founded in 
1991, MortCo comprises a network of 27 mortgage consultants ( or brokers) located 
throughout New Zealand. These consultants match client requirements with the optimal 
lending product selected from more than 10 different financial institutions. The institutions 
reward MortCo with a commission, in proportion to loan size, for successful loan 
applications. 
The mortgage consulting process typically occurs as follows. Clients are drawn to Morteo 
consultants from two primary sources: 1) company advertising or 2) real estate agent 
referrals. Consultants interview clients to establish a clear understanding of their 
circumstances and requirements. The objective is to collect sufficient (and accurate) 
information (e.g., on income, deposit size, type of deposit, mortgage size, risk aversion, 
credit rating etc.) from clients to advise on the most suitable lending product. After some 
analysis, often in a second meeting, the consultant presents the client with a list of relevant 
lending options. At this point the consultant explains the relative merits of each lending 
option to the client. With the client's agreement on a particular option, a loan application 
is then prepared and submitted to a financial institution. Successful loan applicants are 
offered mortgage protection insurance by the consultant. 
MortCo's organisational form is organised as a single-unit franchising form, where 
MortCo consultants are predominantly owner-operating franchisees. Only one mortgage 
consultant can operate per franchise agreement which means franchise holders cannot hire 
additional consultants. However, to maximise productivity, they are encouraged to employ 
personal assistants. 
The franchisor charges an initial fee to become a franchisee. Once established, consultants 
pay a percentage of commissions to the franchisor as a royalty payment. Franchisees are 
also obliged to contribute a percentage of commissions to separate individual and joint 
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advertising funds. Franchisees are not awarded an exclusive territory, but one of a limited 
number of licenses to operate within a larger area. For example, in the metropolitan area of 
Christchurch, New Zealand, MortCo has a limit of twelve licenses (six of these twelve 
licenses were awarded at the time of this investigation). 
Based in Christchurch, the MortCo franchisor recruits, trains, socialises and supports 
franchisees. The franchisor also provides overarching management for the entire system. 
This includes activities such as organising and controlling the range of institutions and 
lending options represented, new product/service developments, organising advertising, 
arranging annual conferences, regular regional consultant meetings and franchise advisory 
council sessions. Franchise brokers, who are employed to attract and recommend 
prospective franchisees to the franchisor, assist the franchise recruitment process in 
Wellington and Auckland. 
MortCo had two mmor exceptions to the single-unit form. In the first, a company 
purchased a franchise and hired an employ to provide mortgage services. In the second, 
MortCo has allowed a husband and wife partnership to simultaneously operate under one 
franchise agreement. Both exceptions occurred in geographically dispersed where there 
was little potential for additional Morteo growth. 
Development 
Morteo pioneered independent mortgage consulting services in New Zealand. The 
founder recognised an opportunity for the service following personal experiences 
obtaining property finance. Prior to the establishment of Morteo, property investors 
approached lending institutions directly. 
The founder began operating with a personal assistant in 1991. Demand grew rapidly and 
consultants were hired to develop the business. By the end of 1997 Morteo comprised 30 
employee mortgage consultants who were located throughout New Zealand. In 1998, the 
founder and key executives decided to franchise operations, and convert existing 
consultants to franchisees. All consultants were offered franchises at a substantially 
discounted price. Not all embraced the new opportunity, however. Some left to start a 
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competing operation while others took positions in that operation or other competing 
businesses. Those that remained appreciated the profile and good name of Morteo in the 
market place. They also believed Morteo's service was superior to competitors. Following 
the departure of some employee-consultants, a number of new franchisees were recruited. 
By mid-1999, Morteo comprised 27 franchisee mortgage consultants. 
Franchise Imperatives 
The development of organisational form at Morteo was influenced greatly by two factors. 
The first factor involved a desire to improve consultant motivation. The founder and key 
executives felt increased motivation would improve consultant productivity, commitment 
and loyalty. The second factor was a desire to maintain adequate power and control over 
consultants. 
Prior to franchising, the founder changed the structure of consultant remuneration to 
improve productivity. The founder observed that consultants relied too heavily on sales 
derived from generic company advertising, arguing they needed to network and build 
referral relationships more aggressively. Initial consultants were paid a retainer and earned 
commissions based on successful loan applications. The retainer was later removed so 
consultants derived remuneration solely from commissions. Removing the retainer and 
increasing consultant commission was designed to provide consultants with additional 
motivation. Productivity did improve with each amendment; however, the founder felt 
most consultants continued to perform below their ability. Furthermore, problems, such as 
consultants bad-mouthing Morteo and/or defecting to competing operations, existed 
indicative of a lack of consultant commitment and loyalty to the Morteo brand. 
The decision to franchise operations was also motivated by the desire to improve 
consultant performance and loyalty to Morteo. The founder and key executives believed 
that franchising would lead to greater motivation and commitment to the overall 
organisation. After paying the franchisor the initial fee consultants, as franchisees, earn a 
greater proportion of total commissions. At the same time, they also became responsible 
for operating expenses previously covered by Morteo, such as office rental, phone rental, 
stationery, secretarial staff etc. Importantly, both franchisees interviewed said that their 
focus and productivity improved dramatically with the conversion from employees to 
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franchisees. That corresponded with the marketing manager's observation that consultant 
productivity had doubled in Christchurch since franchising. 
The Marketing Manager also indicated that the reduction of parent company risk was an 
additional benefit of franchising: 
One of the crucial problems that we were facing (prior to franchising) was the only 
people that were guaranteed income were the consultants. In other words, they 
were absolutely guaranteed their margin and their overheads were covered by the 
company... The objective of franchising is we pass on all the costs. In other words, 
the only person which is guaranteed their section of the income is us ... The bulk of 
the risk is now with the franchisees, as in, if they don't get up in the morning then 
they don't generate income, but their costs of operating the business are still 
incurred 
Franchising was also hoped to improve consultant commitment and loyalty to the MortCo 
brand. As employees, consultants demonstrated a general lack of commitment and loyalty 
to MortCo. They operated in a market where job mobility was high. The founder felt that 
investment in a franchise might help secure more long-term commitment to MortCo and 
help deter consultants from defecting to competing organisations: 
I guess more than ever I have started to realise that commitment is one of the 
biggest things - commitment and long-term loyalty. It just pees me offwhen I have 
to lose people... I mean no one has left under the franchise system. There is no 
reason why someone would walk away from their $60,000 commitment. 
The motivational imperative also influenced MortCo's analysis of alternative franchising 
forms. Franchising forms that involved owner-operating consultants, such as single-unit 
franchising, area representation and subfranchising were clearly favoured over those 
involving employee-consultants, including sequential franchising and area development. 
This preference is reflected clearly in the following quotations: 
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This one [area development] would never work in our operation because the focus 
of what we require is that owner-operator - right. So in other words, this one has 
been taken completely out of the operation ... This one [sequential franchising] is a 
possibility from how much control we want but we always look at this position as 
being reasonably redundant because it must be more of a hands-on role 
(Marketing Manager). 
I would have to give it thought and everyone would be judged on its merits but I 
don't think you would get the same commitment [with sequential franchising). .. 
Because you have then employed somebody and you have gone the full circle and 
you have got employees and if it works the type of person you need has got to be 
intelligent enough to be able to run his own business. So effectively you have 
employed him to run your business. It doesn't take them long before they think 'oh 
yeah, I'd rather do this for myself. ' So my view is that you wouldn't get the same 
level of commitment (Founder). 
The franchisor's need for Control also influenced choice of franchising type, both in terms 
of the initial decision to franchise, and the analysis of alternative franchising arrangements 
thereafter. Control was desired to enforce operating standards and ensure the smooth 
implementation of important adaptations. Franchising provided an advantage in that the 
franchise agreement imposed more rigorous standards on operations. For example, the 
Marketing Manager noted: 
This is where the control side of it comes in. That is why the structure is set up the 
way it is because we need to maintain absolute control. In other words, if we just 
gave the franchisee the rights to 'well here's the rights to a brand name go and use 
it, ' then we could very quickly lose control. And again, why we haven't franchised 
general areas to operators is because then we are reliant on those operators 
without being able to control what they do. So that is why we put in a franchise 
where we are more heavily involved in the control side of operating the business. 
The franchisor also strongly desired power and control in order to effectively implement 
new initiatives. Franchisor executives noted the frequent need for adaptation. They said 
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that, because they are often first-movers, power over consultants is required because new 
initiatives may, in tum, require adaptations. That need for power and control highlighted 
MortCo's preference for a direct relationship with franchisees. Single-unit franchising was 
clearly favoured over indirect forms, area representation and subfranchising, because it 
provided a direct contractual and operational relationship with each and every consultant. 
The Marketing Manager confirmed the importance of a direct relationship in facilitating 
adaptation: 
We have to keep the direct control as we develop any new markets or opportunities 
so we need direct control on how that is done. When we introduce something new 
it is all new because it hasn't been done before. So like anything else, you can '1 
just be absolutely concrete and scry well 'that is going to be the wcry that it is done 
come hell or high water' [or] it is going to fail. You have got to evolve. 
Franchise executives also considered single-unit franchising as an introductory or base 
franchising form that provided them with the power and flexibility to adapt form in the 
future. ExemplifYing this view, the Marketing Manager stated: 
Basically our current structure is this [Single-unit franchiSing] with the facility to 
either operate something like this [area representation] or, either of these others 
[area representation or subfranchisingj. ] mean we have factored in future growth 
right, that is about the franchisees contracting to MortCo and MortCo can 




While MortCo's demand was growing rapidly, the potential for increases in size was 
ultimately limited. The franchisor executives felt that few additional consultants would be 
required because demand size in New Zealand is limited. The executives accepted that 
administrative duties would increase with size, but noted that they were unlikely to 
become problematic. Tasks of recruitment, training and ongoing management therefore 
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were, and would continue to be, adequately catered for within the existing structure. 
Consequently, single-unit franchising was considered the optimal franchising 
arrangement. Demand was considered too small for area representation and subfranchising 
to be viable. Furthermore, as the Marketing Manager illustrated, these indirect multi-unit 
franchising forms offered few administrative advantages given their market size: 
At this stage there is not enough in mortgage braking; it is a limited market, it is a 
readable market, so even if we maxed it out our requirement would never be any 
different ... [Further j for our current sizing we are still able to concentrate on each 
market individually, we still have the resources in our organisation to do that. 
Larger demand size would increase the utility associated with indirect multi-unit forms, 
area representation and subfranchising, as more consultants would put pressure on the 
current structure to the extent changes in form could be necessary. For example, the 
Marketing Manager and founder stated: 
If it had the potential of 1000s of people working for us in Auckland, then we 
wouldn'( come up with the structure that we have got. 1 think the structure has 
built around the criteria. It is like anything else, if you alter one part ... if you tweak 
the motor the gearbox starts to whine. 
Both the founder and Marketing Manager agreed that the burden of managing many more 
franchisees would lead them to consider area representation and subfranchising more 
favourably. The founder stated: 
1 am happy with the structure that we have got at the moment with the size we have 
got but if we had twice as many in Auckland, either I'd have to shift to Auckland, 
which is probably not likely, or we'd give more serious thought to one or two of the 
other options [area representation and subfranchisingj we had discussed. 
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Market Growth 
Since pioneering the industry in New Zealand, MortCo had witnessed rapid demand 
growth. Ten years ago there were a similar numbers of houses for sale but investors 
approached lending institutions directly. As the awareness for mortgage broking services 
has increased, so too had demand. The Marketing Manager estimated total market demand 
growth to be around 20 percent per annum. At the same time, however, competitors 
emerged rapidly. 
Rapid demand growth highlighted a need for more consultants. However, while this need 
was part of Mort Co's analysis, it did not influence actual form choice. In their analysis the 
MortCo founder and executives felt frustrated with the pace of growth achieved with 
single-unit franchising. Despite the advantages associated with indirect forms, area 
representation and sub franchising, MortCo ultimately preferred single-unit franchising. 
The franchisor's desire to increase loan applications per-consultant in the context of a 
rapidly growing market did, however, influence form choice, by highlighting the 
importance of providing consultants with adequate motivational incentives. As previously 
identified, the desire to improve consultant performance was evidenced first, by the 
evolution of consultant remuneration prior to franchising, and second, by the decision to 
convert consultants to franchisees. Further, within franchising, MortCo selected single-
unit franchising because it provided consultants with unrivalled incentives to work 
productively. Other franchising forms, including sequential franchising and area 
development, were rejected because, by involving employees, they failed to provide 
consultants with adequate motivation. 
Customer Dispersion 
Demand for mortgage broking was quite dispersed and, reflecting that situation, MonCo 
had consultants located in many regions throughout New Zealand. This dispersion 
provided MortCo with unique problems and challenges that prompted franchisor 
executives to consider the merits associated with alternative franchising forms. Difficulties 
associated with. dispersion involved two areas of operations. These included recruiting 
more consultants and increasing consultant productivity. Franchisor respondents identified 
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that increased local support would assist both areas. Nowhere were frustrations more 
apparent than the founder's evaluation of Auckland. MortCo was comparatively under-
represented (in relation to competitors) in Auckland, New Zealand's largest city and 
region. That under-representation led both franchisor informants to consider the following 
three structural and franchising alternatives. First, the founder contemplated relocating 
himself to Auckland. While relocating was later discounted for personal reasons, he stated: 
1 mean if 1 was up there putting the same amount of energy into Auckland - you 
know it is costing me a lot by living in Christchurch. 
Second, informants considered employing a regional manager to support MortCo gro-vvth 
and consolidation in Auckland. This alternative, however, was also disregarded. 
Informants felt an employee would have inadequate incentives to meet the franchisor's 
high expectations for the role. For example, the founder noted: 
1 certainly think that you know if it can't be me then it should be someone as 
motivated as me that had owned the contract for the area. 
Third, and finally, area representation and subfranchising were considered. These forms 
were favoured over a hired regional manager because, by involving ownership, they were 
more likely to provide regional managers who were motivated to work productively. The 
founder stated: 
So if they build the Auckland volume up it is a credit to them. So if they double the 
size, 1 'd envisage collectively off the group of guys that would provide X amount of 
income but that they could add on so many more [consultants} and their income 
would go three-fold So it encourages them to build and recruit, to improve 
productivity in all areas, efficiencies and increase and maintain morale. 
Despite the advantages identified with indirect multi-unit franchising forms, franchisor 
executives ultimately felt that the level of dispersion did not justify discarding their current 
form. They still considered single-unit franchising to be the most appropriate type of 
franchising to use in this context. However, while single-unit franchising was embraced 
generally, demand dispersion did influence form choice in two small, isolated locations. 
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This was evident in two minor exceptions to the pure single-unit form. Two franchise 
arrangements provided their franchise holders with additional rights and responsibilities. 
The first involved a company hiring an employee as a mortgage consultant. The second 
involved two individuals consulting under one franchise agreement. Both occurred in 
small, isolated markets with little prospect for further expansion. The size and isolation of 
those markets have influenced the decision to allow these exceptions. Because of their 
isolation they are expensive for the franchisor to support and visit. Furthermore, the small 
size and low potential for future growth increased this cost relative to similarly isolated, 
but larger markets. Consequently, as stated by the founder, they received less support than 
those consultants located in larger areas: 
Because of geographical location I don't visit Nelson or Tauranga - like 
FVhangarei, I have done initial things, but I haven't spent a lot of time there. I tend 
to go (fly) Christchurch-Auckland or Christchurch-Wellington-Auckland The 
downside for them is maybe because Nelson's to be blunt is not firing I can't afford 
to. Arguably you say I should be spending time there but I am trying to focus. Most 
of our income potential is out of Auckland so I tend to spend a lot of time up there. 
The additional benefits afforded to the two exceptions were designed to offset 
disadvantages associated with receiving less direct support. As the Marketing Manager 
stated, this solution might also be used in similar, future situations: 
We are taking this on a developmental basis. In other words, how we physically 
structure any future arrangement is yet to be determined on the basis of what we 
will require. But the objective at this stage is that hey, that is an area we don't 
want to have too hands-on a role in that area so they have, you know, taken 
Tauranga with extra rights, I suppose, or extra possibilities, of having more of an 
area development [agreement). Because [if] you take the franchisors income from 
an area like Tauranga and then the costs of servicing that as afranchisor - we are 
better off to pass on the management of that to the operator in the area. 
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Competition 
Competition had a more major influence on form choice. Competition in the mortgage 
broking sector has grown at a meteoric rate to the extent that literally hundreds of different 
competing operations now exist. While demand had also grown rapidly, informants said 
that growth in competition was more marked. Characteristic of competitive pressures, 
defending market share became more difficult, despite a large advertising expenditure. 
Further, profit margins were diminishing. The founder stated: 
Suddenly the margins come down and we are now at the margin - before 1 worked 
on a 30-40% -1 ran my company on the philosophy of a third wages and salaries, 
a third overheads, and a third profit, and 1 assure you that our profit margin is 
nowhere near that now. Even if it was half that 1 would be thrilled. It has been 
bought into line, basically because people say 'you can't have that sort of profit 
because we want a slice of the action. ' So it has got tough, it has certainly got 
more competitive, and when 1 think of the energy and effort and the momentum that 
we have got, we should be streets ahead. But it is just that basically we are 
dragging all the other mortgage brokers along; they are all eating in our pie. 
Two key challenges were identified in response to this situation. These included 
maintaining both unit-level (consultant) and system-wide efficiencies. For example, the 
founder noted: 
1 have just got to mind my own business, look after our efficiencies and our income 
and all the factors within our company and just aim it at that - 1 just know that 
everyday there is someone else out there and it is like that. You have got to go and 
fight wars every day. 
These challenges highlighted the advantages of single-unit franchising relative to other 
forms. Concerns for unit-level productivity highlight advantages associated with owner-
involvement. In comparison, direct multi-unit forms involve employees as consultants. 
Considerations for system-wide efficiencies highlighted advantages associated with 
centralising franchise management activities (such as, recruitment and ongoing-support). 
In contrast, indirect multi-unit forms involve the duplication of these franchisor activities. 
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Importantly, while informants recognised the potential advantages of indirect multi-unit 
forms for improving unit-growth and productivity, they were concerned that the added 
costs of master franchisees could threaten MortCo's viability. 
Demand Heterogeneity and Task Complexity 
Demand for mortgage broking services was quite heterogeneous. Clients have widely 
varying circumstances and preferences, across a range of factors, which combine to 
influence the suitability of different loan options. For example, client circumstances 
comprise a wide range of variables that included the size and term of loan required, size 
and type of deposit (gifted or not), and level of income. Clients may also have assets, 
outstanding liabilities and future plans and investment needs that are important to the loan 
application, as well as different preferences regarding alternative methods of repayment. It 
was clearly evident from the interviews that while clients shared the same general 
requirement of needing finance, their circumstances varied widely. For example, the 
informants stated: 
There is quite a range. I mean the people we deal with vary in very varying 
degrees (Franchisee) 
Their only common thread is that they need finance. Other than that, every case is 
different (lvfarketing Manager) 
100% of them want a home loan or home finance but obviously everyone is going 
to have different circumstances (Founder) 
This heterogeneity added to the complexity of consultant tasks. Accurately establishing 
client circumstances is challenging, and central to a consultant's ability to recommend the 
optimal mortgage option. Consultants must be skilled interviewers. Critical analytical 
skills are also important as clients commonly withhold important information (e.g., hire 
purchase payments) and overstate their income. Thus, as one franchisee noted, the client 
interview can involve concentrating on and analysing much more than what is said: 
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People don '{ want to tell you things ... If you ask about hire purchase or credit 
cards or whatever and they think because there are only three or four payments to 
go that you don '( need to know ... Some banks will say if you haven't disclosed that 
hire purchase on your application non-disclosure is reason to terminate the 
application... Therefore the bank no longer trusts that client. Then they will over-
emphasise their income: 'You know, I'm on 35 grand a year it is not a problem. ' 
You get something through from their employer and nut out the figures and they 
are stretching to get to 32... So long as you can extract those subtle bits of 
information, but you have got to listen to absolutely everything they say. They 
might give out a little clue. 
The range of lending products and options added to the complexity. Consultants must have 
an intimate knowledge of the wide range of lending products that they represent. One 
MortCo franchisee/consultant put this in perspective by contrasting his experience as a 
lending manager at one well-known bank: 
When I was at Trustbank I just knew one lending product... with this I have to 
know 10 different lending products, and be able to match the clients requirements 
as best we can around where they are at to the best deal. 
The lending criteria and policies of banks are subject to regular changes, adding an 
additional source of complexity. Further, obtaining the best deal sometimes requires 
challenging a bank to customise a package to suit an individual's requirements. 
Consequently, MortCo consultants must have an intimate knowledge of lending criteria 
and policies of a wide range of lending institutions and keep up to date on any changes to 
criteria or new lenders represented. 
The process of identifying the optimal lending option is difficult and complex. Many 
different individual circumstances mean that clients may not be eligible for all loan 
options. The different loan options investors might be eligible for provides them with 
choice, within which the consultant can advise and/or the client can exercise personal 
preference. The' following extended quote made by the Marketing Manager outlines a 
common scenario that illustrates the complexity: 
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Given your situation how do you want to structure your loan? For most people 
they think 'mortgage' and it is going to be x amount per month and we pay till 
doomsday. But it is well past (that). In other words, you can change the amount 
you pay, you can go interest only for a period of time, you can do this, you can do 
that, you can structure anything. So like, do you want to pay this off quickly? What 
other things do you want in your life? So how you structure that is quite important 
as to which institution we put you {to}. . .{and then] what sort of things do you 
want? Do you want to go and lend more money in the future for other things - like 
investment properties - and do you want to keep it pushed out on the maximum so 
you can get the old car and the you know? How are you going to structure your 
finance, because you can do that through your mortgage, and if you are going to 
do that through your mortgage then this is the one for you, and actually it is going 
to cost you slightly more but in the long term you are going to save this and this 
you know - and then, if you do need $20,000 dollars more to go and buy a car on 
today's rates, you'll be paying 10 percent above that. But you can do it with this 
and that is when it gets really technical to come up with what is the end result. 
In summary, the consultant's role is complex. New consultants can expect to operate for a 
year before feeling confident. Difficult scenarios continue to arise, however, even for the 
most competent. 
Two key franchisor functions were identified as essential in order to successfully manage 
this heterogeneity and task complexity. These were franchise recruitment and training. 
Franchisor executives regarded the quality of both as essential, and this influenced form 
choice. Such was the importance of these functions that the franchisor resolved to perform 
them in-house. Further, with regard to recruitment, the founder personally controlled all 
selection decisions. Morteo also ascribed similar levels of importance to training. 
Regardless of background, all new recruits underwent a two-week class-based training 
course provided by the franchisor. The training programme was intensive and difficult. A 
wide range of material needed covering due to the complexity of operating. As the founder 
stated, all recruits, who included professionals, such as ex-bank lending managers, and 
even accountants, found the training challenging: 
63 
Most people, the accountants, for example, that have done our course still find it a 
lot to take in. It is a pressure course over two weeks. No one has actually flown 
through as a breeze, they have actually found it 'shit there is a lot to learn. ' 
The importance ascribed to recruitment and training quality influenced choice of 
franchising form. Single-unit franchising was explicitly preferred over area representation 
and subfranchising because it enabled the franchisor to control the quality of recruitment 
and training. Centralising rather than delegating one or both activities achieved this. 
Interestingly, one indirect form was preferred over another on this basis. Area 
representation was regarded more favourably than subfranchising, because it involves only 
the delegation of training. 
Summary 
Founded in 1991, MortCo now has a network of 27 mortgage consultants located 
throughout New Zealand. With two minor exceptions MortCo's form is characteristic of 
single-unit franchising. MortCo began franchising in 1998 after eight years of company 
expansion. During this period the structure of consultant remuneration evolved from a 
high retainer/low commission-based mix to IOO-percent commission. Now, as franchisees, 
consultants are residual claimants. They pay an initial franchise fee and a regular royalty 
payment, and assume many of the operating costs previously covered by their employer. 
In return, consultants now earn a greater share of commissions. 
The adoption of single-unit franchising, and the development of form that preceded this, 
was influenced markedly by two factors: incentives and control. Both factors reflected the 
personal beliefs and choice of key decision-makers. The first factor, a desire to improve 
consultant incentives, influenced choice by highlighting the relative disadvantages 
associated with alternative organisational arrangements and franchising forms. Key 
decision-makers believed residual claims, through ownership, provide consultants with 
better incentives. than other options. Alternative arrangements to this single-unit 
franchising form, such as employee-based compensation schemes, sequential franchising 
and area development, were all rejected on the basis they either reduce or remove owner-
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involvement at the consultant level. 
The second factor, a desire for control, influenced form choice differently. Franchisor 
informants desired control over consultants to ensure the quality of franchisor related 
activities (e.g., recruitment, training and monitoring), enforce operating standards and 
ensure the smooth implementation of much needed adaptations. Single-unit franchising 
was advantageous compared to company-owned operations because the franchise 
agreement imposed more rigorous standards and penalties for non-compliance. Single-unit 
franchising was preferred over alternative franchising forms, such as area representation 
and subfranchising, because it involved maintaining a direct relationship with consultants. 
By contrast, the founder and key executives felt area representation and subfranchising 
reduced franchisor control to an unacceptable level. 
Franchising form choice was also influenced by factors representing environmental and 
task uncertainties, namely demand size, growth, dispersion and heterogeneity, intensity of 
rivalry and task complexity. Demand size, in particular, influenced form choice strongly. 
Limited demand size highlighted advantages associated with single-unit franchising, 
through maintaining direct control and high levels of owner-involvement. Other forms 
threatened advantages associated with these characteristics, while offering few benefits in 
return. Further, franchisor executives considered the potential scale of operations would be 
insufficient for two alternatives to be viable, namely area representation and 
subfranchising. 
Despite strong increases, the level of demand growth had only a minor impact on form 
choice. High demand growth highlighted the importance of increasing consultant numbers 
and sales per consultant. Despite a strong desire to build consultant numbers, however, 
single-unit franchising was selected over alternative forms (i.e., all multi-unit franchising 
forms) that facilitate more rapid unit-growth. By contrast, the concern for consultant 
productivity did influence form. Franchisor executives preferred forms, such as single-unit 
franchising, that maximised owner -involvement at the consultant level. 
Demand dispersion also had only a mmor influence on form choice. The level of 
dispersion highlighted advantages associated with alternative forms, such as area 
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representation and subfranchising. However, these advantages were insufficient to warrant 
the replacement of single-unit franchising. Single-unit franchising was considered most 
appropriate in this context. Dispersion influenced form most in two small, isolated 
locations. Unable to provide comparable support to these locations, franchisees were 
granted greater latitude in their franchise agreements. 
Competition had a more major influence on form choice. Intense rivalry highlighted the 
importance of preserving and maintaining unit-level and system-wide efficiencies. 
Franchisor executives preferred single-unit franchising in this context because it offered 
advantages over both direct and indirect multi-unit forms. Comparatively, direct multi-unit 
forms reduced unit-level efficiencies (i.e., consultant productivity) by lowering the level of 
owner-involvement. Compared to single-unit franchising, indirect multi-unit forms add 
system-wide costs by duplicating franchisor-related activities. Consequently, single-unit 
franchising was, in part, selected because it preserved unit-level and system-wide 
efficiencies. 
Finally, demand heterogeneity and task complexity combined to strongly influence form 
choice. The high complexity of unit operations increased the importance of ensuring the 
quality provision of two key franchisor management activities: recruitment and training. 
Single-unit franchising was preferred in this context because it involved the franchisor 




Founded in 1964, Sporteo retails general sporting equipment from 50 stores. The stores 
are located throughout New Zealand's large and small cities, and rural townships, and 
trade from a diverse range of situations, including main streets, side streets, strip shopping 
centres and malls. Stores stock between 2000 and 7000 different items and employ up to 
eight-full time and ten part-time staff. 
AlISO Sporteo stores are franchised and single-unit franchising is the dominant form. 43 
of 50 stores are owned and managed by single-unit franchisees. Exceptions include two 
separate franchisees that operate two stores. The exceptions were characteristic of 
sequential franchising. The remaining three stores are organised differently. One 
franchisee owned one store outright and shares ownership in two further stores, with a 
separate partner in each. This form is termed the Franchise Partnership Structure (FPS). 
Operating this form, each partner manages his or her respective store. 
The Sporteo franchisor charges an initial fee and regular royalty payments, based on a 
percentage of sales, for rights to operate a franchise in an exclusive territory. In return, the 
franchisor provides overarching chain management, including support and services for 
franchisees. Franchisor support includes some centralised purchasing. 
The franchisor comprises more than 10 support staff, including a managing director (not 
the founder), and four functional managers (marketing, purchasing, accounting and 
business development). Three have assistants. Additionally, the franchisor comprises 
secretarial staff, and the principal founder (there were two), who continues to play an 
active role in the business. 
Development 
Founded by two friends, the first Sporteo store opened for business in Auckland in 1964. 
Sales and financial resources grew steadily and a second store was soon established in 
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partnership with two former employees. This performed poorly, however, and SportCo' s 
founders purchased their partner's share in the store. After improving this store's 
performance, additional expansion was sought. The founders realised the potential for 
economies of scale: 
We got to have two stores and thought we needed three. So at that stage we started 
to formulate plans as needing four then five, and then you started to see the 
benefits of growing and size (Existing founder). 
Two additional Auckland stores and four more in Wellington grew SportCo's retail 
network to eight company-owned stores by 1982. Content with their achievements, the co-
founder suggested both founders consider retirement. Not sharing the sentiment of his co-
founder, the existing founder (referred to herein as 'founder') purchased his share in the 
business, and set about expanding the network further. Later that year, he decided to start 
franchising to achieve additional growth. This followed an approach from a consultant 
interested in facilitating the process. 
Franchise Imperatives 
The initial decision to franchise was motivated by two central concerns. The first pertained 
to access to capital. Their financial resources did not match SportCo's ambitions for 
growth. As the founder stated, franchising was advantageous compared to company-
owned expansion because it introduced external financial resources: 
To open another [company-owned] store was going to cost $]00,000 to buy the 
site [and] to buy the fixtures and fittings and stock, and it had to be tax paid 
money. At one stage I was paying 66 cents in the dollar tax, so if they are going to 
take two thirds of your money you haven't got much left. So the opportunities 
available never matched the money available ... the reason to franchise was that 1 
bought someone 's new money in. It was money in, not out. 
The second concern pertained to improving the incentives for store managers. Prior to 
franchising, SportCo was plagued with store theft, high levels of absenteeism, and low 
productivity. Making managers owners of stores, as franchisees, was seen as a solution to 
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these problems. As the following quotations illustrate, perception became reality. 
Concerns of staff dishonesty dissolved and productivity improved: 
You don't have to worry about theft because the owner is there on the job in the 
store. One year we lost $13,000 from the backroom at Christmas in Henderson. A 
manager in-store has to be honest and if he is going to be dishonest he can rip you 
off in big chunks. So the loss is [now] theirs (a franchisees) it is not ours so we 
have noticed a huge change (Founder). 
Anything up to a 50% increase in sales in a franchised store as opposed to 
company owned stores (Founder). 
Five franchises were established within two years, bringing the total number of SportCo 
stores to 13. The founder's confidence in franchising increased with experience to the 
extent that he embarked on converting all company-owned stores to franchises. New 
franchise expansion continued alongside the conversion process, and SportCo's retail 
network grew to its current size of 50 stores. 
Single-unit franchising dominated SportCo's franchise development. However, while 
owner-operators control 43 of 50 stores, there were exceptions. Four stores were 
controlled by two franchisees (who have two stores), and three were organised in a 
Franchise Partnership Structure (FPS). 
The founders desire to provide store manager with adequate incentives strongly influenced 
the initial decision to franchise and the choice of franchising form. Franchising, as stated 
earlier, was initially selected in preference to company-ownership, in part, because it 
provided store managers, as franchisees, with better incentives than employee-based store 
managers. Franchisor executives also evaluated alternative franchising forms on the basis 
of incentives. The executives preferred single-unit franchising because it maximised 
owner-involvement in individual stores. Franchisor executives rejected alternative forms, 
such as sequential franchising and area development primarily because they reduced the 
level of owner-involvement in store management. Incentives were also important in 
franchisor comparisons of the FPS and sequential franchising. As the Managing Director 
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stated, the FPS was preferred to sequential franchising because it involved higher levels of 
owner-involvement in individual stores: 
1 mean because the whole thing about franchising being successful is the 
franchisee owner-operator on the shop floor driving the bUSiness, and if they own 
two stores then, in effect, they remove themselves to a degree from that... Instead 
of the franchisee couple focused on one store they are focused on two stores (with 
sequential franchising) and OK while there are some economies of scale, they are 
splitting their energy and start losing the franchisee involvement in the business. In 
comparison, with the franchisee partnership (FPS), you are actually leveraging 
more franchisee resources, because you have got one franchisee partner one 
hundred percent working in the business plus another adding 10, 15 or 30 percent 
input into the business. So you are actually, as I say with the wisdom of hindsight, 
it makes perfect sense, because with the partner structure (FPS) you put in more 
franchisee resources, but with the multiple-store owner you actually take 
franchisee resources away. 
The franchisor informants said that, while single-unit franchising will continue as the 
dominant form, the FPS would be preferred over sequential franchising for any future 
franchisee expansion that might be permitted. 
Franchisee ambition, the second factor, influenced the utilisation of the FPS and sequential 
franchising. As the Managing Director noted, this involved some successful franchisees 
applying for, and being granted with, additional stores: 
Some of our successful franchisees had a desire to do more than one shop, 
basically. I mean that is essentially where it has gone. And sort of over a period we 
have had, and still do have now, individual franchisees or franchisee couples who 
own more than the one store. 
Multi-unit ownership is not encouraged at SportCo. With great importance ascribed to 
owner-involvement in store management, and a willing supply of new franchisees, 




Franchisor executives considered the SIze of market demand for their services and 
concluded that, based on the current store format, full market penetration would be 
achieved with approximately 10 more stores (i.e., 60 SportCo stores). On this basis, 
single-unit franchising was considered most appropriate. Franchisor executives rejected 
area representation and subfranchising because they felt their network was insufficient in 
size for these forms to be viable. Interestingly, even if size was doubled, franchisor 
executives continued to doubt the viability of area representation and subfranchising. 
Consequently, as stated by the Managing Director, while franchisor executives 
acknowledged the burden of franchisor management would increase with twice as many 
stores, single-unit franchising would continue to be preferred: 
1 don '1 think it would change our structure, but it just would change the tasks and 
things that we did., and we would not necessarily allocate it out. 
Market Growth 
Demand growth had some influence on form choice. SportCo experienced two different 
contexts pertaining to demand growth. The first context related to a major portion of 
SportCo's development. Until recently, SportCo experienced a long and sustained period 
of demand growth. The second context related to Sporteo's current predicament that was 
characterised by a plateau in demand growth. Explaining this variation in demand, 
informants cited lifestyle changes and a shift from sports-related to alternative activities, 
such as visiting cafes and playing computer games. The two contexts influenced form 
differently. SportCo concentrated somewhat more on growth in store numbers during 
earlier, more rapid demand growth. Franchisor executives preferred franchising to 
company-owned expansion because it overcame growth impediments associated with 
limited financial resources. Furthermore, while single-unit franchising dominated form, a 
small number of existing franchisees were also permitted to establish additional outlets. 
More recently, however, the decline in growth has shifted the franchisors' emphasis 
toward improving and maintaining existing store performance. Slowing growth has 
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highlighted the importance of maintaining SportCo's current position in what are more 
difficult trading conditions. In this context, providing store managers with adequate 
incentives is crucial for maximising unit-sales growth and profitability. Informants clearly 
preferred forms that maximise owner-involvement in individual stores. Consequently, 
single-unit franchising is preferred, and within alternative forms, the FPS was preferred to 
sequential franchising. 
Customer Dispersion 
The dispersion of demand influenced form choice. SportCo has located stores throughout 
both the North and South Island of New Zealand to reflect the dispersed nature of demand 
for sporting goods. Effects of this dispersion highlight the importance of incentives. For 
franchisor executives, the effects of dispersion include difficulties involved in observing 
and controlling dispersed store activities. Dispersed stores are also expensive to visit. The 
difficulties and the expense associated with dispersed stores highlighted the importance of 
providing individual store managers with good incentives. All informants (including the 
franchisee interviewed) said that store managers perform best, and therefore require less 
monitoring and support, if they are owners or part owners of the stores they manage. This 
recognition contributed to form analysis and choice. The original initial foray into 
franchising had highlighted the merits of making store managers owners. This then 
influenced future decisions. Franchisor executives preferred single-unit franchising 
because it maximised owner-involvement in individual stores. But also, where franchisees 
were permitted to expand, the FPS was preferred to sequential franchising because it 
maintains owner-involvement in all stores. The franchisee concurred with this view by 
recounting his own experiences managing dispersed stores. He shares ownership in stores 
more than four hours drive from his own. He said that having a partner that shares 
ownership (as opposed to hiring an employee) to manage an isolated store reduces both his 
concerns and the number of times he needed to visit. 
Competition 
Historically, competition in the sporting goods sector has been strong, yet it has intensified 
of late. Two years ago a large Australian chain entered New Zealand and established seven 
mega-stores offering goods at very competitive prices. This had an immediate and marked 
impact on the sector; one 32 store chain failed, as did another operation with 50 years 
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trading history. Others have retrenched, some by more than 50 percent. The impact on 
Sporteo was less severe. Informants attribute this to purchasing power due to size, unique 
locations and dedicated store owner-managers. Yet, while Sporteo has maintained size, 
sales have been affected and price competition is more widespread. These effects, in turn, 
contributed to an increased focus on two management challenges, namely improving and 
maintaining store-level performance and system-wide efficiencies. 
All informants (including the franchisee) acknowledged the need for diligent store 
managers for improving and maintaining store-level performance. They felt that store 
managers must [at least] operate efficiently, be responsive to both customers and 
competition, manage stock effectively and, for the benefit of all units, communicate 
important information to their franchisor. As noted by the Managing Director, owners-
managers were regarded as more highly motivated than employee-managers to do these 
things: 
I mean they (owner-operators) are there in their environments 24 hours a day, so 
they can have an intimate knowledge of the local market and what their 
competitors are doing or not doing ... and they have got more of a vested interested 
in doing those things ... passing them on (information to the franchisor), certainly, 
and those sorts of things - much more so in that [owner-manager situation} than 
the likes of a managed structure would, or we could ever hope to do from a 
centralised position. 
A recent attempt to improve system-wide efficiencies reaffirmed the need for motivated 
store managers, but also added the importance of maintaining a direct relationship with 
individual stores. The new initiative involved centralising a larger proportion of stock 
purchasing. The Managing Director said: 
Just with the changing in the market and the introduction of new people and more 
competitors in the business, we had to reassess that and change to make sure we 
are leveraging our buying volumes. 
Franchisor executives felt that maintaining a direct relationship with individual stores 
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provided more effective communication of stock requirements and information. By 
comparison, franchisor executives thought that forms, such as area representation and 
subfranchising, which involve the addition of master franchisees, would make centralised 
purchasing more difficult; it would be more complex administratively and take more time. 
Summing up his views, the Managing Director said: 
The practicalities of managing that (centralised purchasing) we saw as being an 
issue and a problem with those (area representation and subfranchising). 
The desire to maintain and improve both store performance and system-wide efficiencies 
influenced S porteo' s form choice. As identified above, achieving both requires diligent 
store management and benefits from a direct relationship. Informants regarded single-unit 
franchising as the most appropriate franchising form in this context. By contrast, direct 
multi-unit forms reduce store manager motivation by involving employee-managers rather 
than owner-managers, while indirect forms impede efficient communication by involving 
master franchisees. Therefore, single unit franchising was the preferred option. 
Customer Diversity 
Demand for sporting goods was quite heterogeneous. Further, it was heterogeneous both 
within and across different store territories. Within store areas, for example, informants 
said that customers' wants, needs, preferences and tastes varied considerably. Across 
territories, heterogeneity was compounded as individual locations featured umque 
demographics, climate, location to activities, sporting interests, wildlife and so on. This 
heterogeneity meant that store-managers must adapt their stock to local demand. 
Illustrating differences between stores, the Managing Director noted: 
Because of the climate variation the jackets sell better in the South Island than they 
do at the top of the North Island - so you have got climatic variations in the 
apparel we sell. There is in variation in fishing throughout the country and that is 
more to do with the type of fish, because there is variation - you get salmon here 
but you don't get tuna down there, so it is the reflection of that. But I mean, tennis, 
golf, cricket, footwear - footwear, a little bit, because South Islanders are a bit 
more outdoors-in-the-mountains-walking-type-orientated but like outdoor and 
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hiking shoes sell better. Touch (touch rugby) is comparatively stronger in the 
Auckland market so touch shoes sell better there. 
All informants said that store managers must be highly motivated to effectively adapt their 
stock to local customers. As the Managing Director said, this motivation is required 
because the tasks associated with purchasing the right stock in the right quantities is 
Immense: 
The buying part is probably the most demanding part of our business because of 
the number of products, the fragmentation or diversity which is everyone is, and 
each market is a little bit different too because there are different targets, you 
know. The type of person that buys golf gear can be a different type of person [to 
someone} that buys cricket gear or buys fishing gear or buys footwear or buys 
apparel, and within footwear you have different markets with a person who buys a 
suede type street shoe is quite different from the person that buys the running 
shoes. So there is a lot of different markets that the franchisee has to come to grips 
too in terms of trYing to deliver the right products at the right price at the right 
time and in the right quantities. So even for a experienced franchisee that part of 
the business is still quite demanding. There is no real short cuts to it all, so it helps 
with the local involvement (Managing Director). 
The variation of demand within and between stores influence form choice by highlighting 
the need for highly motivated store managers. Single-unit franchising was preferred 
because it preserved owner-involvement in stores. Indeed, all informants (including the 
franchisee) noted that having owners involved in stores, as opposed to salaried managers, 
meant that stores perform more effectively in this diversity. The importance of owner-
involvement is illustrated in the following quotations: 
Stockholdings and buying are completely different between Queenstown and 
Whangarei. Our people can get up to 50% more sales from a store than we could if 
there was a manager in there and the head office was doing all the buying. They 
(the franchisees) can buy what the market wants (Founder). 
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That is the other good thing about having the owners in stores. 1 mean they are in 
tune with their own local area. You can react to or respond to your customers. Just 
having somebody who has the enthusiasm and the drive, you know, because they 
are sharing the rewards at the end of the day, so it does make a difference 
(Franchisee). 
Consequently, single-unit franchising was preferred ill this context of heterogeneous 
demand. 
Managerial Complexity 
A striking feature of this case was the high level of complexity associated with managing 
an individual SportCo store. This complexity derived from four key sources. First, the 
product line was large. While the franchisor specified a minimum range of around 1500 
different items, stores actually stocked between 2000 and 7000. Second, demand was 
diverse. Store managers needed to understand the wants, preferences and tastes of diverse 
customers. These two sources of complexity meant that activities associated with stock 
management, such as buying the right products, in the right quantities (not to mention 
charging the right price), were highly challenging. Third, there were numerous suppliers to 
deal with. Most had around 100 suppliers; the franchisee I interviewed had more than 150. 
Fourth, and finally, store-operators needed to recruit, train and manage staff, including 
sales people. SportCo stores employ up to eight full-time and 10 part-time staff 
Franchisor executives and franchisees alike acknowledged that their stores were complex 
operations to manage. Indicative of this complexity, the founder and franchisee noted it 
took two to three years for the average operator to become capable of managing a store. 
Furthermore, as the following quotations made by the franchisee illustrate, the wide range 
of activities coupled with the number of tasks to perform meant that individual stores were 
very time-consuming to manage: 
There are so many suppliers [and} so many different product lines, you know, and 
then having to do the accounting and the book-work side of things, making sure 
that what you are paying for is what you are getting. You might be the best 
salesman in the world but you could be losing it out the back door. 1 mean staff 
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theft, shoplifting, I mean there are so many avenues that you have got to keep your 
mindfocused on (Franchisee). 
It is complex because you have got so many things coming at you in different 
angles. I mean you have got all your book work side oj things, you have almost got 
to be a baby sitter too because you are dealing with your staff and their personal 
problems and aspirations and all their pitfalls and everything else. Then you have 
got your suppliers. You have got to play one supplier off against another. You have 
got to look at what products you have. [You have] got to compare all the different 
product ranges and make your decisions from those, and then, to top it off, you 
have got to deal with the customer, which is most probably the most important 
thing out of the whole lot (Franchisee). 
The complexity of store operations highlighted two areas in relation to franchising form 
choice, namely having motivated store managers and qUality franchisee selection. Given 
the high level of managerial complexity, all informants emphasised the importance of 
having motivated managers operating Sporteo's stores. Furthermore, all informants 
(including the franchisee) also said they felt owner-operators were, in general, more 
motivated than employee-managers to effectively manage the complexity. For example, 
the Managing Director stated: 
I mean the difference with the franchisees is it is their money. So that is great 
motivation to make sure you know that the bookkeeping and keeping all that part 
of the thing balanced and all those sorts of things which are greater than with an 
employee. And I mean obviously you have got to think from a franchisor's 
perspective that we don't have to worry about it directly because it is their 
business. While we do care, we don't necessarily have that direct worry or 
whatever supposed to if they were company-owned stores and we were paying the 
bills. 
The founder also added, in a follow-up call, a further advantage of having owner-
managers. The founder said that owner-managers, because of the investment they had 
made, were likely to manage stores for several years. By contrast, the turnover of 
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employee-managers was much higher. Therefore, the founder said that, due to the time 
required to learn the business, it helped to have owners managing stores. In relation to 
recruitment quality, the founder illustrated the importance of care and attention during the 
selection process. He preferred that the franchisor organisation maintain control of 
recruiting franchisees. Furthermore, the founder and managing director personally 
controlled all franchisee recruitment decisions. 
Overall, franchisor executives preferred single-unit franchising. Given the level of 
managerial complexity, single-unit franchising was advantageous because it maintained 
control of franchisee selection and provided owner-operating store managers who were 
motivated and able to manage their stores effectively. 
Summary 
Founded in 1964, Sporteo comprised a network of 50 stores retailing sporting goods 
throughout New Zealand. Notwithstanding some exceptions, Sporteo's form was largely 
characteristic of single-unit franchising. Sporteo started franchising in 1982. From this 
date until the present day the network has grown from eight company stores to 50 
franchised stores. A number of factors influenced Sporteo's form selection. Two factors 
stood out, namely incentives and franchisee ambition. 
Incentives strongly influenced Sporteo's selection of single-unit franchising. All 
informants (including the franchisee) believed ownership provided store managers with 
motivational incentives to perform more diligently than any employee-based 
compensation plan. That belief led to a preference for single-unit franchising over direct 
multi-unit forms. Incentives also further impacted on form by influencing the structure of 
franchisee expansion. In rare instances where franchisee expansion was permitted the FPS 
was preferred to sequential franchising and area development because it provided owner-
involvement in additional stores. Franchisee ambition, the second factor, influenced the 
prevalence of multi-unit ownership. Franchisee desire and ambition, not their franchisor's, 
drove instances of franchisee expansion. 
Franchising form choice was also influenced, to a varying extent, by factors representing 
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environmental and task uncertainties. Demand size had some influence on form choice. 
Limited demand meant few stores were required. This context highlighted the advantages 
of single-unit franchising compared to multi-unit forms, including maintaining efficiencies 
(unit-level and system-wide) and control. Sporteo disregarded indirect forms, in 
particular, because they would not be financially viable given the market's size. Sporteo's 
choice of form was also influenced, in a minor way, by the level of market growth. The 
recent plateau in growth focused franchisor attention on maintaining store-level 
productivity, reinforcing the choice, and continued prevalence, of single-unit franchising. 
The dispersed nature of demand contributed to Sporteo's utilisation of single-unit 
franchising. Single-unit franchising was preferred because it reduced problems associated 
with geographically isolated stores. Moreover, single-unit franchising reduced monitoring 
costs by providing owner-managers (or franchisees) who were more motivated, than 
employee-managers, to perform diligently. 
Intense rivalry also influenced the selection of single-unit franchising. Single-unit 
franchising was preferred given the level of competition in this context because it 
maximised unit-level and system-wide efficiencies. These were achieved by maximising 
owner-involvement in stores and centralising franchisor related activities. 
The diversity of customer wants and needs strongly influenced form choice. Demand for 
sporting goods was quite diverse within and across territories. This meant managers were 
needed that were motivated to attune stock with local customer needs, wants and 
preferences. Sporteo preferred single-unit franchising because it provided diligent store 
managers who were more diligent, and therefore more responsive, to customer needs. 
Finally, Sporteo's choice of form was also strongly influenced by the level of managerial 
complexity associated with operating their stores. Sporteo stores were complex and 
burdensome propositions to manage, thereby requiring highly motivated store managers. 
Single-unit franchising was preferred for those reasons. First, single-unit franchising 
involved owner-operators who made more diligent managers. Second, it enabled the 
franchisor to control store manager quality by centralising all store manager recruitment 
decisions. Third, because owner-operators featured lower levels of turnover, than that 
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associated with employee-managers, single-unit franchising ensured a higher overall level 
of experience in store-management positions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE DESCRIPTIONS: DIRECT MULTI-UNIT FRANCHISING 
Introduction 
This chapter presents descriptions of two compames employing direct multi-unit 
franchising, namely VideoCo and RealCo. The following chapter (Chapter 5) examines 




Founded in 1990, VideoCo operates a video hire chain with 88 outlets located throughout 
New Zealand. Individual VideoCo outlets have between 4000 and 15000 video titles 
available for member customers to hire. In addition, outlets hire a wide range of electronic 
games and consoles, and are beginning to offer Digital Video Disks (DVDs). VideoCo 
outlets also sell a small range of soft drinks and confectionery. 
All 88 VideoCo outlets were franchised and arranged in a manner characteristic of 
sequential franchising. Seventy outlets were run by owner-operating franchisees. Multi-
unit franchisees accounted for the remaining 18 outlets. Multi-unit franchisees held 
financial interests in between two and five outlets each. New franchisee expansion 
occurred on an incremental or sequential basis and the franchisor reserved the right to stop 
franchisees from establishing additional outlets. The franchisor had no criteria specified 
for pausing or blocking franchisee expansion. The franchisor charged new franchisees an 
initial fee as well as an ongoing royalty based on sales for right to operate a VideoCo 
outlet in an exclusive territory. 
VideoCo's franchisor office was located in Auckland and the team comprised a general 
manager, marketing manager, purchasing managerlIT manager and business development 
manager. There were also three salaried regional managers that provided support directly 
to individual outlets. One serviced outlets in the South Island and Wellington (North 
Island). The second supported outlets from north of Wellington to Auckland. The third 
supported outlets north of Auckland. 
The franchisor provided franchisees with wide-ranging support. Regional managers visited 
outlets regularly and offered franchisees assistance with local marketing, business plans, 
staff issues, and so on. The franchisor also provided franchisees with extensive purchasing 
support. The. franchisor negotiated with distributors centrally and purchased videos and 
electronic games for all stores, The franchisor further assisted franchisees with purchasing 
by generating specific buying schedules for each individual outlet. The franchisor also 
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helped by organising regular regional meetings and an annual conference. All meetings 
and conferences involved franchisees, regional managers and selected head office 
franchisor representatives. 
Development 
The VideoCo franchise system developed from a buying group comprising more than 30 
independently owned and branded video outlets in 1990. VideoCo's founders formed the 
buying group during the late 1980s to improve purchasing in an environment dominated 
by powerful movie distributors. The BDM noted the extent of distributors power: 
It was even to a pOint where they would tell retailers where they could and 
couldn't open video shops. It was very very dominated by movie distributors right 
in the early days. 
The buying group was a success and by 1990 it comprised 35 independently branded 
outlets. Bargaining as a group meant that members were able to obtain benefits from 
distributors, such as discounts and free promotional items, which could not have been 
achieved by purchasing independently. 
While the group met purchasing objectives, it failed to capitalise on advantages in other 
areas, especially marketing. As stated by the BDM, other possibilities could not be 
explored because the buying group lacked a unified brand: 
So it (the buying group) was quite a successful way of operating. But what they 
(the founders) had created for themselves was a way to be a bit more proactive 
when it came to purchasing their product and making decisions on product 
placement and doing deals on pricing and so forth, but they didn't have anything 
to market because every shop had its own brand. So there was no [unified brand}. 
With new knowledge of franchising and its growth overseas, the founders decided to 
develop another group with a single brand and organise it as a franchise system. The 
founders believed a franchise system, compared to the co-operative buying group, 
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provided a more formalised structure to obtain a broader range of advantages. The 
VideoCo franchise system and brand was launched in 1990, and 30 outlets from the 
buying group, including 10 owned by the founders, joined the franchise system. 
The franchise system provided franchisees with more rigorous standards and not all 
franchisees, that had previously been buying group members, were comfortable with the 
reduction in autonomy. In fact, the BDM said that some franchisees were so unhappy with 
increased control over their businesses that they decided leave VideoCo when their 
agreements expired: 
In that first four years - because they were four year franchise agreements - there 
was a lot of learning for all parties; not only from us as the franchisor, but for 
franchisees as well, getting use to someone else having more control over their 
business and some of them didn't like it very much. So at the end of the four year 
period there would have been probably half a dozen or so that actually pulled the 
pin at that stage. 
The first four years of franchising also produced other problems. The founders attempted 
to simultaneously perform all franchisor duties whilst operating 10 video outlets, and the 
heavy workload limited their ability to manage the franchise system effectively. 
Consequently, the BDM said: 
They didn 't go a lot further than they had been with the buying group, apart from 
the fact they had a brand name and then they started to do promotions with that 
brand name. 
Franchisees that renewed their agreements with VideoCo, after the first four years, called 
for more professional organisation. Some also, as the BDM said, had been concerned that 
the founders had a conflict of interest by being franchisor and owning outlets: 
A lot of the people that stayed said well OK we quite like where this is going but 
we want it to be more professional and the two owners of the company had 
struggled with that ... By this stage they had 10 of their own shops. So they were 
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trying to run the franchise company and their ten shops as one entity and it just 
wasn't working, and there were questions of conflict of interest and all those kinds 
of things. 
An unusual situation then emerged whereby the founders removed themselves from the 
franchisor organisation in order to concentrate on operating their outlets. In 1995, the 
founders established a professional management team to manage the franchisor company. 
Except for directorships, the founders ceased their involvement in franchisor operations. 
After one year, the founders withdrew further from franchisor operations by exiting the 
board of directors. The founders then signed separate franchise agreements for each of 
their outlets and became franchisees. 
Under the new management team VideoCo grew to comprise 88 outlets by 2000. Growth 
involved a combination of new and existing franchisee expansion. Recently, some multi-
outlet franchisees reduced the size of their holdings. In most cases these outlets have been 
purchased by new franchisees. 
Franchise Imperatives 
The decision to franchise operations was influenced by the need for standardisation. The 
founders wanted a formal structure in which they could establish a single brand and obtain 
efficiencies in marketing as well as purchasing. The founders perceived franchising as 
advantageous, compared to the co-operative styled arrangement used for the buying group, 
because it involved a more formalised structure with clearer leadership. 
VideoCo's choice of franchising form was influenced by two key factors, namely 
franchisee ambition and control. In terms of franchisee ambition, some initial franchisees 
already desired and had multiple-outlets before they joined VideoCo from the buying 
group. Further, as stated by the BDM, some sought to expand their personal network 
further: 
In some instances the franchisees had more than one video store before they joined 
the group. The Dunedin franchise, for instance, was very much like that where they 
have got four shops, three of which they had before they became part of VideoCo, 
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and then the fourth one they have opened since they bought a new franchise area 
since then. 
Some new franchisees were also ambitious and desired additional franchises. As the BDM 
said, the franchisor typically granted additional franchises to such franchisees with little 
resistance: 
{AJs long as we are happy with the business they are running then we don't have a 
problem with allowing them to take on another franchise. From time to time we 
have put conditions in place. I recall requiring a refit of an existing store before 
you invest in a new store simply because you have got a shop that is due for a refit 
and it is starting to look a bit tired and we don't want people to take all of their 
money and invest it into a new business and then they have got nothing left to refit 
the old one. So we have done that from time to time. 
Interestingly, the franchisors view on multi-unit ownership altered with experience. The 
BDM said multi-unit franchisees were more powerful and difficult to manage than single-
unit operators. Consequently, if VideoCo were to franchise again, franchisee expansion 
might be limited: 
One of the difficulties we have come across with our franchisees that have multiple 
outlets is that they can be more difficult to manage because there is a perception 
that they have got two or three shops and that they perceive themselves to be worth 
more than a guy that has got one shop and so it can actually create difficulties in 
its self and you only need two or three franchisees that have got multiple outlets to 
get together and they become a very strong lobby group and that creates a 
difficulty in management and that is one area that we would probably look at a lot 
more carefully next time. 
VideoCo's choice of sequential franchising over area development, area representation 
and subfranchising was influenced most by a concern for controL The BDM felt that each 
of these alternative-franchising forms compromised control to an unacceptable level. For 
example, sequential franchising was preferred to area development because it maintained 
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greater control over the development of outlets. The BDM said that area development 
reduced franchisor control over expansion and could lead to slower system growth: 
It is not really the way we would want to do it. We would prefer to keep control 
over it. We might from time to time give a franchisee first rights over a 
neighboring territory if they are looking to expand, but we wouldn't give someone 
a big territory and say go for it ... I would feel that we tend to lose control over the 
development of that territory simply because the person that was given that 
opportunity could take five years to develop four shops whereas if we take control 
over that we can probably do it in half that time. 
The franchisor also preferred sequential franchising to area representation and 
subfranchising for reasons relating to control. The BDM felt that the franchisor delegating 
responsibilities associated with franchise recruitment and support to area representatives 
or subfranchisors would reduce the quality of franchisees recruited and support provided 
thereafter. Furthermore, the BDM reasoned that the basis for area representative or 
subfranchisor remuneration increased the potential for control loss in these areas: 
It is really about the control mechanism for that person there. 1 think that is 
possibly the question that crops up. Are they going to act in the way you wish and 
they might have a vetted interest in just getting as many franchisees as possible 
and you end up with quantity but not quality. 
By contrast, the BDM believed that the sequential franchising form was more appropriate. 
He felt that centralising franchisor-related activities, such as franchise recruitment and 
support, increased the likelihood each function would be performed to an acceptable 
standard. Furthermore, the BDM said it was more beneficial having salaried regional 
managers, hired by the franchisor, than area representatives or subfranchisors whose 
remuneration is tied to the performance of their territories: 
1 mean they (regional managers) are salaried employees and, as such, they are not 
responSible to generate their own revenue. They are purely a support person ... I 




The BDM felt that sequential franchising was the most appropriate franchising form for 
VideoCo given their market size. Furthermore, he said that even if the market were much 
greater in size, VideoCo would continue to prefer sequential franchising to alternative 
types of franchising. For example, if the market size was doubled, the BDM said the 
following about area development: 
We would still like to be in control of every single shop and even if they are two or 
three of them owned by the same franchisee we would want individual control over 
each shop. So yes, 1 think we would tend to shy away from that one there which is 
area development. 
The BDM also said that VideoCo would continue to prefer sequential franchising to area 
representation and subfranchising, even if the market size was doubled. He reasoned that 
the existing form could cope easily with managing many more outlets: 
1 think with twice the number of outlets we would even find ourselves more 
efficient. One of the difficulties we have got now is with three field managers they 
have a lot of territory to cover and if you can afford to have more and they can 
specialise in the area then they become more efficient. And in the same way, the 
way that we operate within the office here, there is a lot of what we do here that 
wouldn't change if we doubled the number of size. So 1 guess there is physically 
more paper and reports and that kind of thing but the way that we go about our 
purchasing would still be the same, and in the same way we would have more field 
staff out there. But they would still be doing the job in the same way and the profits 
would be greater then, simply because doubling the size of the whole thing doesn '1 
double everyone's workload. 
Consequently, the size of demand had little influence on VideoCo's choice ofform. 
88 
Market Growth 
Historically, grov.rth in demand for hiring videos has been strong. In particular, demand 
grew rapidly during the 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, by contrast, informants said 
that grov.rth in market demand has peaked. For example, the BDM stated: 
[Excluding the last 12 months] you would be talking around 15% steady growth. 
So excluding probably the last 12 months, we have stayed pretty well 
stagnant ... The industry is pretty much the same. We have got no reason to feel that 
we are any different from the rest of the industry. 
The regional manager concurred with the BDM's view and added there had been a rapid 
increase in the range and popularity of alternative activities: 
You have got rugby to start with: The Super 12 has become huge. Cinemas have 
picked up a huge amount. Really just more things to spend your money on, and you 
have got Sky TV, and all that. 
The context of earlier rapid market grov.rth and the more recent context of low or negative 
market grov.rth influenced form choice differently. During the period of earlier and more 
market rapid grov.rtb, existing franchisees were more inclined to seek and establish 
additional outlets. This led to a high proportion of outlets owned by multi-unit franchisees. 
More recently, by contrast, lower market growth has reduced the inclination for existing 
franchisees to expand the size of their networks. Furthermore, as stated by the BDM, 
lower market grov.rth has led many existing multi-outlet franchisees to actually reduce the 
size of their networks, and pursue alternative opportunities outside of the sector: 
The earlier part our franchise has grown from existing and new video shop 
owners, but our growth over the last couple of years has seen quite a number of 
new people coming into the industry, and we are also seeing, over the last 18 
months, more businesses changing hands as well. So we are getting new people in. 
Whereas somebody might have owned that video shop for five years, now they are 
looking to do something else, change or whatever. A few of them maybe just 
nervous about the lack of growth over the last 12 months, after seeing it very 
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healthy over a number of years, then all of a sudden it stops, and think well maybe 
this the time I should get out ... For instance, our Invercargill franchisee had three 
shops; {he} had two in Invercargill and one up in Gore, and he has sold off the one 
in Gore and the one in Invercargill and retained one himself and invested in other 
business ventures. 
The increasing number of new franchisees, due to decreasing market growth, also 
influenced form choice. As indicated above, the BDM related an increased proportion of 
new to experienced franchisees to the downturn in demand growth. In turn, he said that 
those new franchisees require greater support: 
One thing that we are seeing demand for is the services for the field managers. It is 
possibly because we have got people who are new to the industry coming in. 
The increase in support required, for the increased number of inexperienced franchisees, 
highlighted disadvantages associated with the area representation type of franchising. The 
BDM said in relation to the recent downturn in demand growth: 
So then you get the new people coming in who don't have the experience and that's 
why we do have requirements there for the field manager to be able to go in and 
spend time with those people. So this is where these other ones, where area 
representation, they become less inclined to do that - less inclined to go and spend 
a day or two days in a shop and more interested in getting people on board 
In summary, market growth influenced VideoCo form choice. Earlier and more rapid 
market growth led to the creation and growth of multi-outlet franchisees. By contrast, 
more recent low or negative demand growth contributed to many multi-outlet franchisees 
reducing the size of their holdings. In tum, a combination of lower demand growth, and a 
greater proportion of new operators, increased the need for franchisee support. This 




Customer demand for video hire was dispersed. Reflecting that dispersion, VideoCo had 
88 outlets in towns and cities throughout New Zealand. The level of dispersion did not 
influence VideoCo' s choice of franchising form. Due to their path to franchising, VideoCo 
was able to establish dispersed outlets from the outset, with little difficulty. More 
specifically, recruiting franchisees directly from the buying group provided VideoCo with 
a ready dispersed network of video outlets. Consequently, the BOM said: 
I don't think it (customer dispersion) does [influence choice of form] because the 
spread oj shops was there right from the beginning. So when they moved from a 
buying group into franchising they were already dealing with people in Dunedin 
and lnvercargill and right throughout the country. 
Had circumstances been different, however, the BOM said that the level of customer 
dispersion could have influenced form choice: 
So if we had been a franchise that started as an entity in Auckland and then 
spread, maybe it might have been different. Maybe we would have started to look 
at things like sub franchising or regional representation (area representation), but 
it wasn't the way that our business developed 
However, while the BOM noted indirect forms, namely area representation and 
subfranchising, were more attractive with dispersed demand, sequential franchising was 
still preferred. The BDM wanted to maintain direct control of individual outlets: 
There is always the concern that [with] those - area representation [and] 
sub franchising - oj losing control. That is the one thing that would be of a concern. 
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Competition 
Competition has intensified. Early on competition was sparse and pioneering operators, 
like VideoCo's founders, were able to build sales and additional outlets with relative ease. 
Now, in contrast, the sector is much more highly populated. Contrasting these different 
periods, the Regional Manager stated: 
Back in the 'hay day' of video - I mean if you go back 10 years - it is a license to 
print money. Well nothing like nowadays. It is like any industry, when there are a 
few stores you are making a fortune and when there is a million stores you are not. 
You could have had a monkey owning a video store 10-15 years ago and they 
would have made millions. But it diJesn 't happen that way now. 
Increased rivalry adversely affected outlet performance. In particular, margins were 
diminished due to price competition, the introduction of loyalty programmes and extended 
rental periods. In response, many smaller competing networks have disbanded and some 
outlets have closed. VideoCo experienced higher franchisee turnover due to increased 
nervousness regarding the sector's long-term outlook. 
VideoCo's form was influenced by competition. Competition added to concern about the 
sector's longer-term prospects that, in tum, contributed to many multi-outlet franchisees 
decreasing the size of their holdings. Multi-outlet franchisees sold outlets to new 
franchisees, which increased the proportion of outlets held by single-unit franchisees. 
Competition also influenced VideoCo's feelings toward area representation, by 
highlighting the importance of franchisee support. The BDM said greater competition 
increased the need for franchisee support: 
When you have got a fair amount of competition there is more demand for that 
regional manager role because they (the franchisees) are always looking for help 
to keep their turnover up. If the competitor has run a promotion they want to do 
something as well, so it becomes quite important for them to be able to have some 
assistance and advice from us, whereas if everything is going fine and we'il see 
that quite often where we have got a shop in a regional town and they are left by 
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themselves and they are quite happy they don't want any help and we'll suggest 
some ways to improve their business and they are not really that interested and all 
oj a sudden a competitor comes into town and a total mind shift [happens J. So 
competition does create that need for support and that is why they are part oj a 
franchise. 
In relation to form choice, the BDM felt that it was better to operate a form where the 
franchisor controls the provision of franchisee support. He believed that providing this 
function directly ensured franchisees received quality support. By contrast, the BDM said 
he felt area representatives lacked· incentives that would motivate them to provide good 
franchisee support: 
I think it goes back to that point where the regional manager becomes a lot more 
responsive than maybe an area representative, because as far as he (the regional 
manager) is concerned., he is just operating a service to franchisees. He is not 
trying to create revenue. 
Customer Diversity 
Demand in the video rental market was moderately heterogeneous. Customer needs, wants 
and preferences varied within and across locations. Contrasts most often compared 
wealthy-and-well-educated versus poor-and-uneducated populations. Outlets catering to 
either population required a different composition of stock. Yet, while there was variation 
this affected a relatively small proportion of stock. For example, both the franchisee and 
BDM stated: 
You buy what is sort of middle oj the road or if you find in your area that they are 
more inclined to martial arts or wrestling or and you buy a few more of those than 
say you would in another area where you might buy more drama or art festival 
type movies. So you have your general new releases which are going to satisfy 
everybody down the middle, but you will have your fringe movies that you can buy. 
It is up to your own discretion (Franchisee). 
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Your main hit movies are the same everywhere, whether it is 'The Truman Show' 
or 'Saving Private Ryan, ' every shop is going to have those movies. Because they 
have generated their own publicity, they will rent everywhere (Business 
Development Manager). 
This heterogeneity had little impact on outlet operations. While stock composition differed 
between outlets, all informants noted that the task of selecting stock was relatively easy. 
For example, the franchisee stated: 
Generally movie people want to see the new release ones so everybody will be 
getting those. Everybody gets 'Titanic' and things like that, so it's the ones on the 
outside: Do I buy two wrestling ones this month or do I buy two art festival ones or 
what little niches do I need to accommodate? You get the feel of it. After a while 
people come in and ask for certain types of movies. Like when I came here, they 
(the previous owners) had wrestling movies but they just had a few older ones. But 
I had people asking for them, so now I get two new new release wrestling movies 
each month. 
The BDM did not think the diversity of demand influenced the choice of franchising form: 
I don't think so because it essentially is still the same business. There is just a 
variation in the product to suit and it is not huge because the main titles are still 
the new titles that are renting. 
Managerial Complexity 
Informants all believed VideoCo outlets were not complex operations to manage. While 
outlets carried between 4000 and 15000 videos and 700 games for rental, the tasks 
associated with stock management were not complex. New video releases arrived at a rate 
of between two and seven per week, and operators quickly learnt how many to order. The 
purchasing manager also assisted this process by supplying franchisees with detailed 
buying schedules based on their outlet's circumstances. The purchasing manager also 
arranged deals with most suppliers directly, obviating the need for franchisee participation 
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in multiple, lengthy and sometimes complex negotiations, The BDM said: 
So the purchasing manager gets the monthly buying catalogue from all of those 
people (distributors) and negotiates on the right price for all the top titles. Then we 
create a buying schedule for each of our franchisees and give them a budget based 
on their sales and turnover and we issue them out, and in its most simplest form we 
can actually create the order for those franchisees. They don't even have to make 
any decisions about what to order. 
Deals with confectionery and soft drink suppliers were also typically arranged by the 
franchisor. Further, as the BDM said, these items were often vendor managed: 
A lot of that stuff (confectionery and soft drinks) is 'vendor stock' or 'van sales. ' 
The Coca Cola truck comes around and they buy two crates off him, so it all just 
happens basically. The ice cream truck comes around and the guy checks the 
fridge and says, 'oh you need some more of those and some more of those' ... so 
they don't have to make too many decisions. 
Product placement and pricing decisions were relatively simple and routine. For example, 
new titles are priced high and added to the 'New Releases' section. With age these move 
to the 'Recent Releases' section, Following this, they are placed into descriptive 
categories, such as 'Action,' 'Drama' or 'Horror.' Hiring costs decrease at each stage. 
U sing a proprietary computer system, outlet managers monitor the performance of each 
video. This assists decisions on pricing, placement, and selling of unwanted stock. 
While informants described the aforementioned tasks as relatively simple and 
uncomplicated, all agreed that responsibilities associated with staff management were 
more complex, Operating a medium-sized outlet, the franchisee interviewed employs three 
full-time and three part-time staff 
Overall, as indicated above, the outlets were considered relatively easy to manage. In 
particular, they were considered much easier to manage than a traditional retailer, such as 
Sporteo. For example, the Regional Manager stated: 
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See video rental is a sort of retailing but it is not, because you have not got all that 
dead stock that retailers have. Yau don't have to anticipate six months ahead for 
the next season [and] it is not like food where you have got to bring in different 
regulations and all that sort of thing. It is a very easy business to run .. .! mean [in 
Video hire] you buy a product, sell it, it comes back the next day and you sell it 
again, it comes back the next day and you sell it again. 
Initially, the BDM did not think the level of managerial complexity influenced VideoCo's 
choice of franchising form: 
No, I guess it doesn't, because it is the type of business that attracts people who 
don't really have too many skills and because the franchisor provides the support 
and if he didn't provide the support then you wouldn't attract those people. I think 
of it in the same way as Pizza Haven (a pizza delivery company) or someone like 
that, because they take people that have just got some money to invest and they 
train them into the business and then they support them by helping with all the 
promotions and so forth. 
The BDM conceded, however, that the simplicity of managing a VideoCo outlet does 
make it easier, compared to some more complex retail formats, for skilled franchisees to 
successfully establish and manage multiple outlets: 
Yes it is [easier], providing that they have got the skills to do it. [However] it is 
very easy to think because you run one business very well that you can then go to 
two. Because with one business you might be spending a lot of time in the business 
and as soon as you have got two then you are not doing that... So it doesn't go 
hand and hand 
Summary 
Founded in 1990, VideoCo comprised 88 franchised outlets dispersed throughout New 
Zealand. VideoCo developed from a co-operative buying group when the founders 
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perceived advantages of a more formal (franchised) network, encompassing a unified 
brand. Thirty outlets were converted to franchises in the process. VideoCo's form was 
characteristic of sequential franchising. Around 20 percent of outlets were controlled by 
multi-unit franchisees. The largest had five. Some multi-unit holdings were established 
during the conversion process. Subsequently, some new and existing franchisees added 
further units. Recently, franchisee turnover has increased and some multi-outlet 
franchisees have reduced the size of their networks. 
The utilisation of sequential franchising was influenced by franchisee ambition. Sequential 
franchising occurred as some existing multi-unit franchisees and new franchisees had 
aspirations to establish and own additional VideoCo outlets. The franchisor provided little 
resistance to such requests from franchisees to expand. Therefore the ambition of 
franchisees was able to influence VideoCo's choice ofform. 
The franchisor's need for control also influenced VideoCo' s selection of sequential 
franchising. Sequential franchising was preferred to area development because it involved 
the franchisor maintaining control over the development of each and every outlet. 
Sequential franchising was also favoured to area representation and .subfranchising for 
control-related reasons. The franchisor preferred sequential franchising because it retained 
direct control of franchisor-related tasks, such as franchisee recruitment and support. 
Importantly, the preference for sequential franchising compared to area representation and 
subfranchising, was also influenced by the perceived effect of different structures of 
remuneration. The franchisor was concerned that the structure of remuneration for area 
representatives and subfranchisors would motivate them to maximise outlet-growth at the 
expense of providing quality franchisee recruitment and support. 
Environmental factors, demand size, growth, dispersion and heterogeneity, intensity of 
rivalry and managerial complexity had a less notable or negligible affect on VideoCo' s 
choice of franchising form. Demand size had no influence on Video Co , s selection of 
sequential franchising. Even if the market size demand were much greater, Video Co 
would continue to utilise sequential franchising. 
Demand growth did influence VideoCo' s form. During strong market growth early in 
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VideoCo's development, a number of franchisees sought additional VideoCo outlets. In 
contrast, a recent plateau in market growth led to a subtle change in the extent of multi-
unit franchising. Many multi-unit franchisees decided to sell some of their outlets, often to 
new franchisees. The sale of outlets by multi-unit franchisees then increased the 
proportion of outlets controlled by single-unit franchisees. The increase in number of new 
and inexperienced franchisees also influenced form choice, by highlighting disadvantages 
associated with area representation. A greater number of new franchisees increased the 
importance of providing quality franchisee support. Sequential franchising was preferred 
to area representation because it was believed to provide better franchisee support. 
VideoCo's choice of franchising form was not influenced by the dispersion of customers. 
The conversion from buying group to franchise system provided VideoCo with dispersed 
outlets from the outset, thereby reducing the challenge associated with establishing outlets 
in locations isolated from the franchisor. 
Competition had a minor influence on VideoCo's form. Increased competition and an 
associated nervousness regarding the sector's outlook., contributed to a reduction in the 
extent of multi-unit franchising at VideoCo. The affect of greater competition on outlet 
performance, and a larger proportion of new franchisees, increased the need for quality 
franchisee support. The need for quality support, in turn, also influenced form choice by 
highlighting disadvantages associated with area representation. 
Finally, the diversity of customers had no notable influence on VideoCo's choice of form. 
The level of managerial complexity also had little influence on VideoCo' s choice of form. 
However, it was noted that simplicity of operating a VideoCo outlet, compared to more 




RealCo is a real estate company with 145 offices located throughout New Zealand. 
Together these offices employ more than 1500 real estate consultants/agents with sales in 
excess of four billion dollars annually. On average, each office had around 10 consultants, 
but ranged from less than five to more than 40. This case centres on RealCo's primary 
focus, which is residential and rural property sales in New Zealand. Using separate 
entities, RealCo also offered a range of other related services, including commercial sales, 
leasing, property management, mortgage lending and insurance. RealCo also had 
international interests, with a franchise network comprising 45 offices in Queensland, 
Australia. The range of related services and the Australian office network are both beyond 
the scope of this case. 
RealCo's form comprises a blend of sequential franchising and area development, and all 
offices were franchised. Characteristic of sequential franchising, some franchisees have 
grown personal networks on an incremental basis, with each additional office requiring 
separate franchisor approval. Area development has occurred in two ways. First, all 
franchises comprise an exclusive territory within which owners can establish multiple 
offices at will. Second, some owners have been granted multiple franchises from the 
outset. This often occurred where RealCo purchased a competing multi-office networks 
before on-selling them to one or more multi-unit franchisee/so RealCo's 145 offices are 
currently controlled by 70 franchisees. While some single-unit franchisees exist, many 
franchise owners have more than one office. Multi-unit franchisees have between two and 
five offices. 
New franchise owners were typically required to pay the franchisor an initial fee to 
become franchisees. Franchisees then pay the franchisor an ongoing royalty fee based on 
commissions received. Multi-office franchisees qualified for a royalty rebate based on 
size. In return for both payments, the franchisor provided franchisees with overarching 
chain management and support. The franchisor provided some services from a central 
location. Remaining franchisor-related services were provided via four regional offices 
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located in other centres throughout the New Zealand. The RealCo franchise management 
team consisted of more than 15 employees, excluding secretarial and administrative staff 
This management team provided co-ordination, training, business consulting services and 
general support to local franchisees. 
Sales consultants were recruited by, and affiliated with, individual real estate offices. 
However, all consultants contract directly with the franchisor. Following recruitment, all 
sales consultants were trained by the franchisor before operating. 
Development 
The first RealCo office was established in Wellington in 1888. Growth from this time 
occurred in two distinct stages. The first stage/period lasted almost a century and was 
characterised by slow, incremental development. During this time RealCo grew to consist 
of eight company-owned offices. The second period was characterised by very rapid 
growth. This began almost one hundred years later, in 1985, after RealCo merged with 
another small, independent real estate network. Branded RealCo, the new company 
comprised 14 real estate offices. 
From 1985, the new company (still named RealCo) embarked on an ambitious growth 
strategy with the objective of establishing a nation-wide network of offices. To achieve 
this goal, external capital was sought and obtained in exchange for RealCo shares. A local 
bank purchased these shares in 1986. In 1990, an insurance company purchased that 
holding and, in 1992, three RealCo executives staged a management buyout. The three 
executives were key instigators of expansion plans, after joining RealCo in the 1985 
merger. The three managers now comprise RealCo's Managing Director, General 
Manager, and Chief Financial Officer. 
The capital injected in 1986 helped fuel RealCo's expansion from 14 to almost 100 real 
estate offices by 1990. Expansion was achieved using two modes of company-owned 
development. The first, and preferred method, involved purchasing existing, independent 
offices and networks. The second involved RealCo establishing new offices. RealCo 
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focused initially on penetrating large populations centres, such as Auckland, Wellington 
and Christchurch, before entering smaller cities and large towns. 
Franchise development began in 1990. From this day, existing company-owned offices 
were converted to franchises. New franchise expansion then grew RealCo to 145 offices 
by 1996. The process of conversion and new franchise expansion produced franchise 
arrangements characteristic of both sequential franchising and area development. 
Considerable consolidation in franchisee holdings took place. At one time the RealCo 
network of offices was controlled by 114 separate franchisees. By contrast, 70 franchisees 
controlled a similar number of offices at the time of the research. The consolidation 
occurred as ambitious franchisees purchased offices from others either struggling 
financially andlor looking to leave RealCo. At the time of data collection, RealCo had 
amended their franchise strategy and sought to limit and reduce multi-unit franchisee 
expansion and size. 
Franchise Imperatives 
RealCo's choice of franchising types was influenced by a number of factors. Of these 
factors, incentives influenced two areas of RealCo's franchise development. In the first 
area, the issue of incentives influenced the initial decision to franchise. Prior to franchising 
RealCo shareholders were realising low returns on their investment, due to poor office 
productivity and profitability. Pressure existed to improve this situation and franchising 
was believed to offer a solution. It was felt that managers would operate more diligently as 
franchisees than employees. This belief proved correct and, as noted by the General 
Manager, office productivity and profitability improved remarkably: 
The cost of running a corporate structure probably halved when it was franchised, 
because the franchise owners owning their own businesses were far more 
particular in what they bought and ordered So the costs reduced 50 percent, and 
because they owned the business the productivity went up 100 percent - so the net 
difference was incredible. 
Interestingly, incentives had a much greater affect than informants had initially imagined. 
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For example, when asked whether RealCo had expected such a dramatic improvement in 
performance, the General Manager stated: 
No we didn't, no. We thought there would be an improvement, but the improvement 
was to be so dramatic, as to be almost unbelievable. 
In the second area, consideration of incentives strongly influenced the decision to limit 
franchisee size. During the processes of expansion and consolidation of RealCo offices, 
numerous franchisees had established multiple offices. On average, the individual 
performance of offices associated with such networks proved to be poor, especially in 
comparison to single-unit franchise operations. Franchisor informants attributed this 
performance difference to the fact many offices owned by multi-unit franchisees were 
managed by employees. Consequently, as stated by the General Manager, this contributed 
to RealCo's decision to reduce and limit multi-unit franchisee size: 
Interestingly enough, we are now focusing on trying to get those larger franchise 
owners back, acquiring them or encouraging them to split up and disseminate the 
offices again, because the replication of the structure that we had wasn't profitable 
for us, and although it is profitable for the franchise owner, it is not maximising 
the return from the territory because you can never get a manager to produce what 
an owner will. So these bigger guys have got managers and they were like us, they 
have got under-performing managers overall. They make a profit out of sheer size, 
but when we look at it on an individual baSis, the productivity per person and per 
office is abysmal. So now our focus is how do we break these big guys up and split 
them up. 
The initial decision to franchise was also influenced by access to financial capital. As 
stated by the General Manager, advantages in this area were initially associated with 
expansion into small, more isolated markets: 
It wasn't economic for us to set up an office in remote areas, so the franchising 
commenced with us wanting to spread the brand, and having an office related that 
we could refer business to and build a national company. 
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However, it quickly became apparent that the access to capital provided by franchising 
was beneficial for expansion in other markets and reducing franchisor financial exposure 
in existing, company-owned offices. 
Company manager, and later franchisee, aspirations also strongly influenced RealCo's 
franchising decisions. Prior to franchising, RealCo had few options available for extending 
talented and ambitious office managers. Consequently, many managers desirous of further 
development looked at opportunities outside of RealCo. This represented a twofold loss as 
RealCo faced losing competent staff, and long term rewards for their investment in 
manager training and development. As stated by the General Manager, franchising helped 
resolve this situation by providing office managers with greater opportunities: 
What we found was the managers that we had recruited, taught and trained 
running the company-owned offices were looking for the next step for them which 
was some form of business ownership. If we didn't provide some form of growth 
for those people they would have left and set up on their own. At that stage we 
started selling those company-owed offices and franchising them. 
Interestingly, while RealCo had been considering franchising for sometime, the first 
franchise sale occurred in direct response to one office manager's aspirations. Illustrating 
this, the Managing Director recounted the conversation that took place when the manager 
telephoned to inform him of his intention to join a franchised real estate company: 
1 said 'well why would you want to do that' and he said 'well you would never 
have franchised a RealCo office' and 1 said 'who said?' and he said 'I did' and 1 
said 'well you know __ all then' and 1 said 'I'll see you in Featherstone in an 
hour. ' So 1 got in the car and went over to Featherstone and we sat down and 1 
said 'have you got the franchise agreement with you from 'Company X' and he 
said yes' and 1 said 'lets twink out 'Company X' and put in RealCo, ' and that was 
our first franchise. 
The influence of franchisee aspirations on RealCo's decisions followed a similar pattern. 
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Ambitious individuals andlor partnerships were often not satisfied with owrung and 
operating a single franchised office. Indeed, several franchisees sought to establish or 
purchase additional offices. Furthermore, they were prepared to leave RealCo if the 
franchisor did not grant them franchises. Illustrating the importance of franchisee ambition 
on franchisor decisions to grant additional outlets, the franchisor realised that allowing 
franchisee expansion could have negative consequences. The franchisor understood that 
allowing franchisee expansion could lead to increased franchisee power and lower office 
profitability, but was not prepared to refuse franchisee demands for risk of losing both 
competent franchisees and strategic locations. As noted in the following quotations, both 
franchisees and the franchisor acknowledged the strong influence of franchisee aspirations 
on RealCo's decision to grant franchisees multiple offices: 
Well people grow, and if they can't grow within your organisation they will pack 
up and grow somewhere else (Franchisee). 
I believe we become successful by helping other people be successful. I believe if 
you put someone in one office who has the capability of running and owning and 
operating a bigger business successfully - if you stop them from doing that they 
will either kick the walls out and find a way to do it themselves, and then you lose 
them, and therefore you lose your top people, or they will sink down to a level of 
inactivity required to do what they are doing and they will lose the 
entrepreneurialism and the drive that made them successful anyway. So it is a lose-
lose situation (Managing Director). 
It is also ego. A lot of it [multi-office expansion] is driven by ego. Some 
ffranchisees] want to be the biggest. Some want to be the best, [while 1 some just 
want to make a living, really. It is the personal goals of the individual (General 
Manager). 
RealCo's franchising decisions were also strongly influenced by the franchisor's desire for 
very rapid growth. As identified previously, franchising provided distinct benefits over 
company-owned development for facilitating growth. Notably, franchising provided 
superior access to capital by supplying franchisees with the managerial and financial 
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capacity to establish and manage additional offices. The desire for growth also influenced 
the types of franchising adopted. Following the decision to franchise, RealCo converted 
existing offices before continuing growth with new franchise expansion. RealCo pursued 
both activities with a level of urgency that focused more on producing growth than how it 
was achieved. Consequently, as franchisor informants described, a range of forms 
emerged: 
It grew as a piece meal. We just went for it. In other words, no serious thought 
[was given} to structure. What we knew is that when we had decided to do 
franchising - that was what we were going to do. I mean, I don't do second, so we 
just had to build and grow (Managing Director). 
It was difficult to get successful operators to join, to put up a new brand and pay 
us a franchise fee. So we acquired shareholdings in a number of them, bought 
whole companies and franchised them afterwards, and generally we became a 
catalyst ... For example, Taupo - one partner wanted out, so we took a shareholding 
and changed the name. We did that in a number of centers around New Zealand 
So we were reasonably flexible in the way we engineered it, but the end result was 
a franchised company, even if we had a shareholding in it (General Manager). 
Flexibility in how growth was achieved was evident in the variety of organisational forms 
and ownership structure that developed. Accordingly, franchise arrangements 
characteristic of sequential franchising and area development all appeared; some involving 
franchisor equity. Such franchisee expansion was attractive to the franchisor because it 
facilitated growth. Specifically, allowing franchisees multiple-offices obviated the need to 
attract, select and establish new franchisees·for each additional office. 
Interestingly, however, subsequent experience with managing multi-office franchisees has 
made the franchisor more critical of earlier decisions. In particular, the franchisor now 
questions whether the long-term disadvantages associated with sequential franchising and 
area development, such as lower office performance and reduced control, outweigh the 
initial benefits produced by facilitating more rapid expansion. The General Manager 
reflected on this issue: 
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lf we franchised again, we would limit the number of offices per franchise owner. 
We wouldn't allow the aggregation of offices that has gone on, although hindsight 
is a wonderful thing. At the time when you are trying to build and you have got 
non-performing offices, and you are trying to get rid of them and there is a good 
franchise owner who wants to take it over - so you say, well we are getting nothing 
out of it so we are better off to get something. And once you establish, you know, 
the numbers then you look at it and say hey, you know, we really should break this 
up. But no, I think we would strive harder to find an independent owner to buy 
than just to persuade the existing franchise owner to take it. 
A desire for increased franchisor control over offices influenced decisions later in 
RealCo's development. In particular, the issue of control influenced RealCo's recent 
decision to reduce and limit the size of multi-unit franchisees. The General Manager said 
that as some franchisees have grown the base of power within RealCo had shifted from the 
franchisor toward such large multi-office franchisees. In tum, the shift in power had 
reduced the franchisor's ability to manage the chain effectively. The General Manager said 
tasks such as monitoring offices and implementing new initiatives became more difficult. 
In relation to new initiatives, for example, RealCo needed to take proposals for all new 
initiatives directly to an executive group comprising powerful franchisees. The General 
Manager said: 
Well we always present what our vision is to them first. If we get their buy in, we 
take it to the rest of the country. lf they resist it then no, then we would change 
tack, re-package it, re-develop it, get the feed back and go back to them. If we 
don't have their mandate then we don't launch it to the rest of the country. So we 
have like an executive group that we take everything to first. If they buy-in, we go. 
lf they don't, we don't. 
Underlying franchisee power was a threat of defection. The franchisor was concerned 
multi-office franchisees would leave RealCo to join or start competing operations. As 
illustrated by the General Manager, such defection was of strategic concern: 
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A major issue is that if we had a large operation that left us, and either traded on 
their own, or took on another brand, it would leave a large dent in the 
organisation that we couldn't immediately fill. 
Consequently, the franchisor's decision to limit and reduce franchisee expanSiOn was 
designed to reduce franchisee power and associated problems. In hindsight, RealCo 
considered one further strategy that might have been implemented to preserve greater 
franchisor power over offices and franchisees. As both the Managing Director and General 
Manager said, the franchisor could have taken a 50 percent share in important locations: 
lfwe had it again we would consider a 50-50 share in the city offices. The reason 
is, not for taking a profit, we get that from the fees, but the control side of things 
would have been better (General Manager). 
I think if we were going to do it again - maybe in terms of the initial structure - we 




The market for real estate services is large. With around 90,000 houses sold per year, the 
market was sufficient in size for RealCo, and at least two other firms, to establish and 
operate more than 100 offices. The size of the market influenced the type of franchising 
RealCo adopted. As indicated in a previous quotation, allowing franchisees to establish 
multiple offices had been advantageous because it meant the franchisor did not have to 
recruit new franchisees for each individual office. 
Franchisor informants also felt the market size influenced the extent of multi-unit 
franchising. For example, the General Manager said that if demand were smaller, multi-
unit franchisees would continue to exist, but have fewer offices: 
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The approach would be the same. You would still have the successful multi-office 
operators. They wouldn't have six offices, they would probably have three and 
your individual offices would shrink from four down to two. The model would still 
be the same. So it is really competency based [Where 1 you have got a competent 
owner they will still have more offices. 
Finally, the market size also influenced the suitability of indirect forms, such as area 
representation and subfranchising. Both the Managing Director and General Manager 
thought that the New Zealand market was too small for these types of franchising, 
particularly when viewed in isolation from RealCo's Australian operations. For example, 
the Managing Director said: 
1 don't think there is any advantages in New Zealand 1 think it is too smaller 
country. But 1 see as we grow, and Australia becomes stronger, it may well be that 
people running both of those countries may want to acquire the rights to those 
-countries, and just pay an ongOing fee for the name, the brand and, the 
development of the technology and the training (Managing Director). 
We have thought about that (sub franchiSing). But while NZ is producing a profit in 
the way that we have, sub franchising at the end of the day is just going to reduce 
the revenue to the franchisor (General Manager). 
Market Growth 
Demand for real estate services is best described as turbulent, with the number of house 
sales frequently increasing or decreasing by 15 percent or more on the previous year. Long 
periods of negative growth were common and these had a marked affect on business 
operations. As noted by the franchisee and Managing Director, lean years highlighted 
inefficiencies as marginal offices find trading difficult: 
Last year it (demand) was down by about 30 percent, so that was a big drop ... 
obviously the turnover was down, and our number of sales went down by about the 
same. So it just meant there wasn't the number of houses around - just not selling. 
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There was still a lot of stock on the market, so you are still marketing and 
promoting and doing the work, but there just wasn't the buyer... There were a 
number of companies who closed down and downsized and a lot of their people 
(sales consultants) came to us... People (sales consultants) started changing 
companies. They get a bit restless and think 'hey, I'm not making money' 
(Franchisee). 
Yes it (negative growth) did [affect operations}, because last year we discovered 
quite quickly that some of our offices were not capable of operating successful 
businesses, and we replaced and closed some of our franchises (Managing 
Director). 
These testing market conditions contributed to RealCo's resolution to limit and reduce 
future franchisee expansion, and consider ways of restructuring some existing multi-office 
networks. This was because, as stated earlier, the franchisor identified multi-office 
networks were more susceptible to performance difficulties than single-office operations. 
In an example, the General Manager noted how a declining market accentuated trading 
difficulties for one expanding franchisee: 
Yes one franchise and they have expanded into the area. But interestingly enough 
they bought another company which had 10% market share ... which basically 
increased the offices by 50 percent. 12 months down the track the market has 
contracted, the offices are all shut, most of the sales consultants have gone - it was 
a disaster. 
Customer Dispersion 
Demand for real estate services was highly dispersed. Such dispersion required RealCo to 
establish and support a large number of offices in geographically isolated locations. These 
requirements contributed to RealCo's franchising decisions. Specifically, RealCo were 
more likely to allow franchisee expansion in areas dispersed from the franchisor and 
regional support centres. This was because, as stated by the General Manager, isolated 
franchisees were more expensive to support: 
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Where the areas are hard to service from our perspective, like the more remote it 
is from the regional office, the more likely we are to allow the aggregation Like 
Kapiti, if you go up the Kapiti Coast. Well, you know, if Mic wants to put another 
office in he says 'well I want to do one in Foxton. ' So well where 's Foxton? [So we 
would say] 'yeah, that'd be great mate' ... but if it is a major metropolitan area then 
we 'lliook at it more harshly because we exert more influence in those areas where 
we have regional offices. 
Despite being more likely to endorse franchisee expansion in dispersed locations, 
however, multi-office expansion was, in fact, more prevalent in metropolitan areas. The 
General Manager said: 
The pattern is multi-office operators are generally only in major metropolitan 
areas ... So generally outside the major metro (metropolitan areas), they are all 
single office operators. 
The Managing Director offered an explanation for this distribution. RealCo offices that are 
isolated from the franchisor, or support offices, are also often a long distance from other 
offices. The Managing Director felt large distances tempered franchisees desire and ability 
to expand: 
Any why would you contemplate having an office in Invercargill and Queenstown? 
It would take you half a day to get there! So there are some natural barriers which 
are created 
Competition 
Literally hundreds of competing firms were operating in the New Zealand real estate 
sector, including six with a nation-wide network of offices. The competition included two 
particularly strong companies from Australia (with more than 500 offices) that entered 
New Zealand recently, purchasing existing networks and expanding further to attain 
nation-wide coverage. The high and increased level of competition made trading difficult. 
Notably, price competition intensified contributing to decreased profitability and several 
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office closures within the industry. lllustrating these points, the General Manager stated: 
They (competitors) nibble awc:ry at the profitability of the business because you 
have always got someone who is discounting their fees dramatically to try and get 
business and they get a certain proportion of the business before they go broke, as 
they inevitably do, because you can't run a competitive business on a low fee 
strategy. 
Difficult trading conditions highlighted two issues. First, RealCo sought to improve office 
productivity and profitability in order to maintain viable offices. Second, as noted by the 
General Manager, RealCo sought to differentiate themselves from competitors by 
introducing new marketing initiatives: 
1 think at the moment we treat the customers like they are all the same, [but} 
because of the competitive nature of the business now, you are having to find out 
more about the individuals needs and wants and positioning your marketing 
presentation around those. 
The franchisor's desire to improve office performance and differentiate contributed to the 
decision to limit multi-office franchisee size. As stated previously, the franchisor believed 
reducing franchisee size would help improve office performance and preserve bargaining 
power needed for implementing important new initiatives. 
Customer Diversity 
Demand for real estate services was quite diverse. Residential homebuyers (and sellers) 
had wide-ranging demographics (e.g., age and culture), circumstances (e.g., financial, 
existing property arrangements), tastes (e. g., desirable/undesirable property features) and 
expectations (e.g., sale price and possession dates). For example, when asked how clients 
vary most, the franchisee responded: 
Really in what they want and their time frames - and it is like going to buy a car -
not everyone is exactly the same. Some people make a decision on the first day, 
some people take two months. So they are all over the place. Some people are more 
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realistic in what the value of their home is. Others have very high expectations and 
it takes a while for them to get used to the market. 
Two conflicting franchisor challenges were highlighted in this context of diversity. On one 
hand, sales consultants and offices needed to be responsive to different customer 
requirements. On another, both needed to be sufficiently similar in their responses to 
preserve brand equity. To balance both objectives, the franchisor developed all new 
initiatives centrally for use throughout RealCo. 
Franchisor attempts to implement and monitor new initiatives in offices highlighted the 
need for franchisor control, and contributed to RealCo's franchising decisions. The 
franchisor's need for control contributed to two choices relating to franchising types. The 
first choice related to the franchisor's recent decision to limit and reduce multi-office 
franchisee expansion. As described earlier, experience had shown the franchisor that 
multi-office franchisees, which were more powerful due to large size, often impeded new 
initiatives designed for the benefit of all RealCo offices. 
The second decision related to the rejection of area representation and subfranchising 
types of franchising. The General Manager thought that without direct control of offices, it 
would be more difficult to balance the conflicting challenges of adaptation and uniformity. 
In an example, he said: 
That area representative is a very interesting idea and it may well be that there are 
efficiencies. But at the moment we develop the training and the ideas centrally and 
what we have found is that if you have this situation here (area representation) you 
end up with three different types of training, three different systems, you know, in 
New Zealand. You would. And how you keep some standards - you end up with 
different marketing and it really starts to disseminate. 
Part of the franchisor's concern about area representation and subfranchising, which 
included a loss of franchisor control, related to the basis for area representative and 
subfranchisor remuneration. The General Manager felt that, because area representative or 
subfranchisor income is closely linked to franchisee revenue, such master franchisees 
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would more inclined to maximise revenue within their territories than support franchisor 
programmes intended for the benefit of all RealCo offices: 
[Because] this guy (area representative or subfranchisor) is on a revenue share 
they are less inclined to support national marketing and training and other 
initiatives because they try to maximise the profit out of it - and those sort of 
considerations go out the window, so you are fighting a battle all oj the time. 
Managerial Complexity 
Unit (or office) management tasks may not have been complex but they provided office 
managers with significant problems. Outwardly the tasks associated with office 
management appeared only moderately complex. RealCo offices offered only a narrow 
range of property services, by specialising in the sale of residential properties. Commercial 
sales and leasing, property management (including residential property management), real 
estate finance and insurance were all undertaken by separate entities. Offices also required 
few suppliers. The most challenging area for managers of offices was establishing and 
maintaining a dedicated team of sales consultants. On average, developing and operating a 
sales force involved recruiting, managing, co-ordinating and supporting 10 or more sales 
consultants. As stated by the franchisee, given the mobility of sales consultants, the 
difficulty of these tasks could not be underestimated: 
With our sales people, if they are working for us and they think that we are not 
doing a good job and they're getting ahead oj us, and they are doing better 
business than us, you are going to say 'well look, there is no value in you guys, I'll 
go and work jor someone else. ' 
While franchisor informants felt the tasks associated with managing a real estate office 
were relatively simple, they noted many RealCo franchise owners and employee-managers 
had difficulties with their roles. Franchisor informants argued that one reason for such 
problems was a general low level of managerial skill within the Real Estate industry. In an 
example, the Managing Director, stated: 
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The quality of the people in the industry is abhorrent ... Most of the people who 
come into real estate come in via the mirror test - which is, you hold a mirror up 
to their mouth and if it fogs up you employ them because no one has looked at this 
business in a professional way. 
Franchisor informants felt that, given the level of managerial complexity, and perceived 
level of managerial skills (within the industry), training was of critical importance to 
RealCo's success within the real estate sector. The General Manager said: 
Weill think the franchise owners and the managers struggle with management, 
[so} we've put a huge emphasis on up-skilling our managers and our franchise 
owners in just the basics of management. 
Given the level of complexity, franchisor informants regarded training as central to 
success throughout RealCo, especially at the sales consultants and office manager level. 
Consequently, RealCo had a strong commitment to training for both groups. For example, 
consultants and office managers were comprehensively trained and tested before being 
allowed to operate. Furthermore, employee-managers of within multi-office networks 
were also required to pass an examination proving their recollection and understanding of 
RealCo's proprietary office systems, manuals and practices. RealCo also had a very strong 
commitment to ongoing training and development for both consultants and managers. 
Both the General Manager and the Managing Director felt the level of managerial 
complexity influenced form choice in two ways. First, both franchisor informants 
preferred direct to indirect franchising forms. Both informants felt that, due the level of 
complexity, important franchisor-related functions, such as training, needed to be 
controlled centrally by the franchisor. Delegating franchisor-related functions, as would 
occur operating indirect forms, meant the franchisor would have less control over their 
delivery. The General Manager explained in relation to sales consultants: 
That's why the franchisor has a direct relationship with the sales consultants. 
Because we train the sales consultants through our new sales person induction 
course the franchisor has the first major contact to sow the seeds in the culture 
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with the sales consultants. And then we follow up in terms of the marketing the 
RealCo People, Home and Property, and other services. We deliver those direct to 
the sales consultants, so we can maintain a relationship with them. [With area 
representation or subfranchising] you would [lose control] because - we would 
expect these guys (area representatives or subfranchisors) to if they have got the 
same culture they will deliver it - but to a degree they would then be charged with 
running the new sales persons training course. So they (area representatives or 
subfranchisors) would have the relationship with the sales consultant and [the 
sales consultants would] become more remote to us ... There will be loss of control. 
Interestingly, however, the General Manager conceded that indirect forms also had 
advantages. And while he preferred direct forms, given .the level of complexity, other 
factors, including intemationalisation, and a desire to reduce owner involvement, might 
ultimately contribute to RealCo adopting an indirect multi-unit form at some future date: 
However, one of the reasons we may move towards this model (area representation 
or sub franchising) is that it is the only way, at the end of the day, that the owners -
that is 'the Managing Director, ' myself, the Chief Financial Officer, J and 'another 
director' can get out of the day to day running. So with a private company like 
ours it is always hard to get out, unless somebody bigger comes along and says, 
you know, 'you're a juicy morsel, I want you J... You know, in Christchurch we still 
get a call from a franchise owner having problems with a sales consultant [asking] 
'Managing Director, General Manager can you help me out? ' At the same time we 
are trying to get a merchant banker to finance the expansion into New South Wales 
to help us buy a large group over there! 
In the second area influencing form, the level of managerial complexity highlighted 
difficulties associated with managing multiple offices. As identified, managing one office 
can be problematic. And, as the Managing Director explained, in the following quotations, 
difficulties can compound with two or more offices: 
How eajJl is itfor someone to run a real estate office? lfthey can read and write 
and follow instructions it really isn't hard at all. If you have got some 
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interpersonal effectiveness skills that will help a lot and if they have some focus 
and vision and a bit of excitement and some good communication skills, that's even 
better. That is one person [with} one office. The most difficult thing in the world is 
for that person to take those skills and superimpose them on another office that 
they are not running. 
I had one office in Christchurch and I had one office for a number of years and it 
was a very successful office and I opened a second office twice and closed them 
down both times because it didn't work. It was only the third time I did it that it 
worked and I found out by the third time and all the pain that I had been through 
in the past why the first two hadn't worked and this was because I didn't have the 
right person in them and I didn't have a system and a structure for that second 
office to operate under which is where all of the training and education and stuff 
that we do now comes from. 
Consequently, he also said: 
Multi-office operations should only be available to people who have the 
capabilities to run those businesses. Now we did, because of circumstances, allow 
people who didn't have the capability to be a multi-office operator. Now we do 
terminate them, now. We do when we know there is a weak person. 
RealCo's decision to limit and reduce franchisee expansion was influenced by difficulties 
associated with managing multiple offices. 
Summary 
Founded in 1888, RealCo had 145 real estate offices located throughout New Zealand. 
RealCo's form was characteristic of sequential franchising and area development. RealCo 
began franchising in 1990, after five years of intensive company-owned expansion that 
grew the chain from 14 to 100 offices. After embarking on franchising, the owners 
decided to convert all company-owned offices to franchises. Following this, the owners 
sought new franchise expansion to achieve more widespread penetration. The process of 
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conversion and new franchise expansion produced franchise arrangements characteristic of 
both sequential franchising and area development. 
RealCo's form choices were influenced by numerous factors. I begin by summarising the 
influence of five factors, namely, incentives, access to capital, manager/franchisee 
ambition/retention, desire for growth and control. These factors influenced one or more of 
three notable periods within RealCo's franchise development, including the decision to 
franchise, the initial selection of franchising form, and recent amendments to form choice. 
Following this I summarise the influence of factors associated with environmental and 
task uncertainties. 
Incentives strongly influenced two areas of RealCo's franchise development. First, 
incentives contributed to the initial decision to franchise. RealCo was realising poor 
returns from company-owned offices and pressure existed to improve performance. In 
response, RealCo owners felt franchising could enhance performance by providing office 
managers with better incentives to perform. In the second area, incentives influenced 
RealCo's recent decision' to reduce and limit multi-unit franchisee size. On average, 
offices associated with multi-unit franchisees performed poorly in comparison to owner-
operated offices. To improve office performance, RealCo's owners have decided to limit 
and reduce franchisee size and expansion, thus increasing the proportion of owner-
involvement in offices. 
RealCo's franchising decisions were also influenced by their access to financial capital. 
Franchising was selected initially, in part, because it provided expansion into small, 
isolated markets at lower cost, and therefore lower risk. The franchisor also realised 
further advantages. Franchising facilitated more widespread expansion by providing 
improved access to capital. Additionally, franchising lowed franchisor risk by removing 
andlor reducing franchisor investment in [previously] company-owned offices. 
The ambitions of office managers and franchisees' also contributed to franchising choices. 
Prior to franchising, talented and ambitious employee office managers often left RealCo in 
search of greater challenges and opportunities. The decision to franchise, in part, reflected 
RealCo's desire to retain these managers. RealCo's owners felt that franchising provided 
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talented staff with an option to extend their personal and business objectives by becoming 
business owners. Franchisee ambition contributed to the high prevalence of multi-unit 
franchisees later in RealCo's development. Numerous franchisees sought to establish or 
acquire additional offices, and were prepared to leave the system if the franchisor resisted 
granting them. 
RealCo's objectives for growth contributed to franchise development. RealCo sought very 
rapid growth to achieve their goal of establishing a nation-wide network of offices in 
minimum time. RealCo's desire for growth influenced the initial decision to franchise. 
Franchising was perceived to facilitate more rapid growth than company-owned expansion 
by providing superior access to both financial and managerial capital. RealCo's ambitions 
for growth also contributed to the extent of direct multi-unit franchising. RealCo's owners 
utilised sequential franchising and area development because they facilitated more rapid 
growth than single-unit franchising. 
A desire for increased control also contributed to franchising choices. Later in RealCo's 
development, the franchisor decided to limit and reduce the size of multi-unit franchisees. 
Multi-office franchisees proved more powerful than singie-office franchisees. Overtime, 
RealCo experienced problems related to increased franchisee power, such as difficulties 
implementing initiatives and monitoring. RealCo's desire to preserve control also 
contributed to the franchisor's preference for direct over indirect franchising forms. 
RealCo preferred direct forms because it allowed them to maintain greater control over 
individual real estate offices. 
RealCo's franchising choices were also influenced, to a varymg extent, by factors 
representing environmental and task uncertainties. The market size contributed moderately 
to RealCo's decisions and preferences. The franchisor preferred direct multi-unit 
franchising forms to single-unit franchising. Single unit franchising was regarded as too 
restrictive on unit growth, given the market's size. Market size also contributed to 
RealCo's preference for direct over indirect multi-unit franchising forms. Franchisor 
informants regarded the New Zealand market as too small for indirect multi-unit forms. 
The market growth rate had only a minor and recent influence on franchising decisions. 
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Turbulent demand highlighted performance difficulties with multi-office networks, 
especially when compared to owner-operated offices. The performance differences, 
exacerbated in periods of market decline, helped contribute to the franchisor's recent 
decision to reduce and limit the size of multi-unit franchisees. 
The level of customer dispersion within the Real Estate sector had a minor influence on 
RealCo's franchising decisions. Franchisor informants were more amenable to franchisee 
expansion in areas isolated from franchisor or regional offices. That was because 
establishing and supporting offices in geographically isolated markets was relatively more 
expensive. Multi-unit franchising was therefore preferred to single-unit franchising 
because it reduced the franchisor-related burden associated with establishing and 
supporting individual, owner-operated offices. Interestingly, however, multi-unit 
expansion was, in fact, more prevalent in metropolitan than isolated areas. Natural 
barriers, such as distance, helped explain the discrepancy, as geographic isolation made 
managing multiple offices more difficult. Consequently, franchisees in metropolitan areas 
were more likely to desire multiple offices. 
Fierce competition contributed to RealCo's decision to limit and reduce the expansion of 
franchisees. Two franchisor-related challenges were highlighted in the context of intense 
rivalry, namely improving office productivity and RealCo's ability to implement new 
initiatives for the benefit of the system. Franchisor informants believed limiting franchisee 
expansion would help achieve both objectives by improving incentives for individual 
office-managers and preserving franchisor bargaining power. 
Customer diversity had a modest influence on RealCo's franchising decisions. Demand for 
RealCo's services was quite diverse, highlighting the need to find a balance between 
adapting to local clients and providing a standardised service. For the franchisor, 
achieving the balance required maintaining bargaining power and direct control of 
individual offices. The need for balance contributed to two franchising decisions, namely 
the decision to reduce the size of multi-unit franchisee holdings and RealCo's preference 
for direct over indirect multi-unit franchising forms. 
The final factor, managerial complexity, also influenced RealCo's choices and preferences 
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pertaining to franchising forms. While tasks associated with managing a real estate office 
were not considered complex, they provided managers with significant difficulties. These 
difficulties highlighted the importance of providing office managers and franchisees with 
quality training and development. Franchisor informants preferred direct to indirect multi-
unit franchising forms, because they enabled them to ensure the nature and quality of 
training provided. The complexity of office management also highlighted difficulties 
associated with managing multiple offices. These difficulties contributed to the decision to 
limit and reduce multi-office franchisee size and expansion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE DESCRIPTIONS: INDIRECT MULTI-UNIT FRANCHISING 
Introduction 
This chapter presents case descriptions of three companies utilising the third, and fmal, 
category of franchising form, namely indirect multi-unit franchising. The three companies 




Founded in 1991, SnackCo comprises a network of 36 operators that sell snacks and 
beverages in organisations throughout New Zealand. SnackCo also had 15 operators in 
Australia, controlled via a master franchise agreement with an independent company. This 
case focuses on New Zealand operations. 
Snacks were presented in cardboard display boxes called snack trays. Each tray was 
stocked with 60 to 70 items, such as potato chips, biscuits and chocolate bars. SnackCo 
also offered beverages, including cold soft drinks and facilities for hot drinks. The 
SnackCo founder described the concept as an "in-house, self-service catering system." All 
items cost a dollar and customers placed money in an honesty box. Snack trays and 
beverages were located in a myriad of sites (e.g., staff rooms, waiting rooms and 
production areas) in a variety of organisations (e.g., factories, doctors practices, law firms, 
schools and universities). A large proportion of SnackCo's revenue derived from snack 
tray sales. 
SnackCo operators developed their businesses by seeking additional sites for trays and 
beverage facilities. Established sites were then routinely monitored, which involved 
visiting sites to replace, replenish or remove trays and beverages. The frequency of site 
visits depended on individual site consumption and varied from daily to monthly. 
Operators established and managed numerous sites. The franchisee interviewed operated 
with his wife and had more than 300 different sites in the Canterbury region. 
SnackCo utilised single-unit franchising, but was changing to area representation. The 
primary focus of this case is SnackCo's decision to adopt area representation. Under the 
current single-unit franchising form, all SnackCo operators are owner-operating 
franchisees and work in exclusive territories. Franchisees are able to employ workers, and 
the largest has five employees. Many operate as husband-wife teams. The franchisor 
maintained a direct relationship with franchisees and centralised all franchisor-related 
activities, such as franchise recruitment and the provision of ongoing franchisee support. 
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The franchisor management team comprised six people. There was four permanent staff, 
including a General Manager, Administration Manager, Marketing Manger and Business 
Development Manager (BDM). The founder/director (35 hours/week) and a second 
director (5 hours/week) also assisted franchisor operations. The franchisor recruited, 
managed and monitored all franchisees directly. Notably, SnackCo's BDM travelled the 
country providing franchisees with direct and on-going support. The franchisor also 
arranged regional and nation-wide conferences for franchisees. Additionally, the 
franchisor met regularly with a Franchisee Advisory Council and Franchise Initiatives 
Committee, comprising democratically elected franchisees, to discuss and solve issues and 
explore new opportunities. 
The area representation form proposed involved establishing five Regional Franchise 
Directors (RFDs), or area representative~, in exclusive areas throughout New Zealand. 
RFDs would provide franchisees with more intensive, and localised, support, than is 
currently provided by the Business Development Manager. The founder believed 
increased support would facilitate unit-sales growth and market penetration. RFDs would 
be contracted to the franchisor but not with franchisees: the franchisor would maintain a 
direct contractual relationship with franchisees. RFDs would also not operate as 
franchisees, nor would they be involved in franchise recruitment. Regarding recruitment, 
however, the founder believed the presence of RFDs would assist this activity by 
signalling Snackeo' s commitment to supporting local franchisees. RFDs would pay the 
franchisor an initial fee. In return, RFDs would receive a percentage of sales from 
franchisees within their territory. Franchisees would also continue to pay the franchisor a 
royalty fee, however the percentage would decrease following the introduction ofRFDs. 
The new proposal contained two further changes affecting operating franchisees. First, the 
franchisor planned to remove franchisees rights to an exclusive territory. Instead, 
franchisees would retain exclusive rights over existing customers and gain freedom to 
compete for new sites within the larger RFDs territory. RFDs would be responsible for 
maintaining a database of franchisees and customers within their territory. In the second 
area, the franchisor planned to limit the number of employees franchisees can hire. 
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Development 
The founder started SnackCo in Hamilton, New Zealand in 1991. The founder moved to 
Auckland the following year and commenced franchising by selling the Hamilton area. At 
that point, the founder regarded franchising as a lucrative opportunity requiring little 
effort: 
Then it was "hey, we will sell you an area and we'll make some dollars out of it," 
and that was what we perceived to be the activity. 
Six territories covering the remainder of New Zealand were soon sold to separate 
franchisees. Subsequently, the founder realised the territories granted were excessive in 
size. Substantial parts of territories went undeveloped meaning more operators could be 
sustained and greater revenues were achievable. The founder encouraged franchisees to 
split and sell parts of their territories in an attempt to remedy this situation. Franchisees 
embraced the process to the extent there were 3 6 separate franchisees operating at the time 
of the investigation. 
Despite increasing the number of franchisees, the founder remained unhappy with the 
level of market penetration. He believed territories were still large, and added that many 
operators were not realising the opportunity he perceived to exist. For example, he noted 
certain franchisees appeared content with their current level of performance and were 
failing to approach certain organisations and/or entire areas within their territories. 
Further, some franchisees were not marketing SnackCo's complete product line to 
organisations, preferring instead to focus on snack trays. Concerning the latter, the founder 
said: 
From an implementation angle, what happens is because snack boxes are very 
easy at one extreme and hot drinks are more difficult at the other extreme -
because one involves some sales skills and the other one doesn't under the present 
system - you have selective implementation. Selective implementation is the 
franchisee can choose to do something and scry "well I'll do this ... I don't know 
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about carrying all those cans of Coke around, they are bloody heavy and, you 
know, well the money is not as good so therefore hey, I will do the snack boxes but 
you know I won't worry about doing those other things. " So then as franchisor you 
miss out on that opportunity completely. 
Founder discontentment with the current level of penetration led Snackeo to develop, and 
attempt to implement, an alternative type of franchising. The founder believed that 
changing the type of franchising, and configuration of territories, would increase market 
penetration and lead to greater system-wide performance. Snackeo was in a transitory 
phase at the time of the investigation. While the new form had been conceptualised, 
presented to franchisees and advertised, it was not implemented. 
Interestingly, the proposed form and territory changes met considerable franchisee 
opposition, which provided an impediment to the implementation of the overall initiative. 
The franchisee interviewed struggled to understand how the new configuration would 
benefit his business. From a franchisees perspective, he could see only disadvantages. In 
particular, he felt threatened by the proposal to remove the exclusive rights for operating 
within his territory. Removing these rights, he reasoned, would increase uncertainty and 
[likely] reduce his and other franchisees personal market size. 
Franchise Imperatives 
SnackCo form choice was influenced by a number of factors. We begin by outlining the 
influence of three factors, namely incentives, access to capital and a need for control. 
Incentives strongly influenced three areas of Snackeo's franchise development. First, 
incentives influenced the initial selection of single-unit franchising over direct multi-unit 
franchising forms. Guiding this, and subsequent decisions, the founder strongly felt that 
employees did not perform as well as owners: 
They (employees) under-perform, they under-achieve; they cost you a lot of time, 
energy and effort ... You know, as long as I have been around in franchising, I have 
not seen one employee-based store or business outperform an owner-operator. 
Consequently, single-unit franchising was preferred to direct multi-unit franchising forms 
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because it preserved a higher proportion of owner to employee-operators. 
Second, incentives influenced the decision to adopt area representation. The founder 
preferred area representation to employing additional support staff because it provided 
RFDs with enhanced incentives: 
We have a lot of opportunity - so we can see opportunities out there - and our goal 
is to say well how can we soak up some of those opportunities, and one of the ways 
of doing that without adding more employed staff and more overhead is say "well 
lets base it on performance within the market," and hence the concept of a 
Regional Franchise Director. 
Third, and finally, incentives contributed to SnackCo's decision to increase the proportion 
of owner-involvement in current operations. The founder reasoned that this would increase 
performance: 
Our move is away from that (a form where franchisees can hire employees) to 
strictly owner-operator. We have identified that owner-operators provide a much 
higher level of performance than you know if they are employees it just doesn't 
work in our business - which is all cash. Almost without exception employees steal 
cash; [the J temptation is just too great. So from a performance angle we need to 
move to owner-operators. 
The second factor, access to capital, also influenced the decision to adopt area 
representation. As indicated in an above quotation, the founder regarded the alternative to 
RFDs, which involved instituting additional salaried regional managers, as expensive to 
the franchisor. 
The third factor, a concern for control, contributed to SnackCo's selection of area 
representation over subfranchising. The founder wanted to maintain direct control over 
operating franchisees. While area representation involved delegating certain functions, 
such as co-ordination and support, the franchisor continued to maintain direct control of 
franchisees. By contrast, the founder felt subfranchising, which involved more complete 
126 
delegation of franchisor-related tasks, such as franchise recruitment, management and 
support, reduced franchisor control of franchisee operators to an unacceptable level. In an 
example, the founder said: 
I just feel that master franchiSing (subfranchising) is fraught with danger ... In a 
master franchise situation usually the sub franchisees are contracted to the master, 
not to the franchisor. So I just feel that situation, based on my experience is, if you 
have got an under performing master, you have got an extremely difficult exit 
program if things go wrong, and therefore whoever fulfills that role (providing 
local support to franchisees), needs to be warehoused to one side, [so} they can be 
cut off over night. 
The Environment 
Market Size 
The size of Snackeo' s market highlighted the costs involved in providing franchisees with 
adequate assistance. Snackeo had 36 franchisees and the founder believed the market 
could sustain both much higher sales per franchisee and at least five further franchisees. 
The founder wanted to attain full market penetration but realised achieving that goal 
would require furnishing franchisees with increased levels of ongoing support. The 
founder felt one travelling support person was insufficient, given the size of the market, 
and said that five dedicated personnel were really needed. Furthermore, he said support 
personnel should be located close to franchisees. 
Snackeo's choice of area representation was influenced by the costs associated with 
providing franchisees with the needed level of support. The founder preferred area 
representation to single-unit franchising because it provided franchisees with greater 
support at low cost. As the founder said in an earlier quotation, area representation 
obviated the franchisor's need to hire additional staff and increase overheads. 
The founder also favoured area representation to subfranchising given the context of 
demand size. Specifically, he felt that the New Zealand market was too small for 
sub franchising to be viable. He noted that while many franchise systems had used 
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subfranchising to facilitate growth, subfranchising reduced the level of franchisor income 
over the long-term: 
I believe that for a lot of people to grow they have needed the funding of master 
franchises - that has been the overriding factor. The trade-off of that is that they 
have dissipated the revenue steam that they could have got. 
Market Growth 
The market for SnackCo' s product line was growmg. Estimates by the founder and 
franchisee ranged from 15 to 20 percent growth per annum. In this context, the founder 
wanted to grow SnackCo sales at a rate at least commensurate with demand growth. 
Otherwise, he noted: 
What happens is what has happened, is that competitors can come into the market 
as well ... You have got to capture it today, because tomorrow if we don't take it 
someone else is going to take it. 
The desire to grow sales contributed to the decision to increase franchisee support. The 
founder believed sales could be increased dramatically by working more closely with 
franchisees to identifY and attain new customers, and build sales within existing sites. 
The founder preferred area representation to hiring additional franchisor support staff for 
two reasons. First, area representation was more cost effective because area 
representatives were responsible for creating their own income. Second, as identified 
previously, the founder felt area representatives were better motivated than franchisor 
employees to assist franchisees, because their remuneration is tied to the performance of 
the franchisees they support. 
The founder further illustrated the important influence of demand growth on form choice. 
The founder thought the advantages of area representation compared to single-unit 
franchising were greatest in a growing market. By contrast, in a period of zero or negative 
growth, he said single-unit franchising, which involved employee regional managers may, 
in fact, be more optimal: 
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Ours (the proposed area representation form) is very much geared around a 
growing system as opposed to a maintaining system. So if I was Sporteo, it would 
probably be very difficult to have that system (area representation) because you 
are semi-mature. Whereas we are very much immature, and therefore I think it 
has more effect when you are a growing business, and I think there is a bit of built-
in obsolescence ... you can grow them into a corporate structure at some point. 
Customer Dispersion 
Snackeo's customers, and potential customers, are spread throughout New Zealand's 
cities and towns. Reflecting that dispersion, Snackeo has 36 franchisees operating in 
different parts of the country. Dispersed demand, and therefore dispersed franchisees, 
highlighted the costs associated with assisting and supporting geographically isolated 
franchisees. As the founder stated, there were substantial costs associated with visiting 
dispersed franchisees: 
Travel to the South Island is very expensive, or vice versa, to hring people from the 
South Island to the North Island is very expensive, and [especially] given you have 
less business in the south than the north. 
The founder considered the cost of support to be of particular importance given Snackeo' s 
goal to improve market penetration, and his understanding that achieving that objective 
would require increased, and more localised, franchisee support. He also realised that 
support could not be provided from a centralised location. Instead, personnel needed 
locating close to franchisees in order to sufficiently understand their markets and provide 
more thorough and timely support. 
The founder's consideration of costs involved with increasing franchisee support 
influenced the choice of franchising type. Two options were seriously evaluated. The first 
involved continuing with the current single-unit franchising form, but adding a network of 
regional managers paid for by the franchisor. The second included instituting a network of 
area representatives (or RFDs). The founder preferred area representation because it meant 
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the franchisor did not have to directly hire extra support staff. In addition, he felt that area 
representatives would be more motivated to provide franchisees with quality assistance, 
due to the structure of remuneration, and that this would produce greater market 
penetration: 
The concept of a regional franchise director has a certain area of responsibilities, 
including the development of new opportunity and also the soaking up of existing 
opportunity. If you live in the market you have a much better grasp of it. Well, you 
are 'Johnny on the Spot, ' and therefore you are going to be 'Johnny on the Spot' 
moving faster, and the rewards you get then (as a RFD) are based on what is 
actually achieved in the market place, which should be much greater. 
Area representation provided one further, but indirect, advantage in the area of franchise 
recruitment. The founder thought that while the area representative would not be directly 
involved in attracting or selecting franchisees, their presence would assist franchise sales 
in dispersed locations: 
When you (the franchisor) are in Auckland and you want to sell a franchise in 
Canterbury - they (prospective franchisees) immediately see themselves as being a 
zillion miles awcry and sort of mentally disconnect from it in the beginning. So 
that's the weakness. The strength of franchising (having RFDs) is the fact you can 
get someone there and they are 'Johnny on the spot' and they are perceived to be 
local, and that is the strength (Founder). 
Competition 
With around six direct competitors, none with nationwide coverage, neither the founder 
nor franchisee regarded the level of competition as particularly intense: 
In terms of strong competitors, {we} probably only have a couple, and they are 
showing signs of perhaps cracking slightly. I believe what will happen is that in 
another couple of years there will probably be a dominant plcryer in the market, 
and there will be some sort of fragmented, bit plcryers who could be very regional -
so it might be someone in Invercargill doing some fund raising activity for a 
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particular cause, perhaps. So in terms of another national competitor, I have a 
feeling there may be none at all, but that said, we still have plenty of competitors 
out there. I mean our competitors are dairies, gas stations, super markets - I mean 
they are our real competitors; other people doing what we are doing I would 
suggest are actually less oj a competitor (Founder). 
[There are] five different operators in Christchurch. There is competition, [but] we 
feel that we operate better than anybody else so we don't see it as a great problem. 
In saying that, like any business, if you didn'l have competition it would be better, 
but we don't really seem to see it as a big problem ... I would say that we would 
have most of the market. We would be the biggest operator in Christchurch 
(Franchisee). 
Despite having only moderate levels of competition, Snackeo's founder was concerned 
about new competitor entry and growth. The founder felt that, as illustrated in an earlier 
quotation, considerable unrealised market potential existed and, if Snackeo did not seize 
it, their competitors would. This situation contributed to the proposed utilisation of area 
representation. The founder realised that, in order to win market share, franchisees 
required increased assistance. In this context, the founder preferred area representatives to 
hiring additional franchisor staff because area representation provided local and motivated 
franchisee support at lower cost. 
Customer Diversity 
Snackeo customers exhibited surprisingly similar wants and preferences, considering both 
variety in site places (e.g., from factory floors to lawyers' offices) and locations (e.g., 
Invercargill to Auckland). Location and climate changes provided some differences. 
However, the founder and franchisee were agreed such differences were minor, and easily 
managed: 
The majority [of customers] are very similar actually, being in business or a work 
place, I'd say they are predominantly similar ... You 'Il get isolated pockets of 
preference for a particular product, because it could be locally made. So you will 
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get somebody in Invercargill [who} wants a short bread log because that is 
something that is made in Invercargill by a well known supplier, so that would be a 
local preference ... It is very easy to accommodate (Founder). 
The first thing you do before you touch anything [is} you read the tray, and it only 
takes 5 or 10 seconds. You have a look [and] if there is no biscuits there you make 
a note. We have cards that [show the} date, number of products returned, cash and 
the difference ... If we went in there and saw all of the biscuits were gone we would 
make a note in this column: 'Biscuits.' It is all we need to put, and we know that 
there is extra biscuits required... It only takes 5 or 10 seconds, you know, like 
earlier on it used to take us a bit longer, but it is like anything. But now we can 
read a tray, make a note and then alter things to suit. In saying that, it is a 
seasonal thing. The reason I am saying biscuits all the time now is because biscuits 
are the big thing that are going. So it is pretty uniform right through the whole 
system, that all the biscuits [at} this time will get increased (Franchisee). 
The founder's decision to adopt area representation was not influenced by the level of 
customer diversity. When asked, the founder said: 
No, because it is strictly a marketing implementation effort. So there is absolutely 
zero impact on the types of franchising. 
Managerial Complexity 
While physically demanding, SnackCo franchises were relatively simple operations to 
manage. The product line contained fewer than 80 products. These were obtained from 
five suppliers, one of which was the franchisor. The process of preparing and monitoring 
snack trays was easy and because franchisees hire few or no employees, the complexities 
associated with staff management were low to non-existent. Most aspects of operating, 
such as, canvassing customers, monitoring trays, dealing with suppliers and preparing 
accounts, were repetitive, varying little from day to day and week to week. Consequently, 
as stated by the' founder and franchisee, the businesses were simple to manage and new 
franchisees built confidence rapidly: 
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In our business, by the time people have been operating for a month, given the 
business is fairly repetitive, they actually know what they are doing pretty well 
(Founder). 
It is not difficult at all. As I scry, with experience, it becomes quite easy 
(Franchisee). 
The founder compared SnackCo to other types of businesses, and highlighted the relative 
simplicity of SnackCo operations: 
[It is} relatively simple. That is one of the beauties of it. [It is a} fairly 
straightforward business. [It is a} good entry-level business for first time business 
owners, you know, it has the advantages of no debtors, so there is no credit 
management control. All they have got to do is process invoices on one side and 
stock on the other and follow the system. So 1 would scry [it is} relatively 
straightforward compared to running Mail Boxes Etc, for instance, which is much 
more complicated, or a sports retailer, which is a more complicated activity again. 
The founder considered the managerial complexity of SnackCo operations and said that it 
did not influence his choice of franchising type: 
Does it affect the system we use? Not really, it is not part of the decision making 
process. 
However, he did note that while he felt that area representation was appropriate for 
SnackCo, it would not suit a franchise system operating a more complex retail concept: 
Ours is relatively straightforward Does that in anywcry affect the type of 
franchising? Possibly it does. Again, I think that we could overlcry the system we 
are going to use really over virtually any system at all, except possibly a retail one. 
1 think it would probably fall down. 
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Summary 
SnackCo was in the midst of a franchisor driven transition from single-unit franchising to 
area representation. From founding in 1991, SnackCo adopted single-unit franchising and 
allowed franchisees to hire multiple employees. Six large unwieldy and exclusive 
territories were initially granted to franchisees covering the whole of New Zealand. Such 
large areas coupled with the performance of that form-territory configuration left large 
portions substantially underdeveloped. The founder subsequently coaxed franchisees into 
splitting and selling parts of their territories to the extent there were 36 franchisees at the 
time of the investigation. Yet despite positive changes, the founder remained dissatisfied 
with system-wide performance; significant opportunity remained unrealised. The 
founder's feeling of discontent provided the catalyst to increase the level of franchisee 
assistance and, select area representation to replace single-unit franchising. 
The founder's decision to adopt area representation was influenced by a number of factors. 
After deciding that increased franchisee support was needed, the founder evaluated how 
this could be provided. He considered two options. The first involved establishing a 
network of area representatives while the second involved adding a network of regional 
managers paid for by the franchisor. The founder's choice of area representation was 
strongly influenced by incentives. The founder wanted to provide operators and support 
staff with incentives that motivated them to perform to the best of their ability. Based on 
his experience, the founder preferred area representation because he felt area 
representatives would be more motivated than employee-regional managers (hired by the 
franchisor) to provide franchisees with quality assistance. Consideration of incentives also 
influenced other aspects of SnackCo' s franchise development, including the initial 
decision to adopt single-unit franchising over sequential franchising and area 
development. Incentives also influenced the decision to limit the number of employees 
franchisees can hire. 
Snackeo's choice of area representation was also influenced by access to capital. The 
founder preferred area representation because it obviated the costs associated with the 
franchisor hiring employee-based regional managers. The adoption of area representation 
was also influenced by a need for control. SnackCo's founder preferred area representation 
to subfranchising. Comparatively, he felt that subfranchising reduced the franchisor's 
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control over operating franchisees to an unacceptable level. 
Snackeo's adoption of area representation was also influenced by environmental and task 
uncertainties. The market size, rate of market growth and the dispersion of customers all 
influenced Snackeo's decision to adopt area representation. The founder felt that, given 
the market size and rate of growth, considerable potential existed to build sales and 
increase market penetration. However, realising this opportunity required increasing the 
level of franchisor-related assistance provided to franchisees. Furthermore, due to the level 
of customer and franchisee dispersion, this support was needed in a wide range of isolated 
markets. This context of demand size, growth and dispersion contributed to the selection 
of area representation by providing increased, and localised, assistance to franchisees at 
minimal cost to the franchisor. Furthermore, the founder preferred area representation 
because he felt it provided localised support staff that were not only cheaper but also more 
motivated, due to the structure of their remuneration. 
Other factors, namely competition, customer diversity and managerial complexity, had a 
more minor to nil affect on SnackCo' s choice to adopt area representation. Of these three 
factors, competition influenced Snackeo's decision most. While facing only moderate 
levels of competition, the founder was motivated by the threat of competition to increase 
sales growth. He felt unrealised market potential existed and that SnackCo needed to seize 
it before competitors. The founder preferred area representation to other forms, in this 
context, because he felt it facilitated more rapid sales growth. 
Customer diversity and managerial complexity had a minimal to nil affect on SnackCo' s 
decision to adopt area representation. Customers were uniform in their wants and needs 
and SnackCo units were simple to manage. Consequently, the founder said neither factor 




Founded in 1989, Serveo is a household and commercial services company with 550 
owner-operating franchisees. Serveo provided lawn mowing and gardening, pet care, 
home cleaning, home security, car valeting, carpet cleaning and pest control, ironing, pool 
valeting and commercial cleaning services throughout New Zealand. 
The company utilised subfranchising and was configured as follows. Subfranchisees 
purchased the right to own and operate one of eight services. Subfranchisees were not 
granted an exclusive territory. Instead, they operated alongside other Serveo 
sub franchisees in a larger territory controlled by a subfranchisor. Subfranchisees paid the 
subfranchisor a fixed weekly fee for an established client base, and had the option of 
selling new clients to the subfranchisor. Subfranchisees were limited to one franchise and 
could hire only one employee. Many had spouses who assisted them. 
Subfranchisors purchased rights from the franchisor to develop one Serveo service within 
a specific territory. Subfranchisors recruited subfranchisees to operate within their area. 
While the franchisor was party to the agreement between the subfranchisor and 
subfranchisee, it delegated full responsibility for subfranchisee selection to the 
subfranchisor. The franchisor, however, often assisted new subfranchisors to recruit initial 
subfranchisees. Once recruited, the sub franchisor trained and supported new 
subfranchisees on an ongoing basis, to the extent subfranchisees had little need to contact 
the franchisor directly. The actual type and extent of ongoing support provided by the 
subfranchisor to the subfranchisee was dependent on the particular service. However, 
support normally included managing a call centre, client database, quoting, distributing 
new work, local advertising and, the presentation of training and education. 
Subfranchisors also monitored the performance of subfranchisees, in such areas as 
workmanship, conduct and presentation. Subfranchisors could simultaneously operate as 
subfranchisees and indeed many did, by necessity, to supplement income and expedite. 
franchise recruitment (by developing then selling a client-base to new franchisees). 
However, subfranchisors were limited to one subfranchisor arrangement. 
l36 
The franchisor focused on growing and managing the Serveo system. The franchisor 
recruited, trained and supported subfranchisors. Support activities included regular contact 
and coaching of subfranchisors, sharing information, arranging group discounts (e.g., for 
fuel, equipment, communications, insurance and clothing) and regular site visits. The 
franchisor also arranged regular meetings with an advisory group comprising 
democratically elected subfranchisors and organised annual regional conferences for all 
subfranchisors and subfranchisees to attend. The franchisor comprised a small team that 
included the founder/managing director, a general manager, executive assistant and part-
time accountant. 
Development 
In 1989, the young founder began mowing lawns and gardening in the Auckland area. He 
had little idea of the sector's potential at this stage. However, an expanding client base 
gave him food for thOUght and, after 18 months of operating alone, he attempted to grow 
the business by hiring employees. But this created problems: 
I did employ people briefly, but on a small scale. I just didn't like it. I hate people 
not turning up, and the quality not there. You had to be there to guide them all the 
time (Founder). 
He then attempted expansion a second time by developing and marketing a business and 
franchise format to owner-operating franchisees. The founder noted the improvement: 
People investing into a business and they put 100% effort into it. Employees do, 
but someone who invests money will always try a lot harder. 
To begin with, the founder visualised a small network of franchisees in his local area. 
However, demand for Serveo franchises and services was unexpectedly high: 
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The first ad we put in the paper we got about 50 calls and we pre-sold four... When 
I first started I thought I would just keep to Auckland and around 20 operators, but 
it just grew so fast, it just kept multiplying. 
After just one year franchising, ServCo comprised 15 franchisees. The founder then 
realised the potential for a much larger organisation with scope beyond Auckland. 
Subsequently, he revised his goals and aspirations and set about building ServCo into a 
nation-wide company. 
The founder selected subfranchising to replace single-unit franchising after a short period. 
Considering his newly revised growth objectives, the founder realised practical limitations 
associated with single-unit franchising. In particular, centralising all franchisor-related 
activities (including quoting, distributing work, local advertising etc.), while attempting to 
grow, was impractical: 
So I could see that I couldn't look after the ball from the start, so we broke off an 
arm, and sold that as a master. Then we used that system over the rest of the 
country as well. 
Subfranchising was then adopted throughout New Zealand. Initial development focused on 
lawn mowing and gardening services. Over time, further (and separate) services were 
added and expanded to the extent that ServCo comprised 550 subfranchisees controlled by 
45 subfranchisors at the time of the investigation. 
Franchise Imperatives 
ServCo's organisational form was influenced by a number of factors. The franchisor's 
desire for growth strongly contributed to ServCo's adoption of subfranchising. ServCo's 
founder was ambitious and sought very rapid growth. That ambition was evidenced in the 
decision to build a nation-wide network of franchises for not only lawn mowing and 
gardening, but also seven additional services. Furthermore, at the time of the investigation, 
ServCo was actively exploring, developing and refining new service ideas, as well as 
considering overseas expansion. 
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The decision to adopt subfranchising largely reflected the franchisor's desire to grow 
Serveo more rapidly: 
The move was made to obviously grow the business a lot quicker and by having the 
master franchisees you had another level or person to liaise [and] keep the 
business growing as well. So really it came down to growing it, and that is one of 
the reasons why we are nationwide, because we have got that person in that area 
actually pushing it hard and creating the system in that territory (Founder). 
By subfranchising, Serveo acquired important financial and managerial resources from 
subfranchisors that helped to expand the system. Importantly also, sub franchising 
provided area managers (subfranchisors) and operators (subfranchisees) that were highly 
motivated due to the investment they had made in their respective businesses. Indeed, the 
concept of incentives contributed strongly to Serveo's organisational form choice. 
Serveo realised the motivational power of ownership based on experiences with 
employees and initial franchisees. Those experiences helped strengthen a belief that 
people operate more diligently, and therefore seek greater growth, when they own their 
own business. Sub franchising was seen as optimal organisational form that could provide 
good incentives: 
We s~ it is best to have the sub franchisee owner-operator person who takes a 
vested interest in their business, particularly with services like cleaning where you 
have got somebody going into the home. You just don't have that same level of 
responsibility and sort of ownership involved when you have got an employee 
doing it. I would suggest that that area developer franchise person would have 
problems with, you know, hiring and firing and staff turnover, and a whole host of 
other issues that you don't get with a sub franchise system (General Manager). 
Anyone that invests has got commitment because he is the one that has borrowed 
the money. So they are going to try in it, they are going to look after the customers 
[and] they are going to pamper the customer ... I know for instance with 'Company 
X' (home cleaning franchise company) they employ lots of people and you just lose 
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control of who is out there doing it. Are they (the employees) wearing uniforms? 
Are they turning up? (Founder). 
The Environment 
Market Size 
The market size for Serveo's service range was very large, meaning scope existed for 
literally hundreds of ServCo operators. That level of potential highlighted the financial 
cost and managerial burden that would be associated with growing and managing a large 
network of operators. As stated by the General Manager, Serveo understood that such a 
large size would not only require numerous operators, but a network of regional managers 
as well: 
With the size of Serveo there is no wcry we could effectively manage all of those 
guys out there. I mean you have to, I think, have regional managers in place to 
deal with it. I just don't think you'd be able to maintain any consistent growth 
either. I think that is one of the advantages [of subfranchisingJ is that the 
sub franchisee is directly contracted to the sub franchisor (General Manager). 
Given the level of demand subfranchising was preferred for its capacity to manage a large 
network with minimal franchisor investment and involvement. Importantly, the franchisor 
considered the scale of demand too large for all alternative types of franchising, including 
area representation, subfranchising's closest variant. For Serveo, sub franchising was 
advantageous because it enabled the franchisor to cost effectively, and more completely, 
delegate tasks of regional management (including operator recruitment, training and 
support) and operation (e.g., mowing lawns, ironing etc.) to subfranchisors and 
subfranchisees, respectively. Area representation, in contrast, which would involve less 
complete delegation, including maintaining centralised recruitment, would be intractable. 
The founder and general manager stated: 
I mean we would find that (area representation) hard because when you have set 
up right throughout the country, I mean you are having to vet every person ... we 
would have up to 30-40 inquiries a day, just on a daily basis, so it would just be 
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mind boggling ... 1 am actually (currently) doing the ffranchisej sales for our 
commercial cleaner, and that alone just ties you up (Founder). 
1 think that (area representation) would be a more cumbersome system, just in 
terms of the communication. Because these guys are contracted directly to the 
franchisor, 1 think there would be some issues in terms of size (General Manager). 
Market Growth 
Growth in demand for Serveo' s services was rapid. illustrating that growth, the General 
Manager stated: 
1 mean all of our services, 1 think it is just a huge market untapped, you know, 
there is no slowing up in the amount of work coming in. 
Both franchisor informants felt that lifestyle changes were fuelling a trend toward 
outsourcing activities historically performed by the householder. Further, they add that this 
trend not only provides growth for their existing service range, it also provides scope for 
additional services. Both currently estimate average industry growth (for their service 
range) to be 20 to 30 percent per annum, although certain services, such as ironing, at 
around 50 percent, were growing faster. In view of this, Serveo continued to expand their 
network, of subfranchisors and owner-operating subfranchisees, as fast as possible. As 
stated previously, by the founder, subfranchising was preferred over alternative 
organisational forms for its unrivalled capacity to facilitate rapid growth with minimal 
resources. Both the founder and General Manager added: 
The first year we got around 14 to 15 operators - which was quite good in those 
days, as around one a month that was quite staggering. We thought it was bloody 
wonderful. But from that point onwards, we have got these territory owners putting 
all their effort into their areas. So then it started just moving really qUickly 
(Founder). 
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1 mean it is still just such a growing market. It is. 1 mean there is going to be a 
level 1 think any company gets to and it becomes hard but, you know, we are lucky, 
once again, because we have got that master. So really, they are actually growing 
it for you (General Manager). 
Customer Dispersion 
ServCo's customers were highly dispersed. Given the potential scale of operations costs, 
associated with establishing and managing hundreds of geographically isolated operators 
to service these customers, were immense. Furthermore, due to geographic isolation, tasks 
such as, franchise recruitment, training and support were not only expensive, but also 
problematic to provide from a centralised location. A desire to minimise the costs 
contributed to form choice. Subfranchising enabled the franchisor to minimise costs by 
delegating tasks to subfranchisors. As noted by the founder, the utility of subfranchising 
increased with dispersion. Conversely, the utility of subfranchising would have been less 
if ServCo were more geographically concentrated: The founder illustrated these 
relationships: 
If you weren't going to be in Wellington or Christchurch - 1 mean you need that 
master level to do what we have done - so you could change your set up ... [Then] 
by just having all your services in Auckland, and having a different structure - 1 
mean 1 think more than likely there would be more money in actually employing 
people ... you would just do it all from here ... [and] you might have someone that 
would look after the lawn mowing branch you'd have someone to look after the 
home cleaning branch (Founder). 
Competition 
Rivalry in the domestic services sector was intense. ServCo had numerous and varied 
competitors, ranging from other large multi-service franchise operations with nation-wide 
networks through to beneficiaries odd-jobbing for cash. While the extent of rivalry varied 
for each ServCo service, informants, as illustrated by the General Manager, clearly 
regarded the overarching domestic services sector as highly competitive: 
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The competition is rife out there. I mean it is ridiculous. It is a bloody tough 
market to be in ... carpet cleaning is probably the most competitive ... you just need 
to open up the yellow pages ... In Auckland, 1 would have thought that there would 
be 50 companies doing that. Sure a few of them are 'one man bands' ... 1 'd say we 
are probably the third biggest in Auckland. 1 mean all of the services have a hell of 
a lot of competition, whether it is franchised or not (General Manager). 
Interestingly, a factor contributing to the level of competitive intensity was the low costs 
of entry. As stated by the General Manager, low establishment costs meant their concepts 
were attractive for competition: 
One of the reasons that there is such a huge amount of competition is that it is 
relatively easy to get into the market - there are low set-up costs. 1 mean if you 
want to be a lawn mower all you need to do is go and buy a mower and wack it in 
the back of your car. 1 mean the number of people that 1 think are unemployed and 
you know going out part-time and doing these services for cash, you know it is 
phenomenal. 
Competition from franchised and non-franchised sources influenced ServCo's form choice 
by highlighting one key management challenge. ServCo demanded a form that would 
allow them to penetrate the market more rapidly than competitors. Illustrating this, the 
founder stated: 
The idea is once you start up a service is that you have to go like hell, otherwise 
you just get left behind. 
Subfranchising was preferred in this context, as stated by the founder, for its unrivalled 
capacity to facilitate very rapid growth: 
Just put people (subfranchisors) in these areas and they grow it for you. So it is no 
good just doing it by yourself-setting one up then moving [on to the next] - you'd 
just be left behind. You've got to get in there and sort it out and go for it. 
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Obviously in the main centers we are looking to take on masters all the time. We 
want to get it out there before someone else does. 
Customer Diversity and Managerial Complexity 
Demand for Serveo services was homogeneous. Serveo customers had very similar needs 
and wants. That similarity was due, largely, of course, to the very specific needs Serveo 
services are designed to satisfY. All informants were agreed that while possessing a variety 
of backgrounds, customers shared the same basic need: 
I mean you get different people that are using the different services... but everyone 
is the same, I mean all they are really wanting is someone to come there regularly 
and to do the job (Founder). 
The tasks associated with operating Serveo's range of service concepts, while physically 
demanding, were simple and uncomplicated. As the founder stated in the following 
quotation, the concepts are simple to operate: 
It is such a simple system - there is nothing complex about it. That is why a lot 
people like it. That is [also] why the lawyers and the bloody banks like it ... 
Imagine owning a sports store and selling fishing gear, and you have to buy hooks 
and sinkers, and there are different types of fish in different areas - it would be a 
nightmare (Founder). 
That simplicity was illustrated in a number of areas. First, as indicated, the service 
concepts were narrowly defined. Each was defined to meet a very specific need such as, 
lawn mowing and gardening, ironing and carpet cleaning. Second, operators required few 
inputs to perform their services and therefore needed few suppliers. Third, operating 
franchisees were limited to hiring one employee. Fourth, the tasks associated with 
performing the actual services, were also simple. Indicative of this simplicity, as stated by 
the General Manager, the services can be, and are, highly formalised: 
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It is a pretty simple system. What it comes down to is training at the end of the day, 
and the ongOing support ... you know, a franchise system is that, it is a system, 
there is a way that we do things, it is documented in a manual. I mean occasionally 
we come across people who think they have got a better way of doing it. Now you 
know well if they have, well we encourage them to give us that feed back. 
The homogeneity of demand and simple tasks associated with operating provided few 
challenges for franchise system management. Importantly, compared to an environment 
with more heterogeneous demand and greater complexity, this context meant that the tasks 
of franchise recruitment, training, management and monitoring of operators was relatively 
simple. It also, according to the founder, meant such tasks were amenable for delegating to 
subfranchisors: 
If you got someone (subfranchisor) good there why can't he choose the right 
person, and if you have got a system going, then when you are choosing someone 
that person there should be able to do it. I mean you know it is his business, he 
bought it [so J he is going to work hard at it. You know, if you have got a good 
system then it is not going to be a problem (Founder). 
In contrast the founder noted that while subfranchising works for ServCo, it would be less 
appropriate in a more complex environment, such as that experienced by SportCo, the 
sporting goods retailer: 
ObViously in some of those (forms, such as area representation and 
sub franchising) it would be a lot harder (for a retail company to utilise). I mean 
we have kept it simple so their position is not complicated and everything. I mean 
retail you have got to buy the right products, you have got to have the right staff ... 
it would be a nightmare. They don't even hold stock or anything in our case. I 
mean we (the franchisor) actually buy the stock like uniforms and allocate it out. 
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Summary 
Founded in 1989, ServCo had a network of 45 subfranchisors and more than 550 
subfranchisees providing one of nine home-related services to households and businesses 
throughout New Zealand. ServCo's organisational form was characteristic of 
subfranchising. 
ServCo's adoption of subfranchising was influenced by a number of factors. Of these, a 
desire for growth contributed strongly. ServCo's founder was ambitious and sought very 
rapid growth. His desire to grow services quickly highlighted the important need for two 
further factors, namely access to capital and incentives. The founder preferred 
sub franchising to alternative organisational forms for its unrivalled capacity to overcome 
financial and managerial limits to growth, and incentives problems, at both the operating 
and regional manager levels. 
Market and task-related factors also contributed to ServCo's use of subfranchising. Of 
these factors, market size and market growth contributed strongly to ServCo's choice. The 
scale of demand size and growth highlighted the level of financial investment and 
managerial burden associated with growing and managing a large network of operators. In 
that context, subfranchising was preferred for its capacity to facilitate and manage growth 
while requiring minimal franchisor investment and involvement. 
The dispersion of customers and subfranchisee-operators also contributed to ServCo' s 
choice of organisational form. The isolation of subfranchisee-operators highlighted costs 
and difficulties associated with the tasks of franchisor management, including the 
recruitment and on-going management of operating subfranchisees. Subfranchising was 
preferred for its capacity achieve both tasks at low cost. Comparatively, the founder noted 
that if operators were more geographically concentrated, a direct form could be preferred. 
ServCo's choice of franchising type was also influenced by competition. Competitive 
activity contributed to Serveo's desire to grow more rapidly than competitors. ServCo 
preferred subfranchising because it facilitated more rapid growth than alternative forms. 
Finally, the level of customer diversity and managerial complexity exhibited little notable 
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influence on form choice. Homogeneous demand and simple tasks associated with 
operating provide few challenges for Serveo' s operating franchisees, subfranchisors and 
the franchisor. In turn, this meant tasks associated with franchise system management, 





Founded in 1983 in New Zealand, Fasteo is a courier company with over 350 couriers in 
New Zealand and 500 in Australia. This case focuses on Fasteo's courier operations in 
New Zealand, which comprises more than 350 franchisees. It excludes consideration of 
Fasteo's overseas operations, as well as their postal network, launched (and franchised) in 
1998. 
Fasteo specialised in document and parcel delivery. 350 couriers operated vans making 
collections and deliveries. Each courier developed and managed a customer-base within an 
exclusive geographic territory. Operating as a courier involved the pick-up and delivery of 
documents and parcels within their area. Items with destinations beyond that area were 
taken to the local Fasteo depot where they were sorted either for 1) delivery by other 
FastCo couriers affiliated with that depot, or 2), line-haul delivery to one of 21 other 
Fasteo depots located throughout the country. At the depots, individual couriers collected 
items originating externally, for delivery within their specific operating area. 
F astCo operated the subfranchising organisational form. There were three levels of 
franchisees: National Master Franchisees (franchisor), Regional Master Franchisees 
(subfranchisors) and Courier Franchisees (subfranchisees). Each country had a separate 
National Master Franchisee (Nl\I1F). NMFs for New Zealand and Australia were wholly 
owned subsidiaries of Fasteo Ltd. The franchisor or NMF for New Zealand recruited and 
provided support to subfranchisors. 
Subfranchisors purchased the right to develop and manage a courier service network 
within a geographically exclusive area. There were 22 subfranchisors in New Zealand. 
Subfranchisors were responsible for establishing a depot and recruiting, training and 
supporting a number of courier franchisees within their exclusive area. Subfranchisors 
were not able to operate as couriers. Subfrancisors, however, were allowed to own other 
Fasteo subfranchisors. A number did. The largest multi-subfranchisor had four 
subfranchisor franchises, including one in New Zealand and three in Australia. 
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Courier Franchisees (or subfranchisees) purchased the rights to operate in an exclusive 
territory within their respective subfranchisor's territory. The majority of courier 
franchisees owned and operated a single van. Most others had two. Courier Franchisees in 
developing areas were purposively granted large territories to attain full market coverage. 
Overtime, as business developed, such subfranchisees had the opportunity to hire 
employees or split and sell parts of their territories to new subfranchisees. 
Income generated through deliveries and the sale of packaging and labels were shared 
between the subfranchisee, subfranchisor and franchisor. 
Development 
In 1983, FastCo's founder began offering courier services personally in the Hawkes Bay 
region. Ambitious, he sought growth and expanded so that FastCo comprised 12 company-
owned vans, operated by employees, by 1984. Despite this growth, the founder felt 
frustrated by the performance of employee-couriers: 
These had company drivers in them. I found that the productivity levels were 
nowhere near what I was doing when I started each run. The cost of operating the 
vehicles were extremely high and I felt there has got to be a better way. 
The founder then decided to franchise operations. Growth and changes to organisational 
form followed rapidly. FastCo began franchising in 1984 and adopted the single-unit 
franchising form. All courier runs were converted to franchises and, as stated by the 
founder, "the productivity levels just increased dramatically. I think about threefold." The 
founder wanted to grow operations further, so looked beyond Hawkes Bay to the rest of 
New Zealand. After less than a year, FastCo adopted subfranchising, and a team of two to 
three franchisor representatives, including the founder, began establishing then franchising 
subfranchisor operations throughout New Zealand. The founder stated: 
The operation was going really well. We had a five-year business plan - so we 
basically put phase two into place, which was setting up in other locations. We 
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started in Gisbourne first, and we franchised that, and then we went to Palmerston 
(North), and we franchised that as a master: We franchised two master territories 
who had, in turn, courier franchisees underneath them - and then on to Wellington. 
So, first of all, we would start an operation, find a master franchisee - or a 
Regional Franchisee, as we call them - and then Courier Franchisees. 
FastCo development continued in New Zealand until 22 subfranchisors and 350 courier 
franchisees were established. 
Franchise Imperatives 
FastCo's franchise development was influenced by a number of factors. Fasteo's choice 
of subfranchising was strongly influenced by the founder's desire for growth. He was 
particularly ambitious and desired rapid and large-scale growth. That desire for growth 
under-pinned the adoption of subfranchising and continued on as Fasteo looked to 
establish operations in Australia and Singapore, and advertised for National Master 
Franchisees in 40 further countries. 
The desire to grow highlighted the need for two factors that were critical for growth. The 
first factor related to internal resources. Specifically, Fasteo's founder recognised that 
Fasteo had neither the financial nor managerial resources to realise 1) a nation-wide 
network of company-owned couriers, or 2), a nation-wide network of company-owned 
depots to support franchised couriers: 
We realised that we didn't have the human resources to control the operations 
ourselves. We didn't have enough people in the organisation and we still realised 
that we had to use our entrepreneurial flair to start the operatiOns. But as soon as 
we had them up and running we went and found the Master Regional 
Franchisees ... And financial resources, obviously, as well. You know, to set up 
these operations is very expensive, and if we had have had a company network 
owned by us, we would never have been able to have the growth that we have got 
today. 
To the founder, subfranchising was better than all other organisational forms. No other 
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form provided similar access to financial and managerial resources at both the regional 
depot and courier level. For example, while single-unit franchising and direct multi-unit 
franchising forms provide external resources at the courier level, both involved (and 
therefore required) a company-owned network of regional depot facilities. 
The second factor related to the motivation of regional managers and couners. The 
founder recognised that in order to achieve growth, both parties needed to be motivated to 
perform. The founder felt that subfranchising was unparalleled in that it provided both 
with incentives to perform diligently: 
I think that a master franchisee has to have the total commitment and has to 
provide the support to the Courier Franchisee and it is a chain oj command. Like 
you have got the Courier Franchisee needs the support oj the master, the master 
franchisee needs the support of the National Master, and then the national master 
needs the support oj the franchisor, and I think that each person along that line 
has to own and operate that business. 
The founder preferred subfranchising over alternative organisational forms because, by 
owning their own businesses, it provided regional managers (as subfranchisors) and 
couriers (as subfranchisees) with good incentives to pursue growth and operate diligently. 
No alternative franchising arrangement provided similar levels of incentives. To the 
founder, ownership at each level was essential for growth. Direct multi-unit forms, by 
comparison, involved a higher proportion of employee couriers. The founder believed that 
employees do not have the same level of incentives, and are therefore associated with 
lower growth: 
What actually happens is, when they start employing too many employees, you lose 
the growth In franchiSing people earn on their own performance jactor. The 
harder they work the more money they earn. They have got their capital at risk as 
well ... and, you know, we have experienced that. When we have owned franchises 
ourselves, the franchises that haven't got employees in them like jar outperform the 
ones that have employees. 
151 
The founder also preferred subfranchising to area representation for incentive-related 
reasons. He believed that sub franchisors would have greater incentives than area 
representatives because they have more complete control (i.e., involves less franchisor 
intervention) over the development of their territories. Furthermore, the founder added that 
the division of responsibilities associated with area representation would invoke confusion 
and, potentially, litigation: 
The contractual obligations would just be too messy as to who provides what and it 
would just leave to much chance for litigation, if you like. You know, "he said we'd 
do this" and the other one is saying "no that's not what we do, you know. ,. 
The Environment 
Market Size 
The market size for courier services was large, providing a number of companies, like 
Fasteo, with the potential to develop networks comprising several hundred couriers. The 
prospect of a large number of couriers contributed to FastCo's decision to adopt 
subfranchising. As stated in the previous section, the founder recognised that, in order to 
achieve desired levels of growth, FastCo needed to introduce external financial and 
managerial resources. Such resources were essential for developing and managing regional 
depots and couriers operations. 
Market Growth 
The market for courier services has grown. The sector grew rapidly following deregulation 
during the 1980s. More recently, the founder said, growth had been steady: 
The market had really started to grow. Well, it started to grow back in 
deregulation days which is back in about the 83, 84 era, and that opened up the 
market to independents like ourselves and then we just blossomed over night. Then 
it stagnated for a little while and probably for the last 5 years I would say there 
has been 7 percent per annum growth... The fast part of the market is the 
document market, so technology isn't having an effect on that. 
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While providing a supportive environment for organisational growth, the founder felt that 
the actual level of growth did not influence FastCo's decision to use subfranchising. 
FastCo adopted subfranchising before it was apparent what level of growth could be 
expected: 
No (the period of large growth did not influence the type of franchising used), 
because we had set the system when we established the system. So the actual 
system hasn't been changed All that we have changed is possibly the method of 
operandi in between. 
Customer Dispersion 
FastCo and other courier company's customers were highly dispersed throughout New 
Zealand. This meant FastCo required couriers throughout the country. Furthermore, due to 
degree of isolation from the franchisor, regional depots were also needed: 
Because we are geographically everywhere, we need to have the master type 
relationship. if we just had one franchise support office to cover the whole country 
it just wouldn't work. It would be a physical impossibility (Founder). 
Numerous regional depots were required to provide localised coordination, administration 
and warehousing facilities for couriers. In the mind of the founder, the degree of 
dispersion meant the costs associated with establishing and managing a network of 
couriers were high. As identified in a previous section, FastCo lacked the financial and 
managerial resources to develop a network of couriers and regional depots. Consequently, 
the founder preferred sub franchising, compared to alternative organisational forms, 
because it minimised the level of franchisor investment and involvement in establishing 
and managing both courier and regional depot facilities. 
Competition 
Competition in the sector has grown and this has impacted on all courier operations. 
Informants regarded rivalry in the sector as intense, and it became more so overtime. 
FastCo had four large competitors with nation-wide coverage. There were also numerous 
small operators and networks with operations confined to particular regions. Increased 
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rivalry made trading conditions difficult. More competltJ.on meant fewer sales and 
increased discounting led to deteriorating profit margins. The subfranchisor noted the 
effect of discounting: 
It is a pain because all it does is lower the bar, because we must remain 
competitive to maintain our market share and sales. But also we must remain 
profitable. 
As a consequence, some couriers, and smaller courier networks failed. The competitive 
context contributed to founder's selection of subfranchising: 
I think that I would say that the answer (to how competition has affected the type 
of franchising selected) would be that the type of system that we have got in place 
has strengthened our position. 
The founder believed that by subfranchising, and having regional managers and couriers 
owning their own businesses, both parties would be motivated to operate efficiently and, 
better identify and respond to customer requirements: 
I think that franchising has enabled us to be very competitive price wise and it has 
enabled us to adapt to our clients' needs probably quicker than most of the bigger 
companies... You have got the couriers contract with the customers - but the 
master assists the courier in offering the best possible service to his clients. 
Customer Diversity and Managerial Complexity 
Customers for courier services were quite homogeneous, providing operators with few 
challenges. Most customers had similar requirements meaning very little adaptation was 
required at the courier level. Adaptation that was needed typically involved only large 
clients, and consisted of adjustments to pricing and/or the frequency of courier visits. For 
example, the founder said that in most cases: 
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It might just be one service a day and in other areas it might be two services a day 
- or three services - depending on the customer's needs. 
While physically demanding, the tasks associated with managing courier operations were 
very simple. This uncomplicated format provides couriers with few difficulties. As stated 
by the founder, several aspects of Fasteo operations, including the service breadth and 
pricing structure, had been purposively designed for simplicity: 
We have always based our business on the KISS principle - 'Keep It Simple 
Stupid' - and that tends to work; limit the number of services to the bare minimum 
that you need ... Our pricing structure is very simple too. 
There were only eight parcel (two local, four national and two Trans-Tasman) and seven 
document (one local, four national and two Trans-Tasman) delivery services. That narrow 
service breadth meant couriers needed only a limited range of labels and document 
satchels. Further illustrating the simplicity of operating, individual couriers operated in 
small territories and (typically) followed a set daily route and routine. Very few hired 
staff 
The homogeneous nature of demand and simplicity of operations had little influence on 
franchising form. The simplicity of meeting customer needs and operating provided 
couriers with few managerial challenges. This, in turn, meant couriers were easy to recruit 
and train. It also meant couriers grew quickly in confidence. Illustrative of this all-round 
simplicity, the informants stated, in turn: 
Well it is only deliveries and pick-ups. So there is no hard work, the only hard 
work is lifting heavy cartons (Courier Franchisee). 
After one week if you haven't got enough basic knowledge to operate we start to be 
cautious because you can, it is like anything, you can only learn so much and then 
you must do (Subjranchisor). 
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I don't think it is that complex at all. All they go through is a week's training 
course which is mainly they'il take a video home and a manual and they will come 
in the next day and answer a test paper and go out on the road for a couple of days 
and [then] they are a Courier Franchisee (Founder). 
Overall, the founder felt the level of managerial complexity and customer diversity had no 
effeCt on their decision to adopt subfranchising. 
Summary 
Founded in 1983, FastCo had a network of 22 regional depot facilities and more than 350 
couriers throughout New Zealand. FastCo utilised subfranchising. Regional depot facilities 
were owned and managed by subfranchisors while courier operations were owned and 
managed by subfranchisees. After founding, FastCo made rapid changes to their 
organisational form. In 1984, FastCo began franchising with a form characteristic of 
single-unit franchising. Twelve company-owned units were subsequently converted to 
franchises. Later, in 1984, FastCo adopted the sub franchising form. 
FastCo's founder desired very rapid growth. That desire underpinned much of FastCo's 
development, including the selection of organisational form. The founder's ambition for 
growth was evident in his aspiration to not only build a nationwide network of couriers in 
New Zealand, but also develop extensive courier networks in Australia, Singapore and at 
least 40 further countries, including the United States. This desire for growth influenced 
choice of organisational form. F astCo adopted subfranchising for two critical reasons 
related to growth. First, realising internal resources were limited, FastCo preferred 
subfranchising because it provided access to much needed external and financial 
managerial resources. FastCo required these resources to develop a network of couriers 
and regional depots to support couriers. Second, FastCo preferred sub franchising because, 
by owning their own businesses, it provided both regional managers and couriers with the 
motivation to pursue growth and operate diligently. 
Franchising form choice was also influenced by factors representing environmental and 
task uncertainties. The market size, in particular, strongly influenced FastCo's choice of 
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organisational form. The scale of demand meant the financial and managerial burden 
associated with recruiting and managing a large number of couriers was high. FastCo then 
preferred subfranchising over alternatives because, by delegating franchisor-related 
activities to subfranchisors (or managers of regional depot facilities), it minimised 
franchisor capital requirements and the managerial burden associated with establishing 
and managing a large courier network. 
Comparatively, market growth had little effect on FastCo's decision to adopt 
subfranchising. While demand grew steadily, and that growth provided a supportive 
environment for subfranchising and business growth, the organisational form was selected 
before market growth rates became apparent. 
Customer dispersion influenced form choice more strongly. The need for couriers 
throughout the country highlighted the costs associated with establishing, managing and 
monitoring a dispersed courier network. FastCo preferred subfranchising, given the level 
of dispersion, because they did not have the internal resources to develop the network of 
couriers and/or regional depot facilities that would be required. Subfranchising enabled 
FastCo to maximise their size and growth whilst minimising their investment and 
managerial involvement in regional depot and courier operations. 
The level of competition had a minor influence FastCo's decision to adopt subfranchising. 
Intense rivalry in the sector highlighted the need for diligent management of regional 
depot and courier operations to operate efficiently and better identify and respond to 
customer requirements. FastCo preferred subfranchising in that competitive context 
because it provided both parties with incentives to perform diligently. 
The final two factors, customer diversity and managerial complexity had little or no effect 
on FastCo's choice of organisational form. The influence of these factors was limited to 
the extent they provided an environment amenable to the utilisation of subfranchising. 
Moreover, homogeneous demand and simple tasks associated with managing courier 
operations likely meant that franchisor-related activities, such as courier recruitment, 
training and on-going management were relatively uncomplicated, and could therefore be 
delegated effectively to master franchisees. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the results of my thesis. I draw from case descriptions in the 
preceding three chapters to test the influence of three dimensions of environmental 
uncertainty (namely, munificence, complexity and dynamism) and task uncertainty on 
franchising form. In Chapter Two these dimensions or concepts were operationalised by 
factors that included demand size and growth ( environmental munificence), demand 
dispersion and heterogeneity (environmental complexity), intensity of rivalry 
(environmental dynamism) and task or managerial complexity (task uncertainty). These 
factors were then discussed in relation to three categories of franchising forms: 1) single-
unit franchising, 2) direct multi-unit franchising and 3), indirect multi-unit franchising. 
Recall SportCo and MortCo operate single-unit franchising, VideoCo and RealCo operate 
direct multi-unit franchising, and ServCo, FastCo and SnackCo, either operate, or are 
intending to operate (i.e., SnackCo), indirect multi-unit franchising forms. 
Propositions were generated linking environmental and task-related factors to franchisor 
choice of franchising form. These propositions are summarised in Table 4.1. This chapter 
analyses the results in light of each proposition. Following the proposition testing, I 
outline additional factors that were not part of the conceptual framework but that have 
influenced franchise form decisions. This chapter then concludes with a section exploring 









Summary of Propositions 
Propositions 
Proposition One: When demand size is high, multi-unit franchising forms 
will be more prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
Proposition Two: When demand size is high, the choice between 
direct and indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's 
strategic choice. 
Proposition Three: When demand growth is high, multi-unit 
franchising forms will be more prevalent compared to the single-
unitform. 
Proposition Four: When demand growth is high, the choice between direer 
and indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's strategic choice, 
Proposition Five: When demand heterogeneity is high, the single-
unit franchising form will be more prevalent compared to multi-
unitforms. 
Proposition Six: When demand dispersion is high, multi-unit 
forms will be more prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
Proposition Seven: When demand dispersion is high, indirect 
multi-unit forms will be more prevalent compared to direct multi-
unitforms. 
Proposition Eight: When intensity of rivalry is high, single-unitfranchising 
will be more prevalent compared to the multi-unit forms. 
Proposition Nine: When task complexity is high, the single-unit 
franchising form will be more prevalent compared to the multi-
unitforms. 
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Environmental and Task Uncertainties and Form Choice 
Environmental Munificence: Demand Size 
Proposition One: When demand size is high, multi-unit franchising forms will be 
more prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
Single-unit franchising was the preferred form when demand size was low. Morteo and 
Sporteo supported this proposition (see Table 4.2). Both franchisors placed great value on 
two key characteristics of single-unit franchising. First, both franchisors felt having 
owners operate units provided unit managers with good incentives to operate diligently. 
Second, both franchisors felt that having a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship helped 
them maintain control of individual units. Morteo and Sporteo perceived other types of 
franchising to be less suitable in terms of providing incentives and maintaining control. 
Sequential franchising and area development compromised unit-management incentives 
by involving employee managers. They were also perceived to provide less control. Of the 
direct multi-unit forms, area development compromised control most. 
Table 4.2 
Demand Size and Form Choice 
Firm Form Demand Size Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Low V' 
SportCo Single-unit Low V' 
VideoCo Sequential Moderate V' 
RealCo Sequential! Area Dev. Moderate V' 
• SnackCo Area representation Moderate V' 
i SenrCo Subfranchising High V' 
I FastCo Subfranchising High V' 
V' = Supported x = Not Supported 
Due to a small market size, both Morteo and Sporteo required relatively few units in 
order to reach full market penetration. Tasks associated with recruiting and establishing 
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units were therefore less than if market size, and the number of units required, were 
greater. Consequently, MortCo and SportCo placed little value on advantages normally 
associated with direct forms, such as increased growth in units through lower 
establishment costs. 
The level of market or demand size also influenced MortCo and SportCo's feelings toward 
both indirect multi-unit franchising forms, namely area representation and subfranchising. 
Franchisor informants from both companies considered their market size to be too small to 
merit using those forms. More specifically, they felt that area representation and 
subfranchising offered more benefits to systems with very high demand size. In contrast, 
MortCo and SportCo felt that indirect forms could offer them few advantages over single-
unit franchising. Furthermore, they believed that demand size was insufficient for either 
area representation or subfranchising to be viable. MortCo and SportCo were concerned 
that demand was insufficient in size to cover additional costs associated with having 
master franchisees. Importantly, VideoCo, RealCo and SnackCo, also echoed similar 
concerns regarding the viability of area representation and/or subfranchising forms, due to 
low market size. 
Both VideoCo and RealCo utilised direct multi-unit forms, sequential franchising andlor 
area development. This also supports the proposition. In line with the proposition, both 
considered their demand context of a size that market penetration could be more readily 
achieved and managed by allowing competent owners to hold additional franchises. 
Moreover, RealCo, in particular, indicated the burden associated with recruiting and 
establishing new owners for each additional office would be too restrictive on chain 
growth. Thus, limiting franchisees to a single franchise appeared nonsensical. Importantly, 
however, while demand size was too large for single-unit franchising, both companies 
considered it insufficient for indirect multi-unit forms, such as area representation and 
subfranchising. Further, both companies considered their context far from a threshold 
whereby indirect multi-unit franchising forms would warrant more serious consideration. 
Consequently, the choice between direct and indirect forms for VideoCo and RealCo was 
based, in part, on demand size. 
With large demand size, and much greater potential for units, ServCo and FastCo (with 
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more than 500 and 350 units, respectively), particularly, but also SnackCo, favoured 
indirect multi-unit forms. This preference supported the proposition. SnackCo was 
converting operations from single-unit franchising to area representation because it 
considered its market capacity to be too large for single-unit franchising. Interestingly, 
while SnackCo considered its market too large for single-unit franchising, it felt it was too 
small for subfranchising. In contrast, both ServCo and FastCo perceived themselves, and 
their market, too large for all forms (including direct multi-unit forms) apart from 
subfranchising. F astCo and ServCo' s franchisor informants felt that, given the size of their 
respective markets, operating area representation, subfranchising's closest variant, would 
be impractical. The tasks involved with franchise recruitment, alone, would be too 
burdensome to centralise. Thus, these larger systems preferred to delegate a greater 
proportion of franchisor related activities, including unit-franchisee recruitment, training 
and ongoing support, to third party subfranchisors. Serveo and FastCo believed that 
delegating such activities obviated the cost and risk associated with developing a large 
head office, but also resulted in better management of unit-franchisees and faster growth. 
Specific to their analyses of direct multi-unit forms, ServCo, FastCo and Snackeo also 
highlighted motivational issues. Specifically, owner-involvement was regarded as 
essential to the success of their units. Both companies felt direct multi-unit forms 
compromised the motivational incentives and advantages provided by owner-involvement. 
To conclude, the evidence provided support for Proposition One. The relationship between 
demand size and choice of franchising form coincided with expectations derived from the 
model. Multi-unit forms were more prevalent, compared to single-unit franchising, when 
demand size was high. When demand was high franchisors were willing to trade-off 
franchisor control, over individual units, in exchange for lower ex ante costs. Conversely, 
when demand was low franchisors opted to recruit and manage franchisees centrally in 
exchange for lower ex post costs. 
Proposition Two: When demand size is high, the choice between direct and 
indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's strategic choice. 
There was some support for Proposition Two. The choice between direct and indirect 
multi-unit franchising forms was, in part, mediated by franchisor strategic choice. In the 
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context of demand size, those franchisors opting for direct over indirect multi-unit forms 
were influenced by the desire or need to minimise standardisation costs. Importantly, 
VideoCo and RealCo perceived their markets to be insufficient in size for indirect forms to 
be viable. In contrast, franchisors adopting indirect multi-unit forms over direct multi-unit 
forms were influenced by the desire to minimise motivational costs. That is, franchisors 
utilising indirect forms preferred having owners than employees managing units because 
they felt owners were more motivated. Importantly, however, the franchisors desire to 
minimise motivational costs was not specifically related to the level of market or demand 
size. 
In summary, the findings were generally supportive of the proposed relationship between 
demand size and choice of organisational form. Multi-unit forms were more prevalent 
compared to single-unit franchising when demand size was high. Additionally, the choice 
between direct and indirect multi-unit franchising forms was mediated, to some extent, by 
franchisors strategic choice. In the context of demand size, those franchisors adopting 
direct over indirect forms did so, in part, to minimise standardisation costs. For franchisors 
utilising indirect forms, the level of market size did not influence the choice between 
direct and indirect forms. 
Environmental Munificence: Demand Growth 
Proposition Three: When demand growth is high, multi-unit franchising forms will 
be more prevalent compared to the Single-unit form. 
The cases of ServCo and FastCo supported the theoretical proposition (see Table 4.3). In a 
context of high demand growth, both preferred subfranchising to alternative forms for its 
capacity to facilitate more rapid unit-growth. Informants from these systems highlighted 
the advantages subfranchising provided by allowing them to focus limited financial and 
managerial resources on recruiting and training subfranchisors that, in tum, recruit, train 
and support subfranchisee operators in their respective territories. For these companies, the 
scale of demand growth, combined with their desire for rapid growth, and the potential for 
large numbers of operators, was such that all alternative franchising forms were 
considered impractical, and therefore were outright rejected. Those forms rejected 
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included area representation, subfranchising's closest variant. Serveo, in particular, 
highlighted the operational implications (e.g., in franchise recruitment with up to 30-40 
enquiries from prospective subfranchisees each day) centralising certain franchise system 
management functions could have on scarce franchisor resources. Both companies also 
rejected area development, another master franchise form, because they perceived units, 
run by employees (instead of owners), would provide lower sales growth. Subfranchising, 
in contrast, was perceived to provide better incentives for growth at both the subfranchisor 
and subfranchisee (unit) leveL 
Table 4.3 
Demand Growth and Form Choice 
Firm Form Demand Growth Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Large x 
SportCo Single-unit Small ./ 
VideoCo Sequential Small from large ./ 
RealCo Sequentiall Area Dev. Turbulent x 
SnackCo Area representation Large ./ 
ServCo Subfranchising Very large ../ 
FastCo Subfranchising Very large ./ 
I 
./ = Supported x == Not Supported 
The case of Snackeo also supported the theoretical proposition. Snackeo commenced 
franchising with single-unit franchising. Snackeo operated in a market that was growing 
rapidly but found its own growth frustratingly slow. Snackeo then opted for area 
representation to facilitate growth. Interestingly, the founder felt that the utilisation of area 
representation would be temporary. He planned to revert back to single-unit franchising 
when growth in the market slowed down. 
The case of Sporteo supported the theoretical proposition. In the context of earlier steady 
demand growth, Sporteo concentrated somewhat more on growth in store numbers, and a 
small number of existing franchisees were allowed to establish an additional outlet. More 
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recently, however, slowing growth, and therefore a more challenging operating 
environment, has highlighted the importance of providing adequate incentives to store 
managers. Consistent with expectations, SportCo preferred forms that maximised owner-
involvement in individual stores. Consequently, SportCo preferred single-unit franchising 
to direct multi-unit forms and the Franchise Partnership Structure was preferred to 
sequential franchising. 
The case of VideoCo provided some further support. Sequential franchising dominated 
VideoCo's form during the period of early steady market growth. Interestingly, however, 
the choice of direct multi-unit franchising was motivated more by ambitious initial 
franchisees wanting more than one outlet, than the franchisor. More recently, demand 
growth has faltered. Franchisee reactions to reduced growth illustrated the importance of 
demand growth on franchising type. Some multi-unit franchisees reduced the size of their 
networks and invested in alternative opportunities outside the video hire sector. 
RealCo's choice of direct multi-unit franchising did not support the proposition. Contrary 
to expectations (see Table 4.3), RealCo adopted a form that facilitated rapid unit-growth 
despite demand in its sector oscillating wildly, sometimes by more than 15 percent on the 
previous year. Indeed, RealCo sought very rapid unit-growth, leading to the rejection of 
single-unit franchising. In a context where one might have expected single-unit 
franchising to be more appropriate, it was rejected because it slowed growth and was 
burdensome on franchisor resources. Sequential franchising and area development were 
preferred because they facilitated more rapid growth. 
RealCo's subsequent experiences, and more recent plans, however, do support the 
proposition. RealCo' s context of volatile demand has highlighted inefficiencies associated 
with direct multi-unit forms. Specifically, low periods have highlighted the poor 
performance of employee-managed, compared to owner-managed, RealCo offices. 
Consistent with expectations, RealCo is now looking to limit franchisee expansion and 
size, thereby increasing the proportion of owner-managed to employee-managed offices. 
Like RealCo, MortCo also failed to support the proposition. Despite a backdrop of strong 
demand growth, MortCo chose not to adopt a form that facilitated rapid growth. Instead, 
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MortCo selected single-unit franchising. That departure from my proposition illustrated 
that there were other important factors contributing to organisational form decisions. 
Notably, for MottCo, the franchisor attributed high levels of importance on other factors. 
F or example, the franchisor exhibited a strong desire to maintain high levels of power and 
control in their relationship with franchisees. The franchisor perceived alternative types of 
franchising to compromise control. Other reasons were also prominent. For example, 
limited demand size and increased competitive activity highlighted viability concerns 
associated with indirect forms. MortCo also associated concerns with direct multi-unit 
franchising forms. In particular, MortCo believed having employee-based consultants, 
instead of more motivated owner-operating consultants, reduced the potential for unit-
level growth. 
In summary, the concept of demand growth possessed some utility in explaining the usage 
and consideration of different franchising forms. Consistent with expectations derived 
from the model, companies such as ServCo, FastCo, SnackCo and VideoCo adopted 
growth facilitating multi-unit forms in a context where demand growth is/was strong. Also 
in line with the proposition, companies featuring low and even negative demand growth 
favoured single-unit franchising. In contrast, however, the initial development of form in 
two cases occurred contrary to expectations. With strong demand growth, MortCo 
maintained the single-unit form. Conversely, with volatile demand, RealCo adopted 
growth-facilitating forms. For RealCo, however, it is important to note that they were 
revising their franchise strategy to an organisational form that supported the proposition. 
Proposition Four: 'When demand growth is high, the choice between direct and 
indirect forms will be mediated by the franchisor's strategic choice. 
Proposition Four was only partially supported. Following the proposition, firms adopting 
indirect over direct multi-unit forms clearly valued more rapid growth, through lower 
motivational costs, over reducing costs associated with standardisation. SnackCo, ServCo 
and FastCo, operating in a context of growing demand, all felt that having owners operate 
units was critical to achieving concomitant organisational growth. Companies adopting 
direct multi-unit forms, however, did not support the proposition. While both VideoCo and 
RealCo rejected indirect multi-unit forms based on cost, their preference for direct multi-
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unit franchising was not specifically related to the level of demand growth. In other words, 
the level of demand growth did not influence their decision to adopt a direct versus 
indirect multi-unit franchising form. 
Overall, there was some support for both propositions, although Proposition Three was 
more strongly supported than Proposition Four. Demand growth influenced form choice in 
a number of cases. Companies operating in rapidly growing environments generally did 
prefer multi-unit forms for their capacity to facilitate growth. Meanwhile, companies 
facing low and even negative demand growth favoured single-unit franchising. Two 
companies, however, adopted forms contrary to expectations. Of these, one added further 
support to Proposition Three by experiencing difficulties consistent with the logic 
underlying the propositions. The second illustrated how no one factor explains form 
choice; instead, multiple factors may work in concert. 
Choices made between indirect and direct multi-unit forms were only partially consistent 
with Proposition Four. In a context of high growth, companies utilising indirect multi-unit 
forms preferred forms capacity to facilitate rapid growth to their ability to reduce 
standardisation costs. For franchisors utilising direct multi-unit forms, the level of demand 
or market growth did not influence the choice between direct and indirect forms. 
Environmental Complexity: Demand Heterogeneity 
Proposition Five: When demand heterogeneity is high, the Single-unit franchising 
form will be more prevalent compared to multi-unit forms. 
SportCo and MortCo strongly support the proposition (see Table 4.4). Both companies 
operated in an environment where demand was quite heterogeneous. SportCo and MortCo 
preferred single-unit franchising to both direct and indirect multi-unit forms for its 
capacity to balance requirements for adaptation with system-wide uniformity. 
167 
Table 4.4 
Demand Heterogeneity and Form Choice 
I Firm Form Heterogeneity Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Heterogeneous-Homogeneous ../ 
SportCo Single-unit Heterogeneous ../ 
VideoCo Sequential Heterogeneous-Homogeneous ../ 
• RealCo Sequential/Area Dev. Heterogeneous-Homogeneous x 
SnackCo Area representation Homogeneous ../ 
I ServCo Subfranchising Homogeneous ../ 
FastCo Subfranchising Homogeneous ../ 
../ = Supported x = Not Supported 
Heterogeneous demand provided SportCo and MortCo with considerable operational 
challenges. SportCo needed store managers who were especially diligent. Diligent store 
managers were required to effectively manage stock in an environment where customer 
requirements varied widely. Similarly, MortCo also needed consultants who were diligent 
in order to accurately determine and match lending products with the diverse 
circumstances and requirements of property investors. Yet, while units of both systems 
were required to adapt and respond to varying needs, they also needed to exhibit a degree 
of uniformity and consistency. Compared to single-unit franchising, MortCo and SportCo 
indicated that that balance would be more difficult to achieve with direct or indirect multi-
unit forms. Direct multi-unit forms were perceived to reduce the capacity for local 
adaptation. In keeping with agency theory, the need for local adaptation highlighted the 
importance of incentives. Both companies believed owners were more motivated than 
employees to operate units diligently. Accordingly, franchising forms that reduced owner-
involvement were rejected on the basis that employee-managers would lack the motivation 
to respond to individual customer needs. Consequently, MortCo and SportCo preferred 
single-unit franchising to direct multi-unit forms. MortCo also, in particular, believed that 
indirect multi-unit forms reduced their ability to maintain uniform systems and standards. 
MortCo was concerned that local master franchisees - whether area representatives or 
subfranchisors - would be motivated, due to business ownership, to adapt units within their 
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territory, to that territory. MartCo was particularly concerned that such adaptation would 
occur at the expense of maintaining adequate levels of system-wide uniformity and 
consistency. Consequently, MortCo preferred single-unit franchising to indirect multi-unit 
forms because it provided the franchisor with greater power to ensure local adaptation was 
balanced with appropriate levels of standardisation. 
Companies operating in environments featuring more homogeneous demand also adopted 
forms that were consistent with the proposition. These companies placed less emphasis on 
the importance of incentives provided by owner-involvement, bargaining power relative to 
franchisees, and/or maintaining a direct relationship with all unit-managers/operators, and 
adopted direct or indirect multi-unit franchising forms. This section will consider the 
prevalence of direct multi-unit franchising first, before considering indirect multi-unit 
franchising. In doing so, I uncovered an additional explanation for the choice between 
direct and indirect multi-unit forms. 
VideoCo and RealCo utilised direct multi-unit forms. Of these, one might confidently 
suggest VideoCo featured more homogenous demand than MortCo and SportCo, who 
utilised single-unit franchising. It was less clear, however, given the difficulty of directly 
comparing different business concepts, whether RealCo featured more or less 
homogeneous demand than both MortCo and SportCo. 
Consistent with the model, VideoCo had some variation in and across stores and that 
provided only a minor impact on the nature and complexity of operating. The lack of 
heterogeneity meant the challenges associated with simultaneously maximising local 
responsiveness whilst maintaining a degree of standardisation were low. In this sense, it 
appeared the level of homogeneity decreased constraints pertaining to form that might 
otherwise be associated with more heterogeneous demand. Indeed, one might suggest that 
the characteristics associated with form that were so important in a heterogeneous 
environment, such as maximising owner-involvement in units, were of less importance in 
VideoCo's more homogeneous environment. Consequently, one might suggest that an 
environment featuring homogeneous demand, such as VideoCo' s was amenable for direct 
multi-unit franchising. 
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RealCo's utilisation of sequential franchising and area development did not support the 
proposition. RealCo, in contrast to VideoCo, utilised direct multi-unit franchising forms in 
an environment with greater diversity of demand. That increased diversity meant the tasks 
associated with balancing local adaptation with system-wide standardisation were more 
challenging. Of both challenges, RealCo was particularly concerned with maintaining a 
degree of consistency and uniformity across locations. 
Consistent with expectations derived from the model, RealCo's utilisation of direct multi-
unit forms was problematic. RealCo's experiences demonstrated that franchisees with 
multiple offices were powerful and that power directly and indirectly impeded the 
effective implementation and monitoring of initiatives intended to benefit the overall 
chain. Those experiences subsequently contributed to RealCo's decision to limit 
franchisee size and expansion. Thus, while RealCo operated direct multi-unit franchising, 
they indicated a preference for single-unit franchising. 
RealCo further increased my understanding of form choice in their context of demand 
heterogeneity. RealCo preferred direct to indirect multi-unit franchising forms in that 
environment. RealCo believed indirect multi-unit franchising would reduce their ability to 
balance local responsiveness with standardisation. RealCo felt that area representatives or 
sub franchisors would be more motivated - because of residual claims tied to their 
performance - to make local adaptations than appreciate system-wide efforts and benefits 
associated with standardisation. 
The utilisation of indirect multi-unit forms by SnackCo, ServCo and FastCo also 
supported the proposition. These three companies operated in environments featuring 
relatively homogeneous demand. In keeping with expectations, this level of homogeneity 
appeared to reduce ex-:-post costs. Accordingly, the challenges associated with managing 
the conflicting demands of local responsiveness and standardisation were relatively minor. 
In turn, it appeared, this context of homogeneity ameliorated disadvantages (e.g., less 
direct contact and control over individual units) otherwise associated with utilising indirect 
forms, particularly when compared to single-unit franchising. In other words, it seemed 
that SnackCo, ServCo and FastCo operate in an in environment - in terms of demand 
heterogeneity - that is amenable to indirect multi-unit franchising. 
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In summary, the cases provided general support for the proposition. The forms utilised by 
the companies were largely consistent with my expectations. Ex-post costs associated with 
local adaptation and standardisation were crucial in firms facing heterogeneous compared 
to homogeneous demand. Correspondingly, companies preferred forms in fit with their 
context. Indeed, companies experiencing higher levels of demand heterogeneity preferred 
single-unit franchising because it preserved unit-level incentives, bargaining power and a 
direct relationship. Companies considered those characteristics vital for management 
Issues pertaining to ex-post costs. By contrast, ex-post costs were less crucial for 
companies experiencing more homogeneous demand. More homogeneous demand 
reduced the managerial challenges associated with balancing local responsiveness and 
standardisation. Consequently, the disadvantages that might otherwise be associated with 
adopting multi-unit forms (when compared to single-unit franchising) were reduced. 
Companies experiencing more homogeneous demand could be less constrained in their 
choice of form. 
Consideration of demand heterogeneity and form choice produced an additional 
explanation for the choice between direct and indirect multi-unit forms. One company, 
namely RealCo, operating direct multi-unit franchising in an environment featuring 
heterogeneous demand, identified relative disadvantages associated with indirect multi-
unit franchising forms. RealCo believed indirect forms would reduce their ability to 
establish and maintain standard operating practices. 
Environmental Complexity: Demand Dispersion 
Proposition Six: When demand dispersion is high, multi-unit forms will be more 
prevalent compared to the single-unit form. 
Fasteo and ServCo supported the proposition (See Table 4.5). Both companies utilised 
subfranchising in a context where demand was very highly dispersed. Those high levels of 
dispersion highlighted the substantial costs associated with the establishment and 
management of large numbers of geographically isolated operators. Both companies stated 
that it would be physically impossible to provide all aspects of franchise system 
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management from a centralised location. Consequently, effectively achieving these 
management tasks required localised management. Sub franchising was preferred in this 
context for its capacity to minimise these costs. 
Comparatively, both FastCo and ServCo regarded all alternative forms as impractical. 
Through more completely delegating franchise system management tasks to 
subfranchisors, subfranchising meant both compames could focus scarce resources on 
recruiting and training subfranchisors who, in tum, recruit and provide ongoing 
management to unit-level franchisees (in different areas throughout the country). Neither 
company had the financial or managerial resources to centralise such functions, nor to 
establish a regional network of employee managers. But also, importantly, neither 
company indicated they would like to establish company-owned operations. Both valued 
the fact sub franchising provided regional managers (as subfranchisors) with business 
ownership. FastCo and ServCo thought employee regional managers lacked the incentives 
to perform establishment and management tasks diligently. The logic for this was explicit 
and clearly followed agency theory. Furthermore, it was consistent with the proposition 
that forms will be adopted that minimise ex ante and ex post costs [which are high] when 
the level of customer or demand dispersion is very high. 
Table 4.5 
Demand Dispersion and Form Choice 
Firm Form Dispersion Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Low ./ 
SportCo Single-unit Moderate ./ 
VideoCo Sequential Moderate ./ 
RealCo Sequential! Area Dev. High ./ 
SnackCo Area representation Moderate ./ 
ServCo Subfranchising Very high ./ 
FastCo Subfranchising Very high ./ 
./ = Supported x = Not Supported 
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Serveo provided additional evidence in support of the proposition. Serveo executives 
stated that if their units were more geographically concentrated, in an area such as 
Auckland, they would be inclined to adopt single-unit franchising. That geographic 
concentration would better enable them to centralise activities associated with franchise 
system management. 
Snackeo's transition from single-unit franchising to area representation also supported the 
proposition. Snackeo identified that the costs associated with establishing, but particularly 
managing dispersed operators, with single-unit franchising, in an environment where 
demand was dispersed, were prohibitively high. Furthermore, SnackCo perceived that 
centralising both activities, whether by performing all franchisor-related functions from a 
central location or having regional managers employed by the franchisor, limited the 
effectiveness of their provision. Consistent with expectations, Snackeo preferred area 
representation. Given the level of dispersion, Snackeo felt area representatives could cost 
effectively provide both localised and diligent support to dispersed unit-level franchisees. 
Video Co and RealCo proVided partial support for the proposition. With medium to large 
numbers of dispersed operators both have adopted direct multi-unit forms. Of these 
companies, RealCo, in particular, articulated a philosophy in line with expectations. That 
is, they were more likely to allow franchisees, which were isolated from the franchisor or 
regional offices to expand. RealCo allowed such expansion because dispersed units were 
perceived to be expensive to establish. VideoCo and RealCo's preference for direct multi-
unit forms over indirect multi-unit forms also supported the proposition. While both have 
established a network of employee regional managers to provide localised support and co-
ordination to franchisees, neither considered demand dispersed enough to warrant 
adopting indirect-multi-unit forms. 
Finally, the cases of Mort Co and SportCo also supported the proposition. Both companies 
utilise single-unit franchising in a context of low to moderate dispersion. Challenges 
associated with the dispersion of operators have influenced form choice at MortCo and 
SportCo. MortCo indicated difficulties establishing dispersed units, and both companies 
experienced problems co-ordinating, observing and controlling dispersed units. These 
challenges influenced form decisions and preferences. For SportCo, initial company-
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owned expansion into dispersed areas produced problems. Employee-managed units 
performed poorly and required considerable monitoring. SportCo preferred single-unit 
franchising because it reduced these problems, and therefore reduced costs, by instituting 
owner-managers who make more diligent managers. MortCo's choice of form was also 
influenced by the dispersion of demand. While advantages were associated with indirect 
multi-unit forms, and minor anomalies existed, single-unit franchising was ultimately 
preferred and prevalent. In terms of alternative forms, MortCo' s founder perceived 
indirect multi-unit forms could reduce difficulties and costs associated with the 
establishment and management of dispersed units. Regarding anomalies, MortCo was 
more likely to customise franchise agreements in small and very isolated markets that 
were relatively expensive to support. Importantly, however, despite these perceptions and 
anomalies, MortCo accepted that their dominant form, single-unit franchising, was optimal 
given the level of dispersion. 
In summary, general support was found for Proposition Six. Multi-unit forms were 
selected when demand dispersion was moderate to high and, single-unit franchising was 
selected when demand dispersion was moderate to low. 
Proposition Seven: When demand dispersion is high, indirect multi-unit forms will 
be more prevalent compared to direct multi-unit forms. 
The cases provided some support for Proposition Seven. The two companies operating in 
very highly dispersed environments, namely ServCo and FastCo, did adopt indirect multi-
unit forms. Furthermore, their decision to adopt indirect forms was influenced by the level 
dispersion. ServCo and FastCo regarded all alternative forms as impractical in this 
environment. Companies in moderate to high dispersion environments made less decisive 
decisions pertaining to form choice. For example, three companies operating in 
moderately dispersed environments, namely SportCo, VideoCo and SnackCo, adopted 
single-unit franchising, sequential franchising (direct multi-unit franchising) and area 
representation (indirect multi-unit franchising), respectively. 
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Environmental Dynamism: Intensity of Rivalry 
Proposition Eight: When intensity of rivalry is high, single-unit franchising will be 
more prevalent compared to the multi-unit forms. 
The findings lent only partial support for the proposition. Only three firms adopted forms 
consistent with expectations. Indeed, while six of seven cases operated in intensely 
competitive environments, only two cases (Morteo and Sporteo) preferred and operated 
single-unit franchising. 
Table 4.6 
Intensity of Rivalry and Form Choice 
Firm Form Intensity of Rivalry Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Intense ,;' 
SportCo Single-unit Intense ../ 
VideoCo Sequential Intense .x: 
RealCo Sequential! Area Dev. Intense .x: 
SnackCo Area representation Benign-Intense ,;' 
ServCo Subfranchising Intense .x: 
FastCo Subfranchising Intense .x: 
,;' Supported x = Not Supported 
Both Morteo and Sporteo supported the proposition (see Table 4.6). Both companies 
operated in a highly competitive context and preferred single-unit franchising. As 
expected, their competitive context highlighted the need for unit-level and system-wide 
efficiencies. Morteo and Sporteo identified advantages associated with single-unit 
franchising in these areas. They identified that compared to direct multi-unit forms, single-
unit franchising provided managers who, because they were owners, were motivated to 
operate diligently and make a success of their respective businesses. Morteo and Sporteo 
also identified that, compared to indirect multi-unit forms, single-unit franchising was a 
175 
more efficient structure for their franchise systems. In particular, these companies felt that 
centralising rather than duplicating franchisor-related activities across different markets 
was more efficient and incurred fewer system-wide costs. SportCo also felt that 
maintaining a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship was important for communicating 
and acting on market information in a competitive environment. 
The case of SnackCo was also consistent with the proposition. In contrast to other cases, 
SnackCo operated in a relatively benign competitive environment. In this context, 
SnackCo was making a transition from single-unit franchising to area representation in 
order to facilitate more rapid growth. The founder was concerned that considerable 
unrealised market potential existed and that if SnackCo did not seize it their competition 
would. SnackCo' s utilisation of area representation was consistent with the proposition. 
One might consider SnackCo's relatively benign competitive context as amenable for 
multi-unit franchising. 
RealCo and VideoCo did not support the proposition (see Table 4.6). Both companies 
operated direct multi-unit franchising in environments that were intensely competitive. 
Their respective competitive environments had little or no notable influence on the 
original decision to adopt these forms. Importantly, however, changes to both RealCo and 
VideoCo's franchising forms had, more recently, been influenced by their competitive 
contexts. In fact, RealCo's most recent franchise strategy did support the theoretical 
proposition. RealCo' s context, which included widespread price competition, falling profit 
margins, and product differentiation, exposed two important disadvantages associated with 
their utilisation of direct multi-unit franchising forms. First, in a context where office-level 
productivity and efficiency was paramount, the General Manager concluded that offices 
controlled by multi-unit franchisees performed poorly compared to offices owner-operated 
offices. Second, multi-unit franchisees had greater bargaining power that frustrated the 
franchisor's attempts to implement new initiatives and monitor offices; franchisor -related 
responsibilities that were intended to benefit the system. Supporting the proposition, these 
problems contributed to RealCo's recent intentions to limit franchisee size and expansion. 
Intensity of competition also contributed to changes in VideoCo's franchising form. 
Specifically, multi-unit franchisees were selling some of their outlets to new franchisees -
thus increasing VideoCo's proportion of owner-managed outlets. In contrast to RealCo, 
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however, VideoCo' s changes to form were not instigated by the franchisor. Instead, the 
changes were driven by the desires and actions of VideoCo' s large franchisees that wanted 
to reduce their financial exposure in the video hire sector. 
FastCo and ServCo did not support the proposition. Both companies operated 
subfranchising in very competitive sectors. The operation of subfranchising departed from 
expectations: I proposed that single-unit franchising would be more prevalent when rivalry 
was intense. Importantly, FastCo and ServCo's utilisation of subfranchising does follow, 
in part, the total logic underlying the proposition. Subfranchising does, like single-unit 
franchising, preserve efficiencies at the unit-management level by involving owner-
operators. Maintaining diligent operators at the unit-level was important for both 
compames. 
FastCo and ServCo's utilisation departed from expectations because, according to the 
theoretical model, it introduced two primary disadvantages: 1) subfranchising reduces 
franchisor power needed for influencing and monitoring system-wide adaptations, and 2) 
subfranchising increases standardisation costs by adding hierarchy and replicating the 
provision of franchisor-related activities in different regions. Interestingly, however, both 
companies felt that subfranchising was optimal. For example, ServCo was most concerned 
with establishing units more rapidly than competitors, particularly for new services. 
ServCo therefore preferred subfranchising for its capacity to facilitate very rapid growth. 
FastCo, by contrast, preferred subfranchising because it felt the subfranchising form 
enabled them to be both more efficient and responsive than competitors. 
In summary, the findings lend only partial support for the proposition. Only three of seven 
companies preferred and operated organisational forms that were consistent with 
expectations. Indeed, of the six companies that operated in intensely competitive 
environments, only two utilised single-unit franchising. Of these, however, it is important 
to note that one company experienced problems consistent with a form-factor misfit. 
Further supporting the proposition, that company was motivated to modify its franchise 
strategy. 
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Task Uncertainty: Task Complexity 
Proposition Nine: When task complexity is high, the single-unit franchising form 
will be more prevalent compared to the multi-unit forms. 
Morteo and Sporteo supported the proposition (See Table 4.7). Both companies utilised 
single-unit franchising in environments featuring high levels of task uncertainty. The high 
levels of managerial complexity associated with operating their respective business units 
meant both companies considered single-unit franchising to be advantageous compared to 
alternative franchising forms. The complexities associated with a large stock range (e.g., at 
Sporteo) and/or complex product/service delivery (e.g., at Morteo) variously highlighted 
the importance of activities associated with managing task complexity. These activities 
were related to ex ante and ex post costs and included recruiting quality unit-managers, 
good unit-management decision-making and ensuring the quality of training and support. 
Morteo and Sporteo preferred single-unit franchising because, when compared to 
alternative forms, it preserved the integrity associated with each of these activities. As 
expected, two characteristics of single-unit franchising were of central importance. First, 
single-unit franchising involved owner-operators in units/stores. Second, single-unit 
franchising maintained a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship. Maintaining this direct 
relationship meant the franchisor performed all activities, such as franchise recruitment, 
training, monitoring and support. 
Sporteo felt that preserving owner-involvement in units was vital. Owner-managers were 
regarded as more motivated and diligent than employees, and diligent managers were 
considered essential given the mental and physical effort required to manage Sporteo's 
complex operations. Furthermore, turnover among franchisees was typically lower than 
employee-managers. Having owner-operators then meant that store managers were 
typically more experienced, and experience was an advantage given the complexity of, 
and time taken to learn, store operations. 
Sporteo and Morteo also valued a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship. Both 
companies wanted to maintain control of recruitment, given the complexity of operations. 
Morteo also wanted to maintain control of training. Both recruitment and training 
activities were regarded as crucial given the complexity of their business concept. 
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Table 4.7 
Task Complexity and Form Choice 
1 Firm Form Complexity Proposition 
MortCo Single-unit Complex-Very Complex ./ 
SportCo Single-unit Very Complex ./ 
VideoCo Sequential Complex ./ 
RealCo Sequential/Area Dev. Complex ./ 
SnackCo Area representation Simple ./ 
SenrCo Subfranchising Simple ./ 
FastCo Subfranchising Simple ./ 
./ = Supported x. = Not Supported 
VideoCo and RealCo also supported the proposition. Both operated direct multi-unit 
franchising and were prima facie less complex than SportCo and MortCo. Comparatively, 
VideoCo appeared less complex than RealCo. The relative complexity (or simplicity) of 
VideoCo placed less emphasis on activities (e.g., recruiting quality unit-manager) and 
attributes (e.g., owner-involvement) that were essential in more complex businesses. 
Consequently, this context rendered VideoCo's format more amenable to direct multi-unit 
franchising. Supporting that view, VideoCo informants identified few disadvantages that 
could be associated with direct multi-unit franchising, given the level of complexity. On 
the other hand, RealCo informants were more concerned about the quality of recruitment 
and training of unit-managers. Furthermore, RealCo indicated greater concern about the 
ability of franchisees to successfully manage multiple units. Despite these differences, 
both were united in their preference for direct over indirect multi-unit franchising forms in 
this context. Neither were comfortable delegating tasks associated with franchise system 
management to master franchisees. 
Finally, SnackCo, ServCo and FastCo also supported my proposition. These three 
companies featured the lowest levels of task uncertainty and either operated (FastCo and 
ServCo) or were about to adopt (i.e., SnackCo) indirect multi-unit franchising forms. Units 
of these franchise systems were characterised by simplicity. Their concepts were 
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comparatively simple and required little training in methods of operation. Indeed, their 
tasks were repetitive, most training was on-the-job (as opposed to institutional) and new 
recruits developed operating confidence quickly. In tum, FastCo and ServCo, in particular, 
acknowledged that the level of simplicity associated with managing their units, and 
recognised that this assisted their ability to delegate tasks, such as recruitment, training 
and monitoring to independently owned and operated master franchisees. Further, they 
argued that this delegation of franchisor-related activities was achieved with little or no 
loss in quality. 
In summary, the choice of different franchising forms coincided with my expectations. 
The single-unit form was more prevalent than multi-unit forms when task uncertainty was 
high. On the other hand, companies encountering less task uncertainty adopted multi-unit 
forms. 
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS AND FRANCHISING FORM 
The qualitative design used in this study highlighted the importance of factors that were 
not part of my theoretical model. These consisted of individual and firm-specific factors. 
Factors specific to individual choice included franchisor perceptions of incentives, growth 
aspirations and need for control. Firm specific factors included resource constraints and 
franchisee aspirations (See Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 
Individual and Firm-Level Determinants of Form Choice 




Need for Control 
. Firm-SpeciflC 
: Resource Constraints 














= very important in form decisions 
= important in form decisions 













As decision-makers, the founders and/or key franchisor personnel had an important impact 
on decisions pertaining to franchising form choice. The findings illustrated that franchisor 
decision-makers had different aspirations, beliefs, preferences, levels of knowledge and 
logic. Those differences, in turn, influenced franchising form choices in myriad ways. In 
this section, I highlight three important factors, relating to individual choices, which 
influenced franchising decisions. 
Incentives 
Incentives played a crucial role in franchising decisions. Incentives were critical both in 





this study is concerned most with choice of franchising forms, it is important to also 
consider the role of incentives in the initial decision to franchise. That is because the 
rationale for franchising, when coupled with the immediate experiences thereafter, often 
influenced subsequent decisions pertaining to franchising form. 
A level of discontent preceded the decision to franchise in most companies. Many of them 
had attempted to expand through hiring employees. Some such as, MortCo, had also 
experimented with alternative forms of remuneration in an attempt to improve unit 
performance. Looking back, all companies shared a common feeling that there had to be a 
better way of organising the management of their units to achieve both growth and unit-
performance. Most felt productivity was poor and, in fact, the founders of many 
companies (e.g., SportCo, Morteo, ServCo and FastCo), who started as owner-operators, 
were frustrated that employee-managers never met performance standards they had set for 
themselves. Furthermore some, such as SportCo, harboured more negative associations 
with employee-managers, after bad experiences with staff dishonesty and theft. 
Franchising offered an opportunity to better motivate unit-operators. Most franchisors 
hoped that having owners, rather than employees, operating units would improve the 
performance of unit-level management. Corresponding with the concept of moral hazard 
in agency theory (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Rubin, 1978), 
franchisor informants believed that franchisees that invested in units would be less likely 
to free ride and shirk. Put differently, owners would be more motivated to make a success 
of their unit/so For all concerned, franchised units did, on average, perform better than 
company-owned units managed by employees and for most companies, that result 
confirmed the logic that led them to franchise. Further, it informed many companies 
evaluation of alternative franchising arrangements. It is important to note at this stage, 
however, that while owner-operators performed better on average, they were not always 
better than employee-managers. Indeed, several franchisor informants, such as RealCo's 
Managing Director, made the point quite firmly that, just as there are poor performing 
employee-managers, there are also poor performing franchisees and, some employee-
managers do perform better than franchisees. 
The franchisor's assumption that owners perform more highly than employees played a 
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very important role in the choice between alternative franchising forms. Companies that 
operated forms that maximise owner-involvement in individual units (i.e., single-unit 
franchising and indirect multi-unit forms) adopted them mainly because they felt these 
forms provided unit-managers with improved motivation, through ownership, for them to 
operate diligently. More specifically, they provided unit-operators with residual claims 
tied to their unit's performance (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Rubin, 
1978). Corresponding with that logic, those same firms rejected direct multi-unit forms, 
namely sequential franchising and area development did so, largely, on the basis those 
types of franchising involve a greater prevalence of employee-managers. 
Incentives were also important at the chain management level. Companies that operated 
indirect multi-unit franchising forms (i.e., ServCo, FastCo and also SnackCo) instead of 
hiring employee regional managers did so, mainly, to provide such regional 
representatives with incentives that would motivate them to operate more diligently. 
ServCo, FastCo and SnackCo believed that owner-operating area representatives andlor 
subfranchisors would be motivated, because they were owners, and therefore risked their 
investment, to operate more diligently than salary-based regional managers. 
Firms that adopted direct multi-unit forms placed less emphasis on the importance of 
incentives relative to other factors. At VideoCo, for example, incentives provided by 
owner-involvement were scarcely mentioned. At RealCo incentives were more important. 
Indeed, incentives were cited as an important reason for the initial decision to convert the 
company-owned chain to franchising. Further, while the current form compromised 
incentives by allowing franchisees multiple-units, franchisor informants were committed 
to increasing the prevalence of owner-involvement at the unit-level. Realising low average 
productivity and performance per multi-office unit, the franchisor was committed to 
reducing the size of such multi-office networks. 
Growth Aspirations 
A desire for growth was also reflected in some decisions pertaining to form. While all 
companies in this study desired expansion, some harboured more ambitious growth 
aspirations than others. Indeed, three of the seven companies studied wanted rapid unit 
growth. These were RealCo, ServCo and FastCo. Therefore, these companies adopted 
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franchising forms that might facilitate more rapid growth. Indeed, all adopted multi-unit 
forms that might facilitate more rapid growth than single-unit franchising. Further, these 
firms selected the most growth facilitating multi-unit forms. For example, within direct 
multi-unit forms, RealCo made use of area development, which facilitates greater growth 
than sequential franchising. Similarly, within indirect multi-unit forms, ServCo and 
FastCo operated subfranchising, which facilitates more rapid growth than area 
representation. The capacity for growth provided by these forms was important in 
decisions of these three companies. Indeed, for RealCo, the desire for achieving rapid 
growth appeared to override many other considerations pertaining to form, such as control. 
Needfor Control 
While some companies adopted forms for their capacity to facilitate very rapid growth, 
others preferred those that preserved more control. Indeed, the choices made by a number 
of companies were influenced by their key decision-makers need for control. MortCo 
illustrated the important and pervasive role need for control could have in franchising 
decisions. MortCo preferred single-unit franchising because it enabled the franchisor to 
maintain a direct relationship with each unit-level consultant. MortCo was seriously 
tempted by indirect multi-unit franchising forms, such as area representation and 
subfranchising, due to frustrations with current levels of growth. MortCo ultimately, 
however, preferred single-unit franchising, mainly, because it provided a higher level of 
control. MortCo' s analysis to determine the relative attractiveness of area representation 
and subfranchising was also influenced by a need for control. MortCo' s founder initially 
found subfranchising more appealing than area representation, due to his desire to increase 
growth. However, his interest in subfranchising diminished after considerations pertaining 
to control. Indeed, MortCo preferred area representation to subfranchising because it 
preserved more direct franchisor control over unit-level consultants. 
SnackCo's decision to adopt area representation over subfranchising was also influenced 
by the founder's need for controL The founder preferred area representation because it 
enables them to maintain more influence in unit-level operations. 
Finally, a need for control also influenced VideoCo and RealCo's evaluations and choices 
pertaining to franchising form. VideoCo preferred (and operated) sequential franchising to 
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area development because it maintained greater franchisor control over unit-level 
development. RealCo decided recently to limit the ability of franchisees to operate 
additional units. Initially RealCo utilised sequential franchising and area development 
widely in order to facilitate very rapid unit-growth. However, the franchisor management 
team later realised that both forms, by allowing franchisees to operate multiple offices, 
compromise franchisor control of real estate offices. 
VideoCo and RealCo's preference for direct over indirect multi-unit franchising forms was 
also motivated by a need for control. Key decision-makers in both companies foresaw 
control problems associated with indirect forms, such as area representation and 
sub franchising. They felt that delegating franchisor-related activities to master franchisees 
compromised control over unit-level operations to an unacceptable level. Interestingly, 
both companies felt that problems associated with control-loss were accentuated by the 
remuneration structure of indirect forms. VideoCo and RealCo franchisors felt that having 
income dependent on territory performance could motivate master franchisees to 
variously: maximise sales within their territories, adapt the system to their territory at the 
expense of system-wide uniformity, and provide low quality franchise recruitment, 
training and support. 
Firm-Specific Factors 
Two factors pertaining more specifically to the firm also contributed to form choice. These 
are resource constraints and franchisee aspirations. 
Resource Constraints 
A lack of financial and/or managerial resources featured prominently in SportCo, RealCo, 
SnackCo, ServCo and FastCo's franchising decisions. All cited a shortage of financial 
capital as one reason for the initial decision to franchise operations. Because many 
franchisors possessed limited resources, that capital was important for expansion. 
Franchising produced more rapid unit-growth than was possible solely using company-
owned development. 
Access to capital was also important for firms requmng a network of regional 
representatives. Indeed, companies that adopted indirect forms (SnackCo, ServCo and 
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FastCo) noted they could not have afforded to establish a network of employee regional 
representatives using company money. Indirect forms obviated the franchisor investment 
that would otherwise be associated with establishing a network of salaried regional 
managers. Area representatives or subfranchisors provided both the financial and 
managerial resources to establish and manage regional management positions. F astCo 
exemplified the importance of resource constraints in their decision. The founder noted 
they would never have been able to achieve the growth they have experienced had they 
limited their expansion to company resources. 
Franchisee Aspirations 
Choice of franchising form was influenced by franchisee aspirations in three companies, 
namely SportCo, VideoCo and RealCo. All three companies had ambitious franchisees 
that wanted to expand their operations by purchasing and managing additional franchises. 
Those aspirations were important driver of multi-unit franchising for each of those 
comparues. 
Of the three compames, RealCo' s form decisions were influenced most markedly by 
franchisee aspirations. At RealCo, some franchisees were particularly desirous of 
expanding their personal network of offices. Importantly, the franchisor recognised that 
multi-office networks on average under-performed and wielded power that made chain 
management difficult. Despite that recognition, however, the franchisees possessed 
sufficient power, and exhibited such a threat of defection, that the franchisor was more 
inclined to let them expand than face losing them. 
Manager ambition and concern relating to managerial retention contributed to two 
companies decisions to franchise - mirroring the influence of franchisee aspirations on 
choice of franchising type. Prior to franchising both RealCo and MortCo executives were 
frustrated with the loss of talented managers. Prior to franchising Rea1Co and MortCo had 
few opportunities for advancement to extend such talented and ambitious unit managers. 
That situation then contributed to both companies decision to franchise operations. Both 
MortCo and RealCo felt that business ownership, through franchising, could provide 




The findings illustrate that there were multiple factors influencing choice of franchising 
form. The analysis in the previous two sections of this chapter explored the influence on 
form choice of eleven separate factors representing environmental and task uncertainties, 
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This section draws on both the preceding sections of this chapter, and individual case 
descriptions, to illustrate how these different factors influenced each of six possible 
preferences between the three primary categories of form (see Figure 4). This format 
reveals, more clearly, that no one factor explains form choice in its entirety. Instead, 
multiple factors operate, often in concert, to explain the different preferences and choices 
between franchising forms. 
1. Single-Unit over Direct Multi-Unit Franchising 
Preferences for single-unit franchising over direct multi-unit franchising were influenced 
by factors at the environmental and individual level. At the environmental level, direct 
multi-unit franchising offered few benefits to companies operating in a small market. 
Where few units were required to be established, informants preferred to have owners 
operate units and maintain a direct relationship with each unit-manager. Single-unit 
franchising was also preferred where market growth was small or negative, and where 
competition was intense, because it involved owner-operators, who were regarded as more 
diligent and motivated than employee-managers. Informants also preferred single-unit 
franchising to direct multi-unit franchising, in a competitive environment, because it 
provided the franchisor with greater power relative to franchisees. Greater power enabled 
the franchisor to implement new initiatives and effectively monitor units. Comparatively, 
by allowing franchisees to add units, direct multi-unit franchising reduced franchisor 
power relative to franchisees. 
Diverse customer requirements, and unit-management complexity also influenced the 
preference for single-unit franchising. Single-unit franchising was preferred where high 
levels of both factors existed. This was because single-unit franchising maintained owner-
operators and a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship. Owner-operators were perceived 
as more responsive to diverse to customer requirements when demand was heterogeneous. 
Owner-operators were also regarded as advantageous where tasks associated with 
managing units were complex. That was because complex operations required very good 
decision-making, and owners were perceived as more diligent than employee-managers. 
An added advantage of having owner-operators was a low level of turnover compared to 
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employee-managers. Lower turnover meant operators were more experienced, generally, 
and therefore better able to successfully manage complex units. A direct franchisor-
franchisee relationship was also preferred in heterogeneous and complex environments for 
two reasons. First, a direct relationship enabled efficient communication of important 
market information. Second, a direct relationship meant the franchisor maintained control 
over recruitment training and support; factors important in heterogeneous and complex 
environments. 
The preference for single-unit franchising over direct multi-unit franchising was also 
influenced, at the individual level, by key decision-maker beliefs pertaining to incentives. 
Indeed, some franchisor executives felt strongly that owners made better unit managers 
than employees. Such franchisors variously felt owners were more motivated, diligent, 
productive, loyal and committed, and exhibited lower turnover. Those beliefs strongly 
influenced the preferences for single-unit franchising over direct multi-unit franchising. 
Key executives need for control also influenced preferences for single-unit franchising at 
the individual leveL Executives exhibiting a desire for power over units preferred single-
unit franchising because it involved the franchisor maintaining a direct relationship with 
operators of each and every unit. Single-unit franchising also allowed franchisors to 
maintain greater power over franchisees and, therefore, each unit, by limiting franchisees 
to a single unit. 
2. Direct Multi-Unit over Single-Unit Franchising 
The preference for direct multi-unit franchising over single-unit franchising was 
influenced by six factors relating to the environment, firm and individual. Market size and 
growth, the growth aspirations of key decision makers, and resource constraints, 
influenced the preference for direct multi-unit franchising in a similar way. Direct multi-
unit franchising was generally preferred where levels of each factor was high. Direct 
multi-unit franchising was preferred in these situations because it facilitated more rapid 
growth, by allowing existing franchisees to establish and operate additional outlets. Direct 
multi-unit franchising was also preferred where customers were highly dispersed. One 
company, in particular indicated that direct multi-unit franchising was advantageous in 
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areas remote from the franchisor because, by allowing remote franchisees to expand, it 
reduced costs otherwise associated with the franchisor recruiting and establishing new 
franchisees for each and every geographically isolated unit. 
Finally, the preference for direct multi-unit franchising over single-unit franchising was 
also influenced by the growth aspirations of franchisees. Indeed, franchisees in companies 
adopting direct multi-unit franchising were highly desirous of, and in most cases allowed, 
additional units. In one system, the strength of franchisee desire for additional franchises 
was so great that some franchisees were prepared to leave the company if the franchisor 
did not grant them. 
3. Single-Unit over Indirect Multi-Unit Franchising 
A range of factors also contributed to the preference of single-unit franchising over 
indirect multi-unit franchising. These imperatives related solely to environmental and task 
uncertainties. Market size, growth and dispersion, and competition, each influenced the 
preference for indirect multi-unit franchising in a similar way. Each factor was related, at 
least, in part, to system-wide costs. In most instances, indirect multi-unit franchising was 
considered neither advantageous and/or viable in markets where: 1) the market size was 
small, 2) few opportunities for sustained growth existed, 3) demand was relatively 
concentrated (i.e., not highly dispersed), and 4) competition was intense. In such instances 
it was generally felt that indirect multi-unit franchising added unduly to system-wide 
costs, by duplicating franchisor-related responsibilities in different markets. In relation to 
competition, informants perceiving single-unit franchising to provide more efficient 
communication also preferred that form. Companies perceived that the efficiency of 
communication would be reduced by introducing master franchisees between franchisor 
and operating units. 
Single-unit franchising was also preferred over indirect multi-unit franchising in situations 
where demand was heterogeneous. Informants considering diverse customers felt indirect 
multi-unit franchising would make maintaining an appropriate balance of local adaptation 
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and system-wide unifonnity more difficult. It was felt that indirect multi-unit franchising 
could, due to its remuneration structure, motivate master franchisees to over-adapt units 
within their territory. Moreover, master franchisees might disregard long-term objectives 
for their own short-term gain. Single-unit franchising was also preferred for another 
reason. One company, in particular, felt that heterogeneous environments required 
effective communication. Single-unit franchising was therefore preferred because it 
maintained a direct relationship between the franchisor and operational units. 
Finally, the complexity associated with managing units also influenced preferences for 
single-unit franchising. Companies operating complex business formats wanted to ensure 
the quality of franchise recruitment, training and support. Single-unit franchising was 
preferred to indirect multi-unit franchising because it involved the franchisor perfonning 
each function centrally. It was felt that delegating such activities to indirect multi-unit 
franchising master franchisees could reduce the quality of these functions. 
4. Indirect Multi-Unit over Single-Unit Franchising 
The preference for indirect multi-unit franchising over single-unit franchising was 
influenced by seven factors. At the environmental level, market size influenced the 
preference for indirect multi-unit franchising over single-unit franchising. Where markets 
were considered very large, indirect multi-unit franchising was preferred for its capacity to 
establish and manage large numbers of units. Indirect multi-unit franchising was 
advantageous because it provided financial and managerial resources at the regional level 
that helped facilitate unit-level growth, and provide on-going management. 
Comparatively, where market size was large, single-unit franchising was regarded as too 
burdensome on franchisor resources. Indirect multi-unit franchising was also preferred 
where market growth rates were very large, due its capacity to facilitate very rapid growth. 
In a rapidly growing market, indirect multi-unit franchising was believed to be 
advantageous for two reasons. First, it helped facilitate rapid growth by providing 
financial and managerial resources at a regional level. Second, it provided regional 
managers (as area representatives and subfranchisors) that were motivated, due to the 
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indirect multi-unit franchising remuneration structure, to facilitate rapid growth in their 
territories. Competition influenced the preference for indirect multi-unit franchising 
similarly. Companies adopting indirect multi-unit franchising said high levels of 
competition motivated them to utilise forms that facilitated more rapid growth than 
competitors. Markets where demand was highly dispersed also influenced preferences for 
indirect multi-unit franchising. Companies felt the costs associated with operating single-
unit franchising, which involved centralising franchisor management, would be prohibitive 
where demand was very highly dispersed. Indirect multi-unit franchising was 
advantageous because it not only involved less cost, but also provided regional managers 
(as master franchisees) with better incentives than salary-based managers, due to its 
remuneration structure. 
Incentives influenced preferences for indirect multi-unit franchising at the individual level. 
Key decision-makers felt that, where franchisor-related management was required at the 
regional level, indirect multi-unit franchising provided regional managers with better 
incentives than single-unit franchising. Under indirect multi-unit franchising, regional 
managers, as area representatives or subfranchisors, invest in their position and are 
rewarded based on the performance of their territories. By comparison, single-unit 
franchising provides salaried regional managers paid for by the franchisor. Companies that 
preferred indirect multi-unit franchising believed that the indirect multi-unit franchising 
remuneration structure provided regional managers, as master franchisees, with better 
incentives to work diligently with unit-operators to promote growth, and maximise 
performance, than salaried regional managers paid for by the franchisor. Growth 
aspirations also influenced the preference for indirect multi-unit franchising at the 
individual level. Key decision-makers with a desire for very rapid growth preferred 
indirect multi-unit franchising for its capacity to facilitate more rapid growth than single-
unit franchising. 
Finally, firm-level resource constraints also influenced the preference for indirect multi-
unit franchising. Companies preferring indirect multi-unit franchising lacked the resources 
to institute a network of employee-based regional managers and support facilities that 
would otherwise be required with single-unit franchising. Compared to single-unit 
franchising, indirect multi-unit franchising enabled such companies to overcome financial 
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and managerial limits to growth at the regional management level. 
5. Direct Multi-Unit over Indirect Multi-Unit Franchising 
The preference for direct multi-unit franchising over indirect multi-unit franchising was 
influenced by environment and task-related factors, and factors pertaining to individual 
choice. Environmental and task-related factors included market size, dispersion and 
heterogeneity, and managerial complexity. Direct multi-unit franchising was preferred in 
instances where market size and customer dispersion were both considered insufficient for 
indirect multi-unit franchising to be advantageous and/or viable. Direct multi-unit 
franchising was also preferred where demand was relatively heterogeneous. Such 
heterogeneous environments highlighted challenges associated with balancing appropriate 
levels of standardisation with local adaptation. Direct multi-unit franchising reduced the 
challenges associated with this task by maintaining a direct franchisor-franchisee 
relationship. By contrast, indirect multi-unit franchising, due to its remunerative structure, 
could compound these challenges. The complexity of unit management also contributed to 
preferences for direct multi-unit franchising. Direct multi-unit franchising was preferred 
where units were complex to operate because, by centralising rather than delegating 
franchisor-related activities, it was considered to provide higher quality unit-level 
recruitment, training and support. 
Individual level factors, including incentives and a need for control, also contributed to 
preferences for direct multi-unit franchising. In relation to incentives, some informants 
preferring direct multi-unit franchising felt that indirect multi-unit franchising misaligned 
incentives within the franchise system. Specifically, they felt that because area 
representative and subfranchisor remuneration is based on the performance of their 
territories, such master franchisees would be inclined to possess a myopic focus on 
individual territory performance, and, variously, fail to implement and adhere to initiatives 
intended for the benefit of the system. Furthermore, indirect multi-unit franchising was 
perceived not to ensure the quality of franchise recruitment, training and support. Direct 
multi-unit franchising, by comparison, did ensure quality in each of these areas, by both 
centralising franchisor-related activities, and maintaining a direct franchisor-franchisee 
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relationship. 
The final individual-level factor, namely a need for control, contributed to the preference 
for direct multi-unit franchising in a similar way. Direct multi-unit franchising was 
preferred by those wanting to both maintain a direct franchisor-franchisee relationship, 
and direct control of franchisor-related activities. Informants preferring direct multi-unit 
franchising believed those two structural attributes helped ensure the quality of franchisor-
related activities, and reduced problems otherwise associated (if utilising indirect multi-
unit franchising) with system-wide adaptation, recruitment, training and support. 
6. Indirect Multi-Unit over Direct Multi-Unit Franchising 
Preferences for indirect multi-unit franchising over direct multi-unit franchising were 
influenced by four factors relating to the environment and individual choice. Informants 
considering markets that were very large in size, featured potential for high and sustained 
grO\vth, and/or were highly dispersed, preferred indirect multi-unit franchising. Indirect 
franchising was preferred in these instances for its capacity to facilitate and manage rapid, 
and large-scale, unit-growth, at minimal cost to the franchisor. Indirect multi-unit 
franchising reduced franchisor costs, otherwise associated with growing and managing a 
large and dispersed network of operators, by recruiting master franchisees who invested, 
in order to operate, in regional management and support positions. Indirect multi-unit 
franchising was also preferred due to its remunerative structure. Key executives, favouring 
indirect multi-unit franchising's remunerative structure, believed the form provided 
operators at both the regional management and unit-level with unrivalled motivation and 
incentives to perform diligently. Such operators were perceived to perform more diligently 






This chapter begins by summarising the most significant findings. The influence of 
environmental and task uncertainties, along with additional factors found to be important, 
on choice of franchising form, are recounted. I then discuss the implications of these 
fmdings for franchising research, organisation theory and franchising practitioners. The 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future research. 
Key Findings 
Using a case study research methodology, involving interviews, documentation and direct 
observations, this research addressed two primary research questions: 1) do environmental 
and task uncertainties influence choice of franchising forms, and 2) what other important 
factors influence choice of franchising forms? Answering these questions, my findings 
show support for the thesis that environmental and task uncertainties do influence the 
selection of franchising forms. Certainly, in as far as the types of franchising utilised by 
most companies were consistent with my propositions for the majority of factors, my 
findings suggest that environmental and task uncertainties do influence choice of 
franchising form. Importantly however, as I discuss below, the overall fit is not neat and 
conclusive. Indeed, the findings illustrate some situations where factors had a less than 
anticipated effect on franchising form choice and other situations where form choice 
occurred contrary to expectations. The research also produced other important findings. 
These include five further factors, relating more specifically to individual choice and the 
firm, found to also influence franchisor's choice of franchising forms. 
Environmental and Task Uncertainties 
My findings illustrate general support for the thesis that environmental and task 
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uncertainties influence the choice of franchising form. More specifically, this investigation 
found that environmental munificence, complexity and dynamism, and task uncertainty 
were useful concepts for helping understand and explain the utilisation of single-unit 
franchising, direct multi-unit franchising and indirect multi-unit franchising. The 
following factors were chosen and operationalised to represent each concept: demand size 
and growth ( environmental munificence), demand dispersion and heterogeneity 
(environmental complexity), intensity of rivalry (environmental dynamism) and task 
complexity (task uncertainty). Support for these factors was evidenced in as far as the 
forms utilised by companies were consistent with my propositions in the majority of cases. 
Indeed, 35 out of 42 possible company form-factor combinations (i.e., 6 factors * 7 firms) 
were at least consistent with expectations derived from the model. 
While there was general support for my propositions, and therefore the model, however, 
the explanatory power of individual factors varied. Certain factors were more important in 
franchisor decisions than others. That level of importance was evident in the logic 
underlying form choice. Indeed, the logic was more explicit and observable for some 
factors than others. The explanatory power of the factors, and the dimensions of 
environmental and task uncertainties they represent, are discussed next. 
The concept of environmental munificence influenced franchising form choice as 
expected. Market size and growth of demand were important considerations in most 
franchisor decisions. Demand size, in particular, was very important and the logic 
underlying my proposition for this factor was observable in most companies' decisions. 
Franchisors considered the size of demand in their decisions. When demand size was 
small, franchisors selected single-unit franchising, which maximises owner-involvement 
in individual units and, through a direct relationship with franchisees, preserves franchisor 
bargaining power and scale economies. Conversely, when demand size was large, 
franchisors were prepared to trade these benefits in order to facilitate the establishment 
and management of a greater number of units. 
Market growth also influenced choice of franchising form. Most companies were in fit and 
some explicitly followed the logic of my propositions. Indeed, in an environment featuring 
rapid growth in demand, companies felt constrained by single-unit franchising and chose 
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multi-unit forms to expand their chains more rapidly. I also found indirect support for my 
proposition from one of two companies that did not adopt the expected type of franchising. 
RealCo adopted a form contrary to predictions, but experienced problems and challenges 
consistent with an environmental factor - franchising type mismatch. In alignment with 
my model, those experiences contributed to RealCo's decision to re-evaluate their 
franchising type. 
I was also able to gain insight into the relative importance of demand size and growth. 
Evidence from one company (MortCo) illustrated how the influence of demand size can 
over-ride the influence of demand growth. MortCo operated in a market that grew very 
rapidly but was limited, ultimately, in size. In a growing market, MortCo found the 
capacity of indirect multi-unit franchising capacity to facilitate and manage company 
growth to be very compelling. MortCo's view was tempered greatly, however, by 
consideration given to the potential for total units. For Morteo, like many other companies 
in this investigation, that potential for total units was considered too small for indirect 
multi-unit forms, such as, area representation and subfranchising, to be viable. Logic 
suggests two circumstances where viability problems are most likely to occur. The first is 
in small markets, like New Zealand, with small populations. The second is in franchise 
systems with highly specialised product/service that, by their nature, require large 
populations to support individual units. Both circumstances limit the potential number of 
units that can be sustained. 
Environmental complexity, compnsmg demand dispersion and heterogeneity, also 
influenced franchising form choice. The geographic dispersion of demand impacted on 
franchisor decisions. When demand was highly dispersed franchisors adopted multi-unit 
over single-unit franchising to minimise recruitment and on-going management costs. In 
contrast, single-unit franchising was selected for systems when demand was less 
dispersed. That helped suggest the tasks associated with recruitment and management 
were less consequential for systems with less dispersed demand. The findings also suggest 
that demand dispersion has explanatory power over and above that provided by demand 
size and growth. ServCo illustrated that power. ServCo's founder stated that ServCo 
would seriously consider adopting single-unit franchising, instead of subfranchising, if 
their more than 550 units were located closer to franchisor headquarters. In an additional 
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area, demand dispersion also helped explain the choice between direct and indirect multi-
unit forms. The evidence suggested that indirect (versus direct) multi-unit forms were 
associated with highly dispersed (versus concentrated) demand. 
Demand heterogeneity also influenced form choice in some situations. The evidence 
suggested form choice was influenced most in situations where demand was 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. Indeed, franchisors operating in an environment 
where customer requirements varied widely related these circumstances to the difficult 
tasks of balancing local responsiveness with standardisation. Those tasks, in turn, 
necessitated having diligent unit management, franchisor control and bargaining power, 
which were more readily achievable with high levels of owner-involvement and a direct 
relationship with franchisees. Consequently, the single-unit form was preferred when 
demand heterogeneity was high. In contrast, companies operating in an environment 
featuring relatively homogeneous demand relaxed the preference for single-unit 
franchising. Finally, evidence from one company (RealCo) helped explain the choice 
between direct and indirect multi-unit forms. RealCo suggested that direct forms might be 
preferred over indirect forms when demand is heterogeneous because the franchisor 
maintains more direct influence over unit-level operations. 
Intensity of rivalry - selected to represent the third and final environmental dimension, 
environmental dynamism - had a less than expected influence on franchising form choice. 
Indeed, less than half of the companies investigated provided support for my proposition 
by adopting the expected type of franchising form. Yet while many form-factor misfits 
were apparent, according to my model, support existed for aspects of the logic underlying 
the proposition. In particular, all except one company felt that providing operators with 
motivational incentives was critically important when operating in an intensely 
competitive environment. Furthermore, one or more firms propounded the importance of 
other arguments - such as, maintaining direct relationship, in order to provide efficient co-
ordination between units for purchasing, and bargaining power, for the implementation of 
important initiatives - to decisions pertaining to organisational form choice, in a 
competitive environment Two companies operating types of franchising contrary to 
predictions were also informative. Indeed, the utilisation of subfranchising by ServCo and 
Fasteo, in intensely competitive environments, illustrated how no one factor, in isolation, 
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determined choices made between alterative types of franchising. Instead, these exceptions 
suggested that other factors could influence the importance of individual arguments that 
make up the logic underlying each proposition. For example, in a competitive 
environment, we expected that indirect multi-unit franchising forms would be inefficient 
in terms of costs, because it involved duplicating franchisor-related activities in different 
markets. Yet, for other factors, such as market size, growth and dispersion, both 
companies felt that duplication was necessary. 
The influence of the final factor, task complexity (representing task uncertainty), on form 
choice supported my proposition. The explanatory power of this variable was strong and 
all form-factor combinations were in fit with predictions. Furthermore, the influence of 
task complexity was noted by business formats featuring both very complex and simple 
task uncertainty. Corresponding with expectations, informants from cases featuring 
greater managerial complexity placed greater emphasis on form characteristics that 
engender quality recruitment, good unit-management decision-making, and quality 
training, support and monitoring. Accordingly, the most complex business formats utilised 
single-unit franchising in order to provide these characteristics. In contrast, the research 
suggested that companies operating in environments featuring relatively simple business 
formats were less constrained in their selection. For example, the franchisors of companies 
utilising subfranchising stated explicitly that they were able to operate that type of 
franchising because their business formats were so simple. It meant tasks associated with 
activities such as unit-management recruitment, training, support and monitoring were 
more easily specified and, therefore, amenable for delegation to master franchisees. 
Individual and Firm-Specific Factors 
Other important factors were found that also influenced the choice of franchising form. 
These findings illustrate the strength of the qualitative methodology employed. Indeed, 
five further important factors that influenced franchising form choice were uncovered 
during the research. These factors consisted of variables relating to individual choice and 
the firm. 
Three factors, including incentives, franchisor growth aspirations and the need for 
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franchisor control, related to individual choice. Individual choice played an important role 
in franchising decisions. My findings demonstrated that the founders and/or key personnel 
harboured different aspirations, beliefs and preferences. Such differences, in turn, 
influenced form decisions in myriad ways. 
Many decisions to franchise operations were influenced strongly by key decision-makers 
beliefs pertaining to motivation and incentives. Indeed, company founders and key 
decision-makers often believed that franchise owners ( or franchisees) invariably made 
more motivated and diligent managers of units than employees. The logic underlying that 
belief corresponded closely with the concept of moral hazard in agency theory (e.g., Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Following that theory, employee-managers were likely to exert less 
effort and consideration in managing units than franchisees because they did not bear the 
full costs associated with their behaviour (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & Ketchen, 
1999; Rubin, 1978). By contrast, owner-operating franchisees were residual claimants on 
the proceeds of the units they manage; thereby increasing the likelihood they will manage 
their units diligently (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Rubin, 1978). This belief influenced 
founders and/or key decision-makers original decision to franchise, as most were 
experienced and frustrated by the poor management of company-owned operations. 
Decision-makers perceptions of incentives also influenced the type of franchising chosen. 
Companies, whose key decision-makers clearly believed in the importance of providing 
unit managers with appropriate incentives adopted forms, such as single-unit franchising, 
area representation and subfranchising, which maximised owner-involvement at the unit-
level. Key decision-makers considerations of incentives also influenced choice of 
franchising type at the regional level. Indeed, companies that adopted indirect multi-unit 
franchising forms, such as area representation and subfranchising, were clearly influenced 
by their key decision-maker's considerations of incentives. These decision-makers 
preferred area representation or subfranchising because they made regional managers (as 
area representatives or subfranchisors) residual claimants on the performance of their 
territories. The decision-makers therefore felt area representatives and subfranchisors 
would be more motivated to perform diligently than employee-based regional managers 
paid for by the franchisor. 
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The growth aspirations of key decision-makers also strongly influenced the type of 
franchising selected. Indeed, some sought very rapid unit-growth and favoured forms such 
as, area development and subfranchising because of their capacity to achieve growth. In 
contrast, the growth aspirations of other companies were tempered by the founder's or 
other key decision maker's desire or need for control. Indeed, while some wanted to build 
system size they also demanded power and control over unit-level operations. Single-unit 
franchising was preferred for maximum controL In other instances, key executives 
selected area representation over subfranchising and sequential franchising over area 
development because they felt these types of franchising preserved more appropriate 
levels of franchisor control. 
This research also identified two firm-specific factors that influenced form choices. These 
include resource constraints and franchisee aspirations. The first, resource constraints, 
referred to financial as well as managerial resources and closely resembled the original 
concept of resource scarcity proposed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly in 1969. Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly (1969) proposed that franchising was useful for procuring much required financial 
capital, skilled management and knowledge of local conditions to chains, particularly 
during their establishment period. My findings showed that most companies cited access 
to financial capital as an imperative for franchising, but some also highlighted the 
importance of accessing managerial resources. 
The concept of resource constraints also influenced choices made between different types 
of franchising. The companies utilising subfranchising clearly illustrated that influence. 
The founders of both companies desired rapid and massive growth but had neither the 
financial or managerial resources to establish and manage a network of nationwide 
regional managers andlor unit-level operators. Subfranchising enabled both companies to 
overcome resource-based constraints to growth. 
Franchisee aspirations, the final factor, also influenced choice between different types of 
franchising. Decisions in two companies were influenced by ambitious franchisees that 
wanted additional franchises. The influence of franchisee aspirations drew these 
franchisors toward direct multi-unit franchising. In one system the ambition was coupled 
with a credible threat of defection and contributed very strongly to decisions allowing 
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franchisees to accumulate multiple units. 
Implications for Theory 
A number of important findings were uncovered during the course of the research that 
contribute to franchising research and organisation theory. I examine these in tum before 
considering the practical implications of this research. 
Franchising Research 
This work adds to existing franchising research in at least five ways. First, it contributes 
substantially to an explanation of why different types of franchising exist. Other 
researchers and writers have examined the relative advantages! disadvantages, and growth, 
management and survival issues associated with selected franchising types (e.g., Bradach, 
1995, 1997, 1998; Dant & Gundlach, 1998; Dant & Nasr, 1998; Justis & Judd, 1986; 
Kaufmann, 1992; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996, 1998; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995; Lowell, 
1991). My research extends that understanding further by not only considering the 
influence of factors related to environmental and task uncertainties, but also uncovering 
several additional factors found to contribute to decisions pertaining to franchising form. 
Additionally, my research contributes considerably by involving a more comprehensive 
set of franchising types. 
Second, this research adds to previous efforts by introducing a new theoretical perspective 
to the analysis of alternative forms. Previous research has analysed selected forms in view 
of agency theory (e.g., Kaufmann, 1992; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Kaufmann & Kim, 
1995) and resource constraints (such as, capital acquisition)(e.g., Kaufmann & Dant, 
1996). This research is unique in that it integrates and applies concepts from structural 
contingency theory, agency theory and transaction cost theory, to show how 
environmental and task uncertainties can and do influence franchising form choice. 
Third, this research increases our general understanding of different types of franchising 
arrangements, answering calls from a number of researchers (e.g., Bradach, 1995, 1997, 
1998; Dant & Gundlach, 1998; Dant & Nasr, 1998; Kaufmann, 1992; Kaufmann & Dant, 
1996, 1998; Kaufmann & Kim, 1995) to move beyond the outdated and erroneous 
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conceptualisation of franchising whereby franchisees are implicitly or explicitly assumed 
to: 1) own and operate individual units and, 2) contract directly to the franchisor. This is 
especially important given that multi-unit forms are pervasive and single-unit franchising 
might actually be an exception rather than the norm (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996, 1998). 
Further, that the differences between alternative franchising forms can give rise to such 
varied and important operational implications means that this simplistic characterisation is 
inherently problematic. 
This research demonstrates the complexity of franchising form choices and franchise 
system organisation. It illustrates how multiple forms may operate simultaneously within a 
single franchise system, and also shows how decisions pertaining to form may change 
over time due to a variety of factors, such as franchisor experience and stage of company 
or franchise development. The research also calls into question the very definitions of 
franchising forms. For example, the research shows how difficult it is to find pure 
examples of certain franchise forms in franchise organisations. This insight calls into 
question whether current theoretical definitions of franchising forms are, in fact, an over-
simplification of practice. This research also adds potential new forms, such as the 
Franchise Partnership Structure identified in SportCo, to our existing range of franchising 
definitions. 
Fourth, my research confirms that multiple perspectives are necessary to understand 
franchisor decisions pertaining to franchising form (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Kaufmann 
& Dant, 1996; Shane & Foo, 1999). Indeed no one theory or factor was sufficient to 
explain the complex choices franchisors made between different types of franchising. 
Instead, a number of theories and factors were complementary and in some cases 
interacted, to offer a more complete understanding of franchising form choice. 
Fifth and finally, this research adds to the limited number of qualitative accounts that exist 
on franchising (e.g., Bradach, 1995, 1997; Floyd & Fenwick, 1999). Such qualitative 
accounts contribute to our knowledge franchising in a number of ways. They enable the 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 
1994, p.3) by focusing on understanding the dynamics present within single settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p.534). They also allow for contextual conditions that may be highly 
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pertinent to the phenomenon under study (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Stake, 1994; 
Yin; 1994). Furthermore, as noted by Bryman (1989), the closeness to detail and 
familiarity with ongoing organisations provided by qualitative research can often prove 
more attractive to practicing managers, than the abstract variables characterised by much 
quantitative research. 
Organisation Theory 
My research contributes to extant organisation theory in at least three ways. First, it 
integrates franchising with extant theory by adopting a structural contingency perspective 
to show how organisational design criteria are shaped by specific environmental and task 
contexts. Second, it extends structural contingency theory by unpacking the notion of fit in 
terms of transaction costs. I show how each design criterion and the environmental or task 
contingency that influences it, is associated with ex ante and ex post transaction costs. I 
argue and find that organisational forms that reduce transaction costs within specific 
environmental and task contexts will be in fit with these environmental and task 
contingencies. Third, my research contributes to integrating transaction cost economics 
with extant organisation theory. There has been a long-standing debate regarding the 
proliferation of perspectives within organisation theory (Donaldson, 1995; Pfeffer, 1993, 
1997; Van Maanen, 1995a, 1995b). This debate has been accompanied by a concern over 
the dominance of economic theories of organisation such as transaction cost economics 
and agency theory (Donaldson, 1990; Pfeffer, 1993). Both transaction cost economics and 
agency theory have been criticised on several counts. Transaction cost theory has been 
particularly criticised for lacking realism and balance in its analysis of organisational 
forms (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Moran & Ghoshal, 1996). I concur with this criticism and 
propose that transaction costs exist within a broader environmental context (Granovetter, 
1985). In this research, I view transaction costs as being embedded in specific 
environmental and task contexts and operationalise these costs in terms of ex ante and ex 
post costs. Thus, the research sought to illuminate how transaction cost contingencies 
shape organisational forms. 
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Implications for Practice 
On a practical level, this research helps franchisors choose between alternative 
organisational designs in specific environmental or task contexts. It helps franchisors 
move beyond assessing the relative advantages and disadvantages of different forms by 
specifYing a range of contextual considerations and showing how different levels of each 
can affect the suitability of each form. I believe that the findings are particularly relevant 
for franchisors seeking to enter or expand into emerging economies. With the gradual 
saturation of the U.S. market, most growth for existing franchisors is likely to occur 
through international expansion. This paper offers a framework to make new and 
appropriate choices about franchising forms in new andlor small markets. 
Future Research 
While the historic view of franchising, as characterised by single-unit franchising, has 
been a useful abstraction for much historical theorising and research (Kaufmann and Kim, 
1995), the proven array and pervasiveness of alternative multi-unit forms (Grtinhagen & 
Mittelstaedt, 2000) means franchise researchers must develop both models and research 
programs which more closely reflect that diversity. 
Empirically testing whether the findings reported here apply to other franchise systems, 
expanding domestically, is a logical extension for this research. Countries with larger 
population and demand bases, like Australia, the U.K the U.S, would provide important 
comparisons for this research. Similarly, an opportunity exists to explore whether a similar 
range of factors influence the forms utilised by franchisors when entering foreign markets. 
More fundamentally, this research highlights a lack of salient basic information detailing 
the range and incidence of alternative franchising forms. To date, researchers have focused 
on the U.S. fast-food sector and typically confined their analyses to a narrow range of 
forms (e.g., Kaufmann and Dant; Kaufmann and Kim, 1995; Robicheaux, Dant & 
Kaufmann, 1994). Consequently, fertile ground exists to investigate the incidence of all 
franchising forms across both business sectors and countries. Relatedly, this research also 
suggests that the range of franchising form definitions should be considered, and that 
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further studies should allow for the possibility of new forms, such as the Franchise 
Partnership Structure, identified in Sporteo. 
Addressing these issues is critical for researchers and practioners to understand the full 
complexity of franchising, as it exists today. Furthermore, as this research demonstrates, 
an improved understanding can be critical to improving franchise system performance. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Example Franchisor Interview Guide 
Informant Background 
• Tell me about your background in the company. 
Company Background 
• Tell me about the development of the company 
• How is the franchisor structured? 
• What services do you provide to franchisees? 
Establishing Case Form 
• What type of franchising do you use? 
• How did this develop? 
• Why do you use this type of franchising? 
• If you were to franchise again, would you use the same type of franchising? 
• Would any of the other types of franchising be suited/not suited to your type of 
business? Why? 
Environmental and Task Related Factors 
Demand Size 
• How do you define the market for your products/services? 
• What is the size of the market for your products/services? 
• Has the size influenced the type of franchising that you have used? If so, how? 
• If the size of your market was larger/smaller would that have influenced the type of 
franchising you have used? If so, how? 
Demand Growth 
• Tell me about the demand for your products/services. Has it grownlbeen 
stable/declined? 
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• Has the __ in demand influenced the type of franchising that you have used? If 
so, how? 
• If the __ in demand for your products/services was larger/smaller would that 
have influenced the type of franchising you have used? If so, how? 
Demand Heterogeneity 
• Tell me about the needs and tastes of your customers. Are they similar or varied? 
Do they differ? If so, how? 
• Did the level of similarity/diversity of customer requirements influence the type of 
franchising you have used? If so, how? 
• If customer requirements were more similar/diverse, would this have changed the 
type of franchising that you have used? If so, how? 
Demand Dispersion 
• Where are your customers and units located? 
• Did the spread of customers and units influence the type of franchising you have 
used? If so, how? 
• If customers and units were more/less dispersed, would this have changed the type 
of franchising that you have used? If so, how? 
Competition 
• Tell me about your competition. How many do you have? Are they large or small, 
strong or weak? How intense is competition? 
• Did the level of competition influence the type of franchising that you have used? 
If so, how? 
• If the level of competition were morelless intense would that have changed the 
type of franchising that you have used? If so, how? 
Managerial Complexity 
• Please describe the range of products/services you offer to your customers. 
• How difficult is it for a unit manager to prepare the product/service for sale to your 
customers? 
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• Tell me about your suppliers? How many? Do unit managers deal directly with 
suppliers? 
• What separate inputs do unit managers need in order to prepare the product or 
service for sale to customers? 
• Overall, how complex are individual units to manage? 
• Did that level of managerial complexity influence the type of franchising that you 
have used? If so, how? 
• If individual units were more or less complex to manage, would that have changed 
the type of franchising that you have used? If so, how? 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Example Franchisee Interview Guide 
Informant Background 
• Please tell me about your background, and how you came to be involved with 
Establishing Franchisee Form 
• Please tell me about your franchise. 
o Do you have an exclusive territory? 
o Do you have more than one franchise? If so, how did that happen? 
o Are you allowed more than one franchise? 
o What rights and responsibilities do you have as a franchisee? 




• Tell me about the demand for your products/services. Has it grownlbeen 
stable/declined? 




• Tell me about the needs and tastes of your customers. Are they similar or varied? 
Do they differ? If so, how? 




• Tell me about competitors in your area. How many do you have? Are they large or 
small, strong or weak? How intense is competition? 
• How does that level of competition affect your business? 
Managerial Complexity 
• Please describe the range of products/services you offer to your customers. 
• How difficult is for you to prepare the product/service for sale to your customers? 
• Tell me about your suppliers? How many? Do you deal directly with suppliers? 
• What separate inputs do you need in order to prepare the product or service for sale 
to customers? 
• Overall, how complex is your unit to manage? 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Example Franchisor Transcript: A Snapshot 
Interviewer 
So once you had made the decision to franchise, did you make the move ... 
Interviewee 
... to totally franchised operators. There was and has been... well why did we franchise 
Christchurch? Christchurch is our successful operation. Why didn't we continue? But if 
you look at the business and the objectives of the business one of the crucial problems that 
we are facing was that we had the only people that were guaranteed income were the 
consultants. In other words they were absolutely guaranteed their margin and their 
overheads were covered by the company. So in other words they were in a control 
situation where the controls of the organisation were at the wrong end. You know they 
weren't employees and we didn't want to have an employ scenario and that is why it was 
developed. It was stepped up we passed on ... the objective of franchising is we pass on all 
the costs. In other words the only person who is guaranteed their section of the income is 
us and how we manage our overheads is ... 
Interviewer 
... you are still sharing it though really aren't you? 
Interviewee 
Yeah to a certain extent but the bulk of the risk is now with the franchisees as in if they 
don't get up in the morning then they don't generate income but their costs of operating 
the business are still incurred including the cost of an office and other costs they have had 
to incur themselves. If they don't generate income they are not incurring costs on us as 
such. They just avoid so it is a cost they cannot avoid. 
Interviewer 
F or sure, so there is a different feeling of productivity from when the mortgage consultants 
were 100% commission? But there is still quite a difference between being a franchisee 
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and a ... 
Interviewee 
... yeah well franchising and this is where the control side of it comes in. That is why the 
structure is set up the way it is because we need to maintain absolute control in other 
words, if we just gave the franchisee the rights to well here's the rights to a brand name go 
out and use it then we could very quickly lose control. And again why we haven't 
franchised general areas to operators is because then we are reliant on those operators 
without being able to control what they do. So that is why we put in a franchise where we 
are more heavily involved in the controls side of operating the business. 
Interviewer 
So if we look at the different types of franchising. This one here (pointing to illustration) 
is essentially what you have got. You tell me if I am wrong, but you are the franchisor and 
you have got franchisees that have only got the rights to one business and can only have 
one themselves. 
Interviewee 
Yes that's it 
Interviewer 
Now if you were to do it again would you do it the same way? 
Interviewee 
Well basically it was developed that way it was more it was more ... the reason we 
franchised as such was we wanted to attract a different type of individual. We wanted to 
attract somebody who was an independent business thinker. In other words not just 
somebody who just wanders in 9 till 5 but somebody who wanted their own business but 
needed the safety net. So I was we don't want the true entrepreneurial type but we want 
somebody who wants ownership to feel in charge therefore be motivated to work. We 
don't want the entrepreneur because they will move in too many different directions and 
we'll lose the focus of the business. So I'd say we probably stick with the same structure 
because it would again attract the individual that we wanted ... and that I think we are 
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pretty much getting what we want in the way of the individuals and being able to deliver 
that as well. So yeah. 
Interviewer 
Great. So if we move on to the next one then in this (pointing to illustration of sequential 
franchising) type of scenario the franchisees, if they are high performer, would be allowed 
to buy a second franchise, which they would have a manager which they would employ 
running [the second business], would you ... 
Interviewee 
.. ,well the structure of what we have allows us that. A franchise can be owned by an 
individual. They could be a company. That can be an individual. If they are a company 
there are restraints on that company. So in other words yes we have the opportunity for a 
franchisee to actually sell his own franchise to a company and take on another franchise 
through that company and employ someone basically. 
Interviewer 
So they could potentially have one and then have another, basically? 
Interviewee 
But there are two issues here. What makes a good franchisee and what makes a good 
franchisor. Because we would be allowing them to become a franchisor or virtually what 
you would call a subby or a franchisor imitating what we are doing. So therefore it is a 
case of we don't want to get into a case of the only way of expanding your possibilities is 
to move into a pseudo management position. It is like in the hospitals they discovered that 
doctors don't make the best managers but managers don't understand the medical 
environment enough. So you have got a situation of you need an administrator or you need 
a consultant and so we are saying well your role will always be consultant and you'll be 
writing mortgages till the day you die basically. But there is the structure. There is always 
the possibility of developing something according to the individual. 
Interviewer 
F or example, I know in Whangarei you have ... 
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Interviewee 
Name, Name & Name who own the franchise and basically employ somebody in that 
position which works welL It does work well. I mean who is to say that the individual 
concerned doesn't leave. He has the same restrictions as a franchisee. In other words he 
has entered into that contract and understands that he has exactly the same restrictions. In 
other words he cant dump out and burn the owners of the business because if he chooses to 
enter a franchise or working for that franchisee he has also quite literally chosen to 
consider that if he is going to write mortgages he can only ever write mortgages for that 
company. He can't step away and create his own business. The restraint of trade is very 
strict and some have suggested is draconian, but it has to be for the protection of the 
business. 
Interviewer 
Well it protects the people joining and it protects you and ... 
Interviewee 
. .. it also protects the people that they may sell their franchise to the others who are 
associated to it because they are buying rights to ahm to operate a very strong brand name 
and once they have developed their network they can't just change the brand name. So 
what we are saying is that if they choose to develop under the umbrella of that network 
then you know it is draconian but it is there for a reason. So personally I'm.imagining that 
in two or three years time we are going to have an issue with one or two. You can tell by 
some of the legal questions prior exactly which individuals are looking at a future outside 
the organisation. But I believe we have got very strong grounds to say well hey look put it 
in the context of what they have purchased. They were aware of draconian nature of the 
your honour why are they wanting to leave the company and become a mortgage broker 
elsewhere? Because it is the skills they have learnt with this organisation that they are 
trying to ... 
Interviewer 
Okay, so this system here (pointing to the illustration): If franchisees are successful they 
are allowed the rights to purchase another franchise. So this is on an incremental basis. So 
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if you did well with this one then we will let you have another. This one here is area 
development and I don't know if you have come across that ... 
Interviewee 
... and again if you look at the structure of what we have done the structure of what we are 
trying to do the purest structure is individuals. But there are geographic issues where in 
New Zealand. You take 80% of the market is in the three major centres so they will never 
change to be any different than what they are or if it is restructured it will be on we will 
have an area manager who will basically take a margin and we will subcontract the 
franchisor's role to somebody as opposed to franchisees right. We will more change the 
structure of the franchisor. So in other words it won't directly impact the rights or 
operations of the franchisees. If one of the franchisees is to become that individual then 
yeah. But you take that into the smaller geographical areas like Hawkes Bay or for 
arguments sake our Tauranga operation. Tauranga is very loosely structured. There is a 
franchise that has been sold in there under a special agreement. The special agreement is 
they have rights to purchase the next franchise operation but it can also be and it depends 
on how they develop the business because it is owned by a husband and wife. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so there is two people operating? 
Interviewee 
Yeah it is one franchise. One of them is operating as the franchisee the other is potentially 
the second franchisee. But we are taking this on a developmental basis. In other words 
how we physically structure any future arrangement is yet to be determined on the basis of 
what we will require. But the objective at this stage is that hey that is an area we don't 
want to have too hands on a role in that area so they have you know taken Tauranga with 
extra rights I suppose or extra possibilities of having more of an area development because 
you take the franchisor's income from an area like Tauranga and then the costs of 
servicing that as a franchisor we are better off to pass on the management of that to the 
operator in the area. 
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Interviewer 
Now this one here (pointing at an illustration of area development) that would mean ... 
Now you can consider this by region, or even country, but consider say the Christchurch 
area. You would be giving a franchisee (or area developer) the rights to the area. They 
would obviously pay for it and they would establish franchises themselves who would be 
managers operating these. These aren't owner operators. So you would give them the 
rights to establish a whole area basically, with employee managers in place. This one 
here ... 
Interviewee 
... is maintaining a franchisee operations becomes the area representative 
Interviewer 
Now the area representative attracts franchisees in an area but doesn't contract with them, 
so you would still have the opportunity to vet the franchisees and sign the agreement with 
them. So the area representative would attract but not contract with them, and then you 
could decide what ongoing support the area representative would provide. 
Interviewee 
Well pretty much well facets of each of these structures have worked into our 
organisation. This area representative basically they are a retailer of franchises. Our 
representation is through Name of Franchise Broker. So he is rewarded for that contact. So 
any contact in terms of business he is rewarded for. It is a one off commission payment. 
Interviewer 
Okay, I would say that Name of Franchise Broker is really a broker. This (area 
representation) person has the rights to provide ongoing services to the franchisee. 
Interviewee 
Oh I see so ... 
Interviewer 
So it would be like saying you give Name of Franchise Broker the rights to do what they 
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do and provide ongoing support over the longer-term. 
Interviewee 
Okay so then definitely that one and I can see that this one is with looser ties the same sort 
of thing but with greyer areas. 
Interviewer 
Okay then this one here (pointing to subfranchising illustration) you would be giving a lot 
more responsibility basically to the subfranchisor. So they would attract and also manage, 
and they also contract with, franchisees themselves. 
Interviewee 
That one (subfranchising) would never feature. These two (sequential franchising and area 
development) would never feature. This (area representation) is more of a long-term 
objective or possibility. Like I say in some of the smaller areas and as far as development 
of a current scenario then you know that is a prime site that is a no go. This one 
(sequential franchising) would never work in our operation because the focus of what we 
require is we require is that owner operator right. So in other words this one has been 
taken completely out of the operation because no we don't want that. This one (area 
representation) is a possibility from how much control do we want but we always look at 
this position as being reasonably redundant because it must be more of a hands-on role. If 
we were going to pass on rights and any form of remuneration then you would expect that 
it would be more in this frame which is okay they are still franchised rights because we 
managed the franchising rights in other words 'hey we've always got to consider that we 
have got to be able to get rid of him (area representative) equally as well as any of these 
(franchisees) but we are in a position where we would go into this position with dealing 
with this individual who deals with the others. 
Interviewer 
With this one here (area representation) you can still delegate most of the ongoing support 
but the difference is that you would still - they wouldn't actually contract with each 
franchisee individually, but provide ongoing services. So you would still have more 
control over franchisees. 
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Interviewee 
I see so this would be relinquishing control to the subfranchisees. Okay then I have got 
that wrong. It is this structure (subfranchising) that we wouldn't go to. So it is keeping this 
direct control of the franchisee that we would always want to maintain. 
Interviewer 
You would still [maintain direct control of franchisees] in this situation here (area 
representation). You can structure it... it is quite confusing, because you can structure it so 
many ways. But often what happens is that the subfranchisor is given the rights to go and 
develop the area pretty much autonomously_ However, you can still have it written in to 
the agreement that the franchisee is contracted to the subfranchisor and the franchisor, so it 
is a three way ... 
Interviewee 
... basically our current structure is this (single-unit franchising) with I think the facility to 
either operate something like this (area representation) or either or of these others (area 
representation or subfranchising). I mean we have factored in future growth right. That is 
about the franchisees contracting to Our Company Name and Our Company Name 
Limited can subcontract. The franchisees have absolutely zero rights over how the 
franchisor is structured. In other words we could actually sell the company to somebody 
else and the area would be protected under their agreements because they have trading 
rights for the company name and company rights etcetera so whoever purchased the 
company would have to satisfY the franchisees requirements for the period of their 
franchise. So we are very limited as to how we could do it but then restructuring of the 
franchisor operation can happen at any time. So we can evolve that in anyway that we 
want. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so this is interesting. So you find this one (area representation) perhaps more 
interesting than this one (subfranchising)? 
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Interviewee 
Well if you give the direct... I mean from here what I say is my own argument up until 
now is that you need to cover all future options. But we need to maintain as direct a 
control as possible to protect the brand. Now that is in today's market. I mean once we 
develop a culture around the current franchising structure then we will be in a position to 
be making modifications and restructure as required. I mean it is still very early days. It is 
still pretty much like this (single-unit franchising) happening like that but then it may be 
that the Auckland operation is subcontracted into different structures similar to something 
like one of these (area representation or subfranchising). 
Interviewer 
And if you did subcontract, you would like to have it so that the person you subcontracted 
to had some sort of remuneration tied to their performance? 
Interviewee 
Tied to the performance. Totally tied to performance. The entire remuneration is tied to 
performance from an operator perspective. The franchisor. What we have done is that we 
have structured it so franchisees can't do anything unless we say that they can but they 
can't outsource anything either. In other words it is all through the organisation. 
[Final 15 lines of interviewee's response deleted for commercial reasons]. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so we have gone through that. Another area I would like to go through is the size of 
demand for mortgage broking. Say nationally. How do you define demand? 
Interviewee 
Well basically everybody who buys a home and takes out a mortgage requires finance. So 
we take a look at the total number of sales and look at that as demand. Everybody who has 
a mortgage is looking at refinancing at some stage or topping up or making some 
alteration so that is another market. So if we look at the mortgage market and we look at 
the structure of how that was delivered seven or eight years ago right when The Founder 
was starting out nine years ago now when The Founder was starting up that was handled 
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directly with the financial institutions. Now mortgage broking and the success of Name of 
Company and other broking services around the country has been that like we predict we 
are about 33 percent of the Christchurch market. That has gone back slightly from our hey 
day but then there are a lot more competitors in the market also. So even if we are solely 
what the market is and look at the total market being or if we can grab a third share of 
every market in New Zealand by operating the way we do there is quite a large market. 
Interviewer 
So do you look at your market then in terms of the number of sales or ... 
Interviewee 
... well, we measure against sales 
Interviewer 
Volume number of house sales or ... 
Interviewee 
... yeah pretty much. So one of the major statistics that we follow is basically house sales: 
total number of sales. 
Interviewer 
Is that 90 000 a year? 
Interviewee 
Something like that (begins reading a document). 
Interviewer 
Can I ask what that publication is? 
Interviewee 
Real Estate Institute. Total New Zealand 6376 for a reasonable month, January 99. 
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Interviewer 
84 for the year? 
Interviewee 
Ah well that is a high month, so yeah I think you are closer to like 70 or 75 000 a year and 
depending on the year as well I mean we had a 30% reduction in house sales last year at 
various times of the year. 
Interviewer 
I understand it is a pretty good time for house sales 
Interviewee 
I mean you have got your peaks and your troughs. You have just got to go back to your 
basic rules of business and when you are doing figures you have got to look at the stability 
of your market and the way people are going to buy and sell properties. It is sort of like 
chocolate-coated wetas might have a very limited market or be a very niche market or be 
wiped out and people found that there were toxins in them so ... But people buy and sell 
property so the stability of the market is pretty awesome and there are some traits of the 
market that you can trace back to doomsday. A property value will double every 10 years 
and that has been traceable. So there are some basic rules you have got to think are going 
to continue based on ... 
Interviewer 
Okay, the demand size. Getting back to that. Do you so would you look at the number of 
house sales being the total market? 
Interviewee 
As our specialist area of business yeah. You have got to look at company philosophies 
now of certain companies. A lot of other companies will look at a base market and say lets 
diversifY from that and represent a whole lot more products etcetera etcetera. What we are 
saying is that we will stick to our base business and there will be peripheral activities to 
support that because unlike consumables or anything else people purchase a property. It is 
a big part of their life and it remains a big part of your life so if we remain an integral part 
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of that we are going to get the next house sale. And the average term of a mortgage has 
decreased so people are either getting out of mortgage or moving more. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so we have got a good idea of what the total market size is in terms of sales. Do you 
translate that into what that equates to in terms of... so if you say there is 90 000 house 
sales or 80 000 house sales a year ... 
Interviewee 
Our income is derived from basically the size of the mortgage. It is a percentage of the 
draw down. So our income is linked directly to that. It is not about fees or anything like 
that so we don't have to treat it as a commodity as much. But then it is also a case of you 
look at what it is that you are delivering. What services you are delivering. I mean if we 
are sitting in front of a customer there are other associated products which we can be 
presenting at the same time i.e., mortgage-related insurance which we are just entering 
into. So anything related to the mortgage that we can directly related to the mortgage then 
we will become active for other insurance services. We can farm out as well basically at a 
commission. So we can pass on the customer's details with their letter to other individuals 
who can also generate income for their organisation. 
Interviewer 
Can I ask you then if you consider the size of your market? If it was bigger would that 
make any impact on the type of franchising structure that you have here? 
Interviewee 
I think it would yeah. We would definitely move away from faster away from the 
simplistic you know (points to illustration of single-unit franchising)... If it was a case of 
structure because we are limited we have limited ourselves to the number of franchisees. 
Admittedly that is quite a high number because we do as a percentage against the 
population so it is always evolving. But we have limited that to x number so our structure 
will manage that number of individuals. But if it had been a case of well you know if we 
have got future plans which involve other individuals we may have had to go in with a 
different structure. At this stage there is not enough in mortgage broking; it is a limited 
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market, it is a readable market, so even if we maxed it out our requirement would never be 
any different ... [Further] for our current sizing we are still able to concentrate on each 
market individually, we still have the resources in our organisation to do that. If it had the 
potential of 1000s of people working for us in Auckland, then we wouldn't come up with 
the structure that we have got. I think the structure has built around the criteria. It is like 
anything else, if you alter one part ... ifyou tweak the motor the gearbox starts to whine. 
Interviewer 
So there is quite a strong relationship there, you are saying between perhaps the market 




In terms of the size of the market, is it growing, the market for mortgage broking or is ... 
Interviewee 
... it is, yes. At this stage it is growing. But again there are only so many properties for 
sale. Under current development we would have 50 years before this franchise system is 
out of date. The franchise system is licensed for 20 years so it will definitely fulfil the next 
20 years requirements unless all of a sudden there is a population explosion in New 
Zealand and the requirement for properties and property sales quadruples then it would put 
pressure on us a lot sooner. 
Interviewer 
Now are you saying that property sales are pretty constant. But then you are talking about 
people's mortgage terms decreasing. Then presumably that's an increase in the size of 
your market actually? 
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Interviewee 
It is, but then there are other factors in the market as well in that you look at the other 
businesses active in the market like our banks are our competitors. BNZ but they are 
always in a position to where they are attempting to grab back what they do. So in other 
words they are marketing activities. They are attempting to get the customer back direct. 
So they are always attempting to alter the market. Now you have got to think that we will 
never have a hundred percent of the market so we have got to make predictions that 
says. .. Our future strategic plan is based on there being a growth period still for mortgage 
broking but that has to ... the difference between owning 35 percent and 45 per cent of the 
market is you know several times your investment so to own 45 percent of the market 
costs you more or very close to what owning 35 percent of the market costs you or more if 
you look at it in percentage terms, One of the other components is that we are comfortably 
out-stripping our competitors and miles ahead of our competitors in what we can actually 
spend on our business because of the structure so and we and again part of the franchise 
structure is that we still keep our fingers in the pie quite deep so that we can actually 
control the general business growth. 
Interviewer 
So if we think about the total demand for mortgage broking it sounds to me like it is fairly 
constant. It is not actually growing at a huge rate or. .. 
Interviewee 
... no. It would be growing I would say at about 20 percent a year. I mean and that's very 
hard to read. I mean for us we are riding the quest of a wave we can't measure because the 
measurement controls are completely out of our hands. It's not an open industry. I come 
from an industry like grocery. God you know every Moro bar that went through the tills on 
the Monday morning after the week that it was sold you can measure the time of day that 
it was sold so that when you put an ad on television you can actually physically measure 
impact of advertising on a period basis. So I come from a very controlled environment 
where you can totally measure what you do to a very measurable market. So from a 
marketing perspective I came back in the days of the Wild West. It is sort of like wow this 
is cowboy material. 
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Interviewer 
There is a lot more uncertainty, less perfect information? 
Interviewee 
Yes, and a lot less understanding outside say the banks. Now they have some very good 
inside knowledge but they have the resources to develop that. So for us to develop the 
knowledge of our market would be the cost is just inhibitive. And you know so we are 
saying we have got a success formula it is working. We are milking it. Weare investing in 
the business substantially and it is working and it is increasing. So where we can get 
measurements we are attempting to measure our business. But it is just you know it is just 
hey like the surfers say if you have got a big wave you don't let go do you. They all know 
they will crash to shore one day. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so with this growth, or this continued growth say, does that effect in any way the 
type of structure ... 
Interviewee 
, .. it is pretty uncertain and where it will impact the business is that if the estimated 
growth falls short of the actual target. In other words we put ourselves on television and 
we are doing the things that drive the business along and then all of a sudden the 
exponential curve rockets. We are in a case where okay we have to constantly review what 
we need so need some very strong strategic planning for that like computers and how they 
are going to impact our business and how growth of internet activity is going to impact our 
business. Is that going to pull all of this back or is it going to or how can we as a 
marketing arm of an organisation represent better value to our franchisees by changing the 
direction of the company into those areas. 
Interviewer 
Okay, so I'm talking about total demand growth here, not just growth in your services. 
Presumably there is going to be some relationship between total demand growth and 
growth in your services. So if it did grow would that affect the type of franchising? 
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Interviewee 




I see it as a progressive scale. In other words if you go down (from single-unit franchising 
to subfranchising) it is a progressive scale. Then you would move into this (area 
representation from single-unit franchising) which is a lighter weight version of this 
(subfranchising) if you see what I mean. Whereas this (area development) the only reason 
this one is totally discounted is because we don't want people employing people. 
Interviewer 




So maybe from this (single-unit franchising) into ... 
Interviewee 
... something like those (area representation then subfranchising, but not sequential 




(Appended to the interview transcript for Sporteo's Managing Director) 
Sporteo's franchisor headquarters was located above their first and existing store. Once a 
company-owned store, it is now operated by a single-unit franchisee. The store and 
franchisor headquarters had different entrances. The entrance to headquarters came off a 
side street and led to stairs. The stairs led to a reception area. The reception area was in the 
middle of the building. A wide hallway went off in both directions. Offices led off the 
hallway in both directions. In total there were around six offices and one meeting room. 
The interior and furnishings subtlety reflected Sporteo's branding. Furnishings were all 
modern and consistent throughout the floor. Like the building, they were neither flashy nor 
cheap in appearance. The founder and staff were smartly attired in 'business casual' styled 
clothing. 
All offices, except the founder's, had computers. 
During the visit, I also met two marketing executives and the Purchasing Manager. The 
Managing Director invited me to have lunch in Sporteo's staff room. Here we joined the 
two marketing executives and the Purchasing Manager. Sandwich materials (e.g., bread, 
cheese, ham, lettuce, spreads etc) were kept in a fridge. Sandwich making appeared to be a 
shared and informal activity. 
Employees came and went from the staff room. Some business matters were discussed 
during lunch. Discussions mostly involved issues relating to co-ordination, such as who 
was doing what and when. All interactions were civil and the Managing Director appeared 
to have a consultative style with employees. 
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